

Phillips University Library
Enid, Oklahoma

13 OCT 1960

10-60 UNIVERSITY LIB
CHILDS BOX STATION
PHILLIPS UNIVERSITY
ENID OKLA

Current History

OCTOBER, 1960 FOR READING TODAY . . . FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

The American Presidency in the Last Half Century

THE GROWTH OF THE PRESIDENCY	<i>William G. Carleton</i>	193
WILSON AS PRESIDENTIAL LEADER	<i>John Wells Davidson</i>	198
HARDING'S ABDICATION FROM LEADERSHIP	<i>Sidney Warren</i>	203
COOLIDGE: REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE .	<i>Richard F. Fenno, Jr.</i>	208
HOOVER: THE PRESIDENCY IN TRANSITION . . .	<i>Victor L. Albjerg</i>	213
THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATIONS	<i>Robert E. Burke</i>	220
TRUMAN'S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP	<i>Louis W. Koenig</i>	225
EISENHOWER'S POPULAR LEADERSHIP	<i>Norman A. Graebner</i>	230

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Civil Rights Planks in the Party Platforms, 1960		237
RECEIVED AT OUR DESK: Studies in American Politics .	<i>Edward G. Janosik</i>	241
THE MONTH IN REVIEW		245

Current History

Founded in 1914 by
The New York Times

Published by
Current History, Inc.

Editor, 1943-1955:
D. G. REDMOND

OCTOBER, 1960
Volume 39 Number 230

Publisher:
DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Editor:
CAROL L. THOMPSON

Assistant Editor:
JOAN L. BARKON
Promotion Consultant:
MARY A. MEEHAN

Contributing Editors

ROSS N. BERKES
University of Southern California

SIDNEY B. FAY
Harvard University

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY
Columbia University

HANS W. GATZKE
The Johns Hopkins University

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER
University of Illinois

OSCAR HANDLIN
Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ
University of Notre Dame

HANS KOHN
City College of New York

NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY
Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE
Brandeis University

A. L. ROWSE
All Souls College, Oxford

HARRY R. RUDIN
Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williams College

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE
University of Southern California

COLSTON E. WARNE
Amherst College

Book Review Editor:
ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

85 cents a copy: 7 dollars a year. Canada 7 dollars twenty-five cents a year. Foreign including the Philippines 7 dollars seventy-five cents a year.

Coming Next Month...

RUSSIA AND CONTINUING COEXISTENCE

November, 1960

Our November, 1960 issue evaluates Russian policies and their dramatic overtones throughout the world. The year 1960 has witnessed an increase in world tension, highlighted by Premier Khrushchev's boycott of the summit talks last May. With the emphasis again on Soviet-Western competition, the obstacles to continuing coexistence appear even greater. Seven specialists assess Soviet policies and the implications for coexistence. Articles in this issue include:

SOVIET INDUSTRIAL GROWTH by *Michael T. Florinsky*, Professor of Economics, Columbia University, and author of "Towards an Understanding of the U.S.S.R.";

THE BERLIN CRISIS AND KHRUSHCHEV'S POLITICS by *Hans Kohn*, Professor of History, City College of New York, and author of "The Idea of Nationalism, A Study in Its Origins and Background";

SOVIET LABOR POLICIES by *Solomon Schwarz*, author of "Labor in the Soviet Union" and "The Jews in the U.S.S.R.";

RUSSIAN MILITARY STRENGTH: PRESENT AND POTENTIAL by *Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.*, formerly Director of the Defense Studies Program, Harvard University;

THE VITALITY OF RUSSIAN TRADE by *Robert Loring Allen*, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Oregon, and author of "Soviet Influence in Latin America";

THE STABILITY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT by *Julian Towster*, Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley; and

AGRICULTURAL PROGRESS IN RUSSIA by *Alvin Z. Rubinstein*, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, and editor of "The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union."

The November issue begins a 3-part series on Continuing Coexistence! In December the focus will shift to Communist China and Continuing Coexistence, followed in January, 1961, by a study of West Europe and Continuing Coexistence.

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Entered as second class matter May 12, 1943, at the post office at Philadelphia, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, 1960, by Current History, Inc.

Current History

Vol. 39

OCTOBER, 1960

No. 230

Our October issue reviews the growth of the American presidency during the twentieth century. Eight historians and political scientists discuss the way in which the seven presidents of the last fifty years have interpreted their office. Our introductory article notes that "The greatest expansion in all of the President's roles has taken place in this century," while warning that "The spectacular rise of the presidency during this century should not blind us to the fact that the President, far from being a dictator, actually has more responsibilities than he has powers to meet them."

The Growth of the Presidency

By WILLIAM G. CARLETON

Professor of Political Science, University of Florida

AN AMERICAN President performs many roles; he performs all of them every day; and his effectiveness in one influences his effectiveness in the others. All of the presidential roles have been tremendously widened and deepened in the twentieth century.

The President is Chief of State, and today he is expected to take the leading part in far more ceremonials, ranging from the most elevated to the most folksy, than ever before in our history.

The President is Chief Executive and Chief Administrator, and today he presides over a vast and sprawling federal administrative establishment which makes the federal establishment of the turn of the century look picayune indeed.

Flowing from his roles as chief of state, chief executive and chief administrator, the President is chief ameliorator of disaster and budding crisis. Let natural disaster strike, and he mobilizes the relief agencies; let labor-management or business dislocation threaten, and he is the first to take measures to avert a crisis. In the twentieth century a natural disaster affects more people, and crises of all kinds are much more common than they were in the nineteenth century.

During this century, the President has become chief legislator. In spite of the separation of governmental powers, he must formulate and fight for a legislative program in Congress. Indeed, today a "strong" President is one who can get his program through Congress; and when Congress adjourns without having passed much of a President's program, it is the President who is blamed, and not Congress.

The President is party leader, and he must actively take and keep control of his party. Since the President has now become chief legislator, his leadership activities within his party have greatly increased, for party leadership is one of the important weapons he uses in fighting for his program in Congress.

The President is Commander in Chief of the Armed Services in both war and peace, and during United States' participation in the two total wars of this century, the President was given an awesome authority over the nation's economy and society. Today, with national defense continuously to the fore, the President makes decisions and recommendations in this field every day which affect in vital ways almost all aspects of American life.

The President is chief director of foreign affairs, and today American responsibilities in the world have expanded enormously. Presidential decisions and recommendations in foreign policy affect defense, and both foreign policy and defense have become central to American life; in the main all other questions and issues have become derivative.

The President is chief spokesman of the nation, the voice of the people, the great teacher. The White House has become the podium and sounding board of the country. In times of immediate excitement or crisis, the President must take to the radio and television to speak to and for the nation, and increasingly the President uses all of the mass media to mold long-time opinion, attitudes and trends.

Until this century, Congress was considered to be the leading branch of the American government, as the long list of impotent, weak, dull or stuffy Presidents who followed Lincoln, and continued to Theodore Roosevelt, well illustrates. Both Walter Bagehot, writing in the late 1860's, and Woodrow Wilson, writing his *Congressional Government* in 1884, attributed the confusion in American government to the ascendancy of Congress. True, prior to the twentieth century there had been foretastes of the President's later strength. President Jefferson was an active party leader and "embodied himself in the House of Representatives." Both Jackson and Polk were vigorous executives; both cracked the whip over Congress in fighting for legislative programs; both were strong party leaders. And Lincoln, during the Civil War, carried the presidency to breath-taking heights. But these were exceptions. Most Presidents until the twentieth century were "constitutional" Presidents and allowed Congress to take the lead, sometimes even in foreign affairs.

The great expansion in all of the President's roles has taken place in this century. Let us narrate some of the high points in this development and summarize the basic reasons for this trend.

Theodore Roosevelt, coming to office in 1901, was the first *modern* President. During his administration, every one of the roles of the presidency was widened and invigorated. He openly confessed to a belief in "the strenu-

ous presidency"; he believed that it was not only the President's right but his duty "to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or the laws." Roosevelt used the White House as a pulpit from which to preach the virtues of national strength and social justice. He dramatized the presidency; and his smallest activities, and those of his family, hit the headlines of the newspapers almost every day. It was in his time that the work of the presidency so increased that the President could no longer conduct it from the White House itself; during his working hours the President moved from the White House to the executive offices which were built on the White House grounds, and the staff of the President was enlarged.

Under Taft, much progressive legislation was enacted, but this was not because of strong presidential leadership in Congress but because of a remarkable bipartisan alliance of progressive Roosevelt Republicans and progressive Bryan Democrats in Congress. President Taft took a relaxed view of his office, belittled Roosevelt's notion of a strenuous presidency, and emphasized separation of powers and the "constitutional" role of the President. But as the century wore on, it became clear that it was Roosevelt's view, and not Taft's, which was to prevail.

Woodrow Wilson, like Roosevelt, contributed vastly to the growing strength of the presidency. Wilson was a confirmed believer in party government; he thought of himself as a kind of prime minister, with his party and himself as party leader responsible for a legislative program in Congress. The enactment of a remarkably coherent body of reform, known as the New Freedom, during the first Wilson administration, is probably the most notable example in American history of directed party unity and leadership.

Wilson was the first American President to become a real world leader, and much of his difficulty came from the novelty of America's first full-scale participation in world affairs. During the war, Congress gave Wilson immense powers over the American economy and social order, powers in many respects even greater than those exercised by Lincoln during the Civil War.

Under Harding, Congress gave the Presi-

dent control over the federal administrative budget. Until this time, every federal administrative agency made its own budget estimates for the following year and gave them to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Appropriations. In 1921, Congress directed that henceforth the budget recommendations for every federal administrative agency, civil and military, must come from the President and from no other source. Detailed estimates were to be gathered and coordinated by a Director of the Budget, operating under presidential direction. Today, the Bureau of the Budget and its Director are component parts of the Executive Office of the President. Although Congress, in making appropriations, does not always follow the President's budget estimates, it usually comes close to them, and it is difficult to see how an American president today could keep even a semblance of control over the vast federal administrative machinery without his presidential budgetary powers. Many students of American government believe that the President still does not have sufficient control over his administration, and that he will not come near to having it until he is given the power to veto individual items in the appropriation bills. The governors of most of the American states now have this vital power, but Congress still withholds it from the President.

As the Coolidge administration recedes into history, it becomes clearer that Coolidge did not assume his role as ameliorator of a budding crisis, and use Treasury and Federal Reserve measures to check the speculative boom. And more and more it is being said of Hoover that he did not sufficiently use presidential leadership, presidential powers, and the agencies of government to cushion the effects of the depression and initiate recovery measures.

Franklin D. Roosevelt contributed mightily to the growth and prestige of the presidency. Most of America's leading Presidents have attained fame in history by carrying the nation through one crisis, but Roosevelt carried the nation through two—the Great Depression and World War II. Under him, federal administrative agencies proliferated as never before, enormously increasing the President's administrative responsibilities.

Roosevelt prepared a reluctant American public for war; he exercised immense authority over the war-time economy; he took a personal hand in directing both the diplomacy and grand military strategy of the war; and he was the father of the United Nations. As spokesman for the nation and great teacher, Roosevelt could take the most complex problems and give them a simple clarity, make them understandable to plain people everywhere—and, supremely important, he could do this without robbing them of content and depth, without reducing them to the propaganda stereotypes of "Big Brother." Finally, Roosevelt set up and structurally organized the Executive Office of the President, to make the presidency more manageable.

President Truman had to deal with chaotic world conditions, the collapse of whole societies, which followed World War II. He was called on to exercise powers in the world analagous to those once exercised by a Caesar Augustus, to make specific decisions of the most difficult kind; and he made them. The Truman saga has contributed to the great folk tradition that a person not much gifted above the average run of men can handle the job of President, even the awe-inspiring responsibilities it carries today. However, neither Truman nor Eisenhower had the second Roosevelt's genius for carrying extremely complicated public problems to the people and making those problems understandable. Truman failed to explain the stalemate in Korea, the nature of limited war in the nuclear age. And both Truman and Eisenhower, while including foreign economic aid in their legislative programs, never really succeeded in explaining to the American people the urgent necessity for economic and social programs in the underdeveloped areas.

President Eisenhower, during his first term, did much to relax tensions—the tensions of McCarthyism at home and the tensions of Korea and the cold war abroad. Under Eisenhower, the Executive Office of the President took its present form. This consists of the White House Office itself, with its numerous top-flight aides and assistant and special aides, and the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Security Council, and the Office

of Defense Mobilization. Eisenhower sought to simplify the President's huge tasks by operating much like a chief of staff. However, the President is much more than a chief of staff, and he must go far beyond his staff briefings if he is to get an adequate feeling for the many problems confronting him. The Eisenhower administration, by establishing a Cabinet Secretariat and other devices, also sought to arrest the decline of the President's Cabinet in power and prestige.

What forces have been at work during this century to augment the powers of the presidency? Let us summarize these.

First, Americans are now more national-minded, democratic-minded, and mass-minded than they were at the beginning of this century. Increasingly, they have come to regard the President, elected by the whole nation, as more representative of national and democratic opinion than Congress, which they have come to regard as largely representative of local interests.

Second, foreign policy and national defense have now become the major areas of public policy, and since the President must take the initiative and the ultimate responsibility in both these areas, he and his office have loomed larger. Increased power and prestige in these roles have carried over to give him more power and prestige in his other roles.

Third, industrialization, urbanization, and the centralization of the economy have forced the federal government to expand its activities. The Great Depression of the 1930's markedly accelerated a trend already well under way. All of this has resulted in the welfare state and the administrative state. The President now presides over many more departments, bureaus, boards and commissions, and the federal administrative machinery today is a giant compared with that of the first years of this century.

Fourth, legislation today, dealing as it does with highly complicated matters—involved tax systems, banking and credit, labor-management relations, the commodity and stock exchanges, agricultural price supports, hydro-electric power, atomic energy, and the intricate new armaments and weapons—is more technical, and Congress has been compelled to turn to the experts in administrative agencies for specialized assistance. Increasingly,

congressional bills are prepared in the administrative agencies, presided over by the President and staffed by appointees chosen by him directly or indirectly.

Fifth, much of the legislation now considered by Congress, dealing as it does with economic and social matters, touches individuals more frequently and in more aspects of their personal lives than it did formerly. Then too, today people are organized into powerful functional groups, and these groups are most sensitive to the effects of legislation on their numbers. Senators and Representatives must be wary, for if they alienate important groups in their localities and districts they will soon be "lame ducks." On the other hand, the President can afford to take the large view and be "courageous"; his constituency comprises the whole nation and within it are many localities, sections, groups, and interests. If the President alienates some groups and some areas, he can hold onto and even increase his popularity with other groups, other areas and in the country at large. Hence the President can stand for a comprehensive program of national legislation, with less concern for the adverse reaction of particular sections, groups and interests.

Sixth, the President has come to represent a more democratic constituency than Congress, and therefore he stands before the country with greater moral authority. Today, both houses of Congress are so constituted that they over-represent the rural areas and under-represent the growing populous urban areas. In the Senate, where every state regardless of population has two Senators, the sparsely populated and rural states continue to be over-represented. Even the House of Representatives, designed to represent population, has come to over-represent the rural areas and to under-represent the urban ones. The actual drawing of the congressional districts within a state is left to the state legislature, which in most states is flagrantly weighted in favor of the rural areas. In drawing the congressional districts, the rural-dominated legislature favors the rural areas. It is not uncommon for a congressional district in an urban area to represent from 800,000 to 900,000 people while a congressional district in a rural area represents from 200,000 to 300,000 people.

On the other hand, the manner of electing

the President gives full weight to the growing populous urban areas. The electoral vote of each state is largely based on population. Moreover, the electors of each state are elected by the whole state at large and not by districts, and hence a vote in an urban area is equal to a vote in a rural area. Thus the President is elected by a more democratic constituency than is Congress, and the growing metropolitan areas, with their labor groups and minority groups, have come to look at the President to defend and fight for their interests.

Seventh, the presidency has become the beneficiary of the rise of national journalism and the other mass media of communication in the twentieth century. A story about the President, no matter how trivial, is news in the national media because the President is the leading national personality.

The spectacular rise of the presidency during this century should not blind us to the fact that the President, far from being a dictator, actually has more responsibilities than he has powers to meet them.

The President must give leadership to a country of continental size, to the most pluralistic society in the world. A single state like New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Ohio, Illinois or California has a wider variety of economic enterprises, occupations, nationalities, races, and religions than any country of Western Europe.

The American system of government, like the American society, is highly pluralistic. There is the federal system, which distributes power between the states and the federal government. There is the separation of governmental powers—executive, legislative and judicial—within the federal government itself. A President may be checked not only by Congress but also by the federal courts, in the final analysis by the United States Supreme Court. America's two major parties, expressing the amazing pluralism and diversity of the American society, are internally divided into many factions, particularly in Congress. The President's own party in Congress is divided, and sometimes a wing of the President's party will combine with the dominant wing of the opposition party to check its own President. About one fourth of the time, too, the President is of one party

and the majority in Congress is of the other party. Members of Congress frequently defy their own party, their leaders, and their President in response to interests, groups and political machines in their own local states and districts.

The President must even bargain with Congress, congressional leaders, chairmen and ranking members of congressional committees, and autonomously-situated administrative officials for the control of his own administrative agencies. Congress creates the administrative agencies and prescribes their structural organization. In making appropriations for the agencies, Congress does not always follow the President's recommendations, and through its control of the purse, Congress sometimes determines the policies and even the personnel of some of the agencies. There are times when an agency (or a particular administrator) becomes virtually independent of the Executive by virtue of its ability to ingratiate itself with Congress (the Corps of Army Engineers), its close personal relations with a chairman of a congressional committee, its ties with a powerful pressure group (the alliance of the American Federation of Farm Bureaus with certain bureaus of the Department of Agriculture), or its hold on public opinion (the F.B.I. and J. Edgar Hoover). By turning on the white heat of congressional investigation, Congress may make the departments quail.

Not one of the great roles of the President is automatic and self-executing. To have great constitutional powers, to possess strong institutional weapons, and merely to give commands are not enough. A President must never cease being a politician; he must constantly put to use his personal skills and prestige; he must mediate, persuade, negotiate, bargain, and use the carrot and the stick every day he is in the White House.

William G. Carleton is author of *The Revolution in American Foreign Policy*, published in a revised and enlarged edition by Random House in 1957. He has written numerous articles on domestic and international politics for periodicals in the United States and overseas.

Reassessing Wilson's contribution to the presidency, this scholar asserts that in handling both domestic and foreign policy, President Woodrow Wilson had "superior equipment" and "actually was better prepared than most Presidents." "As a war leader Wilson was superb. He met the challenging problems of the first total mobilization in American history." "But it was as the spokesman of the United States and the Allies that he displayed his greatest leadership."

Wilson as Presidential Leader

By JOHN WELLS DAVIDSON

Associate Editor of The Papers of Woodrow Wilson

THE forty-eight years that have passed since the election of Woodrow Wilson to the presidency have dispelled the thickest clouds of partisan prejudice and have given Americans enough perspective to consider his place in history with some degree of objectivity. In fact the Eighty-Sixth Congress has even established a commission to make recommendations for an appropriate memorial to him. Only recently, Walter Lippmann, in an article in *Life* ranked Wilson, along with Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin D. Roosevelt, as one of the three "innovating" Presidents of the twentieth century, a type of President needed by the country today. It seems very fitting, therefore, in this presidential election year when major domestic problems are crying for solution, when our leadership in world affairs has been challenged and appears on the verge of disintegration, to re-examine the political philosophy and achievements of President Wilson.

John Wells Davidson has taught history at the University of Alabama, the University of Maryland, Yale University and Vassar College. He is the editor of *A Crossroads of Freedom: The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Woodrow Wilson*. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* is a project to publish a comprehensive edition of Wilson's letters, speeches and public papers, under the auspices of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and Princeton University.

Although Woodrow Wilson came to the presidency in 1913 with only a modicum of practical experience (measured by traditional standards), his training at home by his father, a Presbyterian minister of considerable intellectual attainments, was undoubtedly a great factor in his development. Undergraduate work at Davidson College and Princeton, a law course at the University of Virginia, and graduate work at Johns Hopkins provided a substantial foundation on which he built a teaching career that led him eventually to a professorship and the presidency at Princeton. Then came his political apprenticeship with his entry into New Jersey politics and election to the governorship.

Wilson's Background

Wilson's religion gave him a sense of responsibility toward his fellow man, a moral fiber to his character, and a confidence in his ability to make the right decisions. His studies gave him depth of understanding and perspective towards the world in which he lived. His teaching sharpened his intellect and developed his natural ability to speak clearly and forcefully. His writing improved further his facility of expression and disciplined his thinking. His Princeton presidency made him a national figure and brought him into closer contact with leaders in politics and business. His governorship introduced him to the hard realities of politics.

It is difficult to generalize about Wilson's

political philosophy of the 1885–1909 period. To describe it as basically conservative is to ignore the many nuances that foreshadow his turn to progressivism. It is true, as many writers have pointed out, that he was influenced greatly by his extensive reading in the works of Walter Bagehot and Edmund Burke, but he did not accept them uncritically. At times scholars have pictured Wilson, even during his presidency, as a staunch defender of laissez-faire principles; but as early as 1889, in *The State*, he indicated his preference for a middle ground between the extremes of socialism and laissez-faire. This refusal to become a hidebound conservative and his unwavering belief in American democracy and in the efficacy of moral principles made it comparatively easy for him to adopt the main tenets of progressivism at about the time he became active in politics.

Wilson's entry into the New Jersey gubernatorial race brought great changes in his thinking. The ferment of the progressive period undoubtedly influenced him, and his direct involvement in American politics caused him to make a careful analysis of his position on current problems. He entered the camp of the progressives and after his election as governor became a leader of "state progressivism." But it is worthy of note that even during his gubernatorial campaign he had looked towards a greater use of the powers of the federal government similar to that which he would espouse later during his presidency.

After a few successful months as a reform governor of New Jersey, Wilson seems to have regained his faith in the ability of the states to cope with the problems facing them. In June, 1911, he referred to them as "the chief battleground of economic reform" and advocated close co-operation between them and the federal government. But his success as governor was partially responsible for the shifting of his efforts for progressive reform to the national level. It made him the hope of a considerable number of Democratic progressives all over the country and contributed to his victory over Champ Clark in the contest for the Democratic presidential nomination.

The 1912 presidential campaign was one of the most important political contests in American history. President Taft, the regu-

lar Republican nominee, soon saw that he had little chance to win re-election because of the split in his party and therefore sat on the sidelines. But Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, the nominee of the newly formed Republican Progressive party, campaigned vigorously and discussed the issues of the day so intelligently and eloquently that they not only enlightened the electorate but also clarified their own thoughts.

Wilson's most effective weapon employed during the campaign was his charge that Roosevelt's proposal to solve the trust problem by regulating monopoly would perpetuate the favored position of special interests and would have the effect of legalizing monopoly. On the other hand, he himself advocated a buttressing of the Sherman Antitrust Act by a law to regulate competition, and at the same time denied Roosevelt's charge that he stood for an old-fashioned Jeffersonianism opposed to the use of the powers of the federal government in the interest of the people.

Contrary to some accounts of the campaign, Wilson praised rather than condemned Roosevelt's social justice program though he did object to certain parts of it. Although he would not go so far as Roosevelt in the use of federal powers for social justice, he was certainly conscious of social problems and was thinking about how they should be solved.

In November, Wilson emerged from the campaign of 1912 with a reform program for the revitalization of American democracy and a re-adjustment of the American economy. The political philosophy back of this program was in part a product of Wilson's experience as student, teacher, university president and governor but it had been given definite shape and dynamic qualities in the crucible of the campaign. The challenging nature of his opponent, Roosevelt, and the advice of the great legal mind of Louis D. Brandeis contributed much to Wilson's own thinking and in the end produced "The New Freedom," in the main a highly viable program of reform.

Wilson's First Term

After his inauguration in 1913, Wilson lost no time in making full use of the powers and prestige of the presidency. He caused

considerable astonishment and consternation by breaking traditions and adopting new methods. Washington society gasped when he cancelled the traditional inaugural ball. And even members of his own party became uneasy when he revived a practice abandoned by Jefferson and delivered in person a special tariff message to a joint meeting of the two houses of Congress. On more than one occasion he even went to the Capitol and used the President's room there to confer with congressmen about important bills, something that had not been done since Lincoln's time. To him also should go the credit of establishing the modern presidential press conference, but his conferences lacked the easy informality and the give-and-take that characterized those held by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Wilson did not depend entirely upon new methods to attain his objectives. He sought and gained the confidence of the regular Democratic leaders, including both conservatives and progressives, who had become chairmen of important congressional committees, and with their help secured enactment of New Freedom legislation. He also approved the use of the caucus to rally the full strength of the Democratic party behind his program. Although at first he sought to supervise personally the distribution of party patronage, he eventually heeded the advice of seasoned politicians and turned it over for the most part to his private secretary, Joseph Tumulty, and Postmaster General Albert Burleson, who used it on occasions to reinforce party ties.

With a political skill that amazed veteran politicians, Wilson drove Congress so unmercifully that during his first two years in office he obtained enactment of the Underwood Tariff Act, the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Antitrust Act. In 1916, he secured the passage of bills which Arthur S. Link has called "advanced progressive" measures: the Child Labor Act, the Adamson Labor Act, and the Federal Farm Loan Act. Thus Wilson went very far towards fulfilling his campaign promises of 1912.

Considered as a whole, the nature of domestic legislation advocated by Wilson during his first administration indicates a tendency on his part to rely more and more on

the federal government as an instrument of progressive reform. Once he had the vantage point of the presidency, he saw more clearly the nation's needs and the means that should be employed to operate effectively the complicated governmental machinery. In 1916, therefore, he merely set out on a course that he had considered necessary if the states should prove to be ineffective instruments of reform. The ease with which Wilson extended his program of 1912 to include the "advanced progressive" measures of 1916 is proof of the viability of the New Freedom.

What Wilson seems to have been moving towards from 1910 to 1916 was the setting up of the federal government as a kind of third force which would keep a balance between big business and organized labor. He accepted big business as inevitable, even desirable, if operated in accord with fair practices. On the other hand, he recognized labor's right to organize and to be exempt from certain repressive measures under cover of the law but opposed an absolute exemption of labor unions from prosecution under the antitrust laws. In other words, Wilson's ideas on the subject are comparable to John Kenneth Galbraith's belief that the "major peacetime function of the federal government" since 1933 has been the support of "countervailing power."

The legislative program enacted under Wilson was a substantial achievement. It laid the groundwork for the New Deal. Whether one argues that the New Deal was a direct descendant of the New Freedom or a distant relative, it is difficult to imagine Americans accepting the advanced ideas of Roosevelt and his advisers without first going through some sort of conditioning stage such as the New Freedom. There is even some indication that Wilson himself envisaged extending his New Freedom and would have done so but for the disruptive action of the European war and America's involvement. This much certainly seems clear: if performance merits recognition, Wilson deserved a second term as President on the basis of his New Freedom legislation.

In the campaign of 1916 Wilson was in a different position. He had a record to defend, but he also had the problem of attending to his duties during one of the most critical and trying periods in American history.

Part of his bid for re-election was based on his economic and social reforms, and there is considerable evidence to indicate that his record on this score may have carried enough weight with Republican progressives to give him the margin of victory.

Wilson as Peace-Maker

Much greater emphasis, however, has been given to the peace issue as the major factor in Wilson's re-election—the use by Wilson's followers of the slogan “He kept us out of war.” No conclusive evidence has yet been uncovered to show that Wilson himself approved the use of this slogan, but there is considerable evidence that it was objectionable to him. Regardless of how one looks at the campaign, the image that Wilson presented to the country was that of a dynamic figure who was willing to take definite stands on the questions before the country. In this respect, he stood out in contrast to his able opponent, Charles Evans Hughes, who let himself be so hamstrung by certain elements in his party that he appeared at best a well-intentioned, indecisive candidate.

When we turn to consider Wilson's record in foreign affairs, we move into an area much more controversial than his domestic policies. The generally accepted view that he was poorly prepared for such a task is only relatively true in comparison with his superior equipment for other problems. He actually was better prepared than most Presidents. Quite correctly, Arthur S. Link has pointed out that Wilson possessed “a coherent and deeply rooted philosophy about the nature and ends of government, a philosophy that could be readily translated into the basis of a foreign policy.”

The revisionist historians of the 1930's were highly critical of Wilson for allowing the country to be drawn into World War I and charged him with favoring the Allies for economic reasons. Today, however, the perspective of history has revealed the sincerity of his efforts to keep out of war: first, by strict observance of international law; then, by mediation; and finally, by proposing the establishment of a league of nations. Ernest May's recent scholarly work, to a large extent based on materials of the German foreign office, proves conclusively that Wilson could have done nothing to reverse the decision of

the German High Command, which gained control of the German government late in 1916, from making the last desperate try to knock Britain out of the war by unrestricted submarine warfare.

As a war leader Wilson was superb. He met the challenging problems of the first total mobilization in American history. Under his direction, the United States produced supplies for itself and the Allies and sent two million American soldiers to France. But it was as the spokesman of the United States and the Allies that he displayed his greatest leadership. Charles Seymour has said very aptly that Wilson's speech on the Fourteen Points “forged a weapon of psychological warfare at the same time that he drafted a charter of peace.” And when the Central Powers collapsed, both victors and vanquished turned their faces towards him, all recognizing him as the leader who held the key to the future.

Soon afterwards Wilson made his greatest decision—to participate personally in the making of a treaty which he hoped would bring peace to the world. Wilson's decision to go to Paris as the head of the American delegation is comprehensible when considered in terms of his beliefs and character. His conviction that the President by virtue of his office possesses unrestricted initiative powers for the negotiation of treaties must have been an important factor in his rejection of diplomacy by cable when matters of such great pith and moment were at stake. His faith in the persuasive powers of the spoken word, which he had used effectively in American politics, made him want to meet the European statesmen face to face at the peace table. And most important of all, he believed his personal appearance at the conference would make less likely the sidetracking of the League for a hastily drawn peace treaty.

There is, however, much force to the argument that one of Wilson's greatest mistakes in his peacemaking was his failure to adopt a bipartisan approach by the appointment of an able active Republican to the American delegation. Understandably, he would have been handicapped by the presence of anyone as partisan or as personally antagonistic as Senator Lodge. But the appointment either of former President Taft or of Elihu Root;

both of whom were capable of rising above partisan and personal differences, would have answered many of the objections of the less obdurate of the Republican opposition.

For psychological warfare Wilson's Fourteen Points were an excellent weapon, but as a blueprint for a peace treaty they left much to be desired. Hajo Holborn has paid tribute to the greatness of Wilson in projecting the American political tradition "ably and eloquently into a liberal international faith." But Holborn has shown that at the same time "The weakness of Wilson's international program lay in the generality of many of its tenets and in the contradictory nature of some of them." Despite these and other inherent weaknesses in the Fourteen Points, Wilson did succeed in accomplishing much by going to the Peace Conference.

Contrary to the myth created by the publication in 1920 of John Maynard Keynes' *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, Wilson's colleagues in the Council of Four did not "bamboozle" him. The perspective of some 40 years and the availability of new source material (particularly Paul Mantoux's notes on the meeting of the Council of Four) have shown that Wilson handled himself well both in the open and in the secret meetings of the Paris Peace Conference; and that Keynes' portrait of him is nothing more than what Charles Seymour has called it—"a fantastic caricature."

On the whole, the Versailles Treaty was a settlement on which the leading nations of the world could have based an effective program for world peace. Its terms were severe but not unreasonably harsh, as were those of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty that Germany had imposed on Russia. At least some of its faults might have been corrected if the great powers in the League had made full use of Article XIX, which Wilson regarded as the safety valve of the treaty. Not the strictness of its terms, but the indecisive way in which it was applied during the postwar years was the chief reason for its eventual failure.

A number of very able and reputable historians have charged Wilson with pursuing a rigid and uncompromising policy in his fight for ratification of the Versailles Treaty by the Senate, and have maintained that this resulted in the killing of his own child. But this charge cannot be proved beyond a rea-

sonable doubt. In fairness to Wilson, it should be noted that he did advocate and secure changes in the treaty, as late as March, 1919, along the lines recommended by former President Taft. But on his return from Paris in July, he refused to accept any further reservations that would amount to changes in the text of the treaty, and he feared that acceptance of any of the Lodge reservations would only encourage the Senator from Massachusetts to make even greater demands. If Wilson should receive blame for the Senate's rejection of the Treaty, Lodge merits even more for his cynical insistence on reservations to a treaty that he wanted under no conditions.

Wilson's three Republican successors of the 1920's interpreted the presidential election of 1920 as a complete repudiation of his internationalism and scrupulously avoided any open cooperation with the League until the Manchurian crisis of 1932. Even Franklin D. Roosevelt during his presidency constantly strove to avoid what he regarded to be the mistakes of a man whom he admired and under whom he had served as assistant secretary of the Navy. His adoption of a bipartisan policy during the World War II period and his favoring the insertion of a provision for the use of the veto into the charter of the United Nations are examples of these efforts to profit from Wilson's mistakes.

Considered in the context of world history, Wilson's greatest contribution was his setting up of a goal for mankind—peace through collective security—towards which Roosevelt himself was turning in the last months of his life. His success in joining the Covenant of the League to the Versailles Treaty resulted in a commitment that the world has not yet succeeded in forgetting entirely even though the League did not prevent a second world war and became a war casualty itself. The nations of the world returned to the idea of collective security when they organized the United Nations, which has served to keep the channels of diplomacy open although as yet it has not been able to make collective security work effectively for peace. If the world is ever to advance from a state of cold war maintained by a balance of fear and eliminate the threat of total nuclear war, it will almost inevitably turn in the direction Woodrow Wilson pointed in 1919.

There is obviously no way to whitewash Harding's administration. As the twenty-ninth President declared himself, "I am not fit for this office and should never have been here." More shocking, according to Sidney Warren, than the corruption that prevailed during Harding's term "was the apathy of the public or its perverted attitude towards the scandals." "... The harshest condemnation was not for the men who had dragged the nation down into the nadir of perfidy, but for those who had exposed them."

Harding's Abdication from Leadership

By SIDNEY WARREN

Professor of History and Political Science, California Western University

COMMENTING on the election results of 1920, Mark Sullivan hardly exaggerated when he wrote that Woodrow Wilson had become "the symbol of the exaltation that turned sour, personification of the rapture that had now become gall, and sacrificial whipping boy to the present bitterness." It was obvious to those who knew how to take a barometric reading of the nation's climate of opinion that the American people had grown weary of Wilsonianism. The Republicans were confident that it was once again their turn at the helm; the question was whom could they select to do the apparent steering.

As early as February—four months before

Sidney Warren was Visiting Fulbright Professor of American History at the University of Durham (England) in 1949-1950; the following year he was Visiting Professor of American History at the University of Glasgow (Scotland). Among his published works are *American Freethought* and *Farthest Frontier: The Pacific Northwest*. He is chairman of the political science department at California Western University. Presently, he is preparing a study of the twentieth century President in his new role as world leader under a grant-in-aid from the American Council of Learned Societies.

the Republican convention—Harry Daugherty of Ohio had predicted a deadlock on the selection of a candidate, and he named the man whom the inner circle would choose as a compromise. He was right on both counts. Governor Frank O. Lowden and General Leonard Wood battled to a stalemate. That night about 15 or 20 of the Old Guard met in a hotel room to resolve the issue. Shortly after 2:00 A.M., weary, bleary-eyed, and by then almost indifferent, they decided on Warren G. Harding, Senator from Ohio. The next day, on the tenth ballot, the convention ratified their selection.

The story of the smoke-filled room at the Blackstone Hotel in Chicago with its gathering of Senators and party bigwigs playing the role of king-makers soon became a political legend. This, however, was less a conspiracy or plot to seduce the American public than the selection of a man embodying the personal qualities and conservative mentality which they believed would appeal to the people, while at the same time serving their own purposes. Harding reflected to perfection the conservatism of the delegates. The convention was dominated by men representing financial and industrial interests who were prepared to pay for whatever they wanted the government to do.

On the other side of the fence, the Democratic convention held in San Francisco late in June was an untidy, limping affair. Party solidarity had been badly frayed by the League fight and the organization was fall-

ing apart. Wilson, physically and emotionally ill, was not only incapable of providing leadership, but complicated the situation for would-be aspirants by his desire for a third-term nomination. The contest finally was fought between William G. McAdoo, the President's son-in-law and former Secretary of the Treasury (who, however, did not have Wilson's backing) and James M. Cox of Ohio, favorite of the bosses because he was against prohibition and was not associated with the unpopular incumbent administration. Cox won on the forty-fourth ballot.

The 1920 Campaign

Wilson had hoped that the election would be a "solemn referendum" on the League, and Cox promised that if he were elected the United States would join the organization as soon as possible after his inauguration. Both misread the public mind. During the campaign Cox battered valiantly but futilely against the wall of indifference the people had erected about themselves on the question of the League. The Republican platform straddled the issue, criticizing the Covenant but pledging to work for "an international association of nations."

Harding was nicely vague and equivocal. He never attempted to clear up the ambiguity of a party divided between isolationists and internationalists: leading Republicans such as Hoover, Hughes, and Root argued that his election was the surest way to bring the United States into the League with safeguards; isolationists such as Borah and Johnson stated with equal vigor that his election was the surest way of keeping us out of the League.

The Senator from Ohio was an impeccable candidate. From his front porch Harding made dignified, conciliatory and pointless speeches. Even the friendly *The World's Work*, a leading journal of opinion of the day, declared in its November, 1920, issue that "The Senator's speeches may be properly criticized for their vagueness, for their lack of original thought, for their occasionally conflicting character. . . ." However, it went on, "The front porch is a far safer campaign forum than the tail end of a Pullman car" and the presidential candidates who had remained quietly at home won out over those who went barnstorming over the country.

Cox, who wore himself out traveling up and down the land, must at least partially have agreed as to the virtue of front porch campaigns when the election returns came in. The nation turned to Harding to the tune of 16 million votes to Cox's 9 million. The man of the hour won the electoral votes in 37 out of the 48 states, and for the first time in history Tennessee went Republican, as did every county along the entire West coast.

A number of other factors contributed to the defeat of the Democrats. On the domestic front wheat farmers denounced Wilson for removing the price supports and for discriminating in favor of the Southern cotton farmers. Labor was critical because of runaway prices; management flayed him for his alleged coddling of labor. On the international front his policies were completely repudiated. There were those who felt that the peace was too harsh; others criticized it as too lenient. Some attacked Wilson for betraying internationalism at Versailles, while others upbraided him for surrendering the national interest. In the final analysis, however, the nation wanted, as Harding so aptly put it, "not heroics but healing, not nostrums but normalcy, not revolutions but restoration, not surgery but serenity."

Harding's Background

The twenty-ninth President of the United States has been called by one writer "Fate's tragic mannikin" and most of his life he was manipulated by people who used him for their own ends. Warren G. Harding's strongest qualification—and his personal misfortune—was that he looked like a President. He was handsome, gray-haired and dignified; Daugherty is said to have remarked when he saw him for the first time, "Gee, what a President he'd make." And he proceeded to make one of the men who could have contentedly lived out his life in the tree-shaded little town of Marion, in the comfortable routine of the Saturday night poker game, church the next morning, playing bridge on some well-tended lawn, or the tuba in the town band. Good-natured, easy going, with an indiscriminate trust in people and a compulsive need for their affection, his father had once told him, "It's a good thing you weren't born a girl because you'd be in a family way all the time. You can't say no."

Harding's formal education consisted of three years in high school. Although he served as a state senator, lieutenant-governor, and United States Senator, he was never troubled by ideas. With an unshakable belief that the Republican party was the only one fit to rule and in the infallible political wisdom of the Old Guard, he had been a strict party man and had always voted as directed.

His view of the presidency was more applicable to a small-town mayor: he thought the Chief Executive should be the guest of honor at conferences, cornerstone layings, and ceremonies opening public buildings. He considered the cabinet members executive heads of departments with the President in the role of presiding officer.

Harding's cabinet was a conglomeration of the wise, the inept, the self-seeking. Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, J. W. Weeks, Secretary of War, and Henry C. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, were to serve with distinction or competence. The scheming and unscrupulous oil man, Albert B. Fall, was appointed Secretary of the Interior, and the President's Svengali, Harry M. Daugherty, his Attorney General. Andrew W. Mellon, the multi-millionaire aluminum king, was made Secretary of the Treasury.

An administration brought to power by business interests was naturally subservient to them and carried out their policies. Mellon persuaded Harding to support the proposal to reduce income and inheritance taxes. In 1921, he maneuvered Congress into repealing the excess profits tax, but a band of Senate progressives blocked his efforts to cut taxes on high incomes. On the positive side there was considerable reform in fiscal policy, including a national budget which up until that time had not existed, and the appointment of the first Director of the Budget.

Pro-Business and Anti-Union

For labor the record was bleak. A determined campaign was launched in the post-war years to smash whatever unions existed and maintain the open shop. In 1920, the president of Bethlehem Steel announced that he would refuse to recognize a union even if 95 per cent of the workers belonged to it.

When 400,000 railroad shopmen struck after a wage slash ordered by the Railroad Labor Board, Attorney General Daugherty obtained a sweeping injunction which broke the strike.

Following the lead of the administration the Supreme Court in a series of decisions upheld the yellow-dog contract, permitted a union to be sued under the anti-trust laws, drastically limited picketing, and declared boycotts illegal. It also strangled every effort at social reform in other decisions such as the one declaring the Child Labor Act of 1916 unconstitutional, nullified the minimum wage law for women and a new law levying a tax on products manufactured by children. Beamed the *Wall Street Journal*, "Never before, here or anywhere else has a government been so completely fused with business."

Harding's Foreign Policy

In foreign affairs the administration made strenuous efforts to resist entanglements with the rest of the world. On August 25, 1921, Congress by joint resolution declared an end to the state of war between the United States and Germany, and in October the Senate ratified separate treaties of peace with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The joint resolution reserved for the nation any rights secured by the war, the armistice, or the Treaty of Versailles, but assumed none of the obligations under the Paris peace settlement. This, it was hoped, would tidy up things and the country could then quietly retire behind its oceans.

Harding's overwhelming victory at the polls was taken as a mandate against the League, and in a speech after he became President, he declared that the League issue was as dead as slavery. The administration attitude was underscored by the action of a State Department official who for months refused even to open mail from the League secretariat. But the world was even then too small and the nations too dependent on one another for strict isolationism to be either feasible or possible.

No sooner had World War I ended than the leading powers began plans for rearmament. Relations between the United States and Japan had become strained during the Peace Conference, and a number of factors made the situation worse during the next

few years. War talk became alarmingly prevalent on both sides of the Pacific. Americans also saw a serious threat in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Most ominous of all for peace, a naval race among the United States, Great Britain, and Japan loomed. Something had to be done and quickly.

The answer was the Washington Naval Conference, probably the most notable achievement of the Harding administration, though it was initiated by the isolationist Senator Borah as a means of bringing about disarmament outside the League. Harding had opposed the idea at first, but under pressure at home and abroad he capitulated and invited nine European and Asiatic powers to discuss disarmament and Far Eastern problems. On November 12, 1921, the first plenary session convened, and after Secretary of State Hughes, who was also chairman, delivered the conventional introduction, it became his show entirely.

The audience, which had settled back comfortably to listen to the customary opening day platitudes, was suddenly jolted upright by a statement unique and startling in the extreme to a body that had convened to talk about disarmament—that the only way to disarm was to disarm. Hughes then calmly proceeded to junk almost all the existing navies. With completely undiplomatic audacity he proposed that the United States, Great Britain and Japan scrap a total of 66 ships amounting to 1.87 million tons. One British expert commented that “Secretary Hughes sank in thirty-five minutes more ships than all the admirals of the world have sunk in a cycle of centuries.”

After interminable haggling, the Conference the following year adopted a five-power naval treaty establishing a ratio in capital ships of 5:5:3:1.7:1.7 for the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a member of the United States delegation, nullified the Anglo-Japanese alliance with his four-power treaty guaranteeing the status quo in the Pacific. A nine-power treaty pledged the signatories to guarantee the territorial, administrative and political integrity of China; in other words, to prevent Japanese expansion in the Far East.

In retrospect, the United States bartered away a good deal, notably fortification of

our island bases. And we transferred the burden of maintaining the open door policy to others who, when the chips were down within a decade, proved unreliable. More important, we surrendered, or more accurately, abdicated our position of naval superiority for the sake of a system of collective security in the Pacific which broke down at the first major challenge. But these are post hoc observations.

At the time, substantial concessions were wrested from Japan. Shantung was returned to China; Japan promised to withdraw her troops from Siberia, return North Sakhaland to Russia, abandon the most extreme of the 15 demands upon China, annul the Lansing-Ishi agreement, and concede to the United States cable rights upon the island of Yap. The results of the Conference were almost unanimously approved in the United States; only a few die-hard isolationist and chauvinist newspapers protested. By overwhelming vote of both parties, the Senate approved the batch of treaties.

Harding—and the nation—had been fortunate in the choice of a man like Hughes, but in other areas of the administration his selection of department heads proved to be disastrous. William Allen White, a frequent visitor to the White House, felt that the President’s “heart was right and his courage fairly good, but his confusion lay in his lack of moral perceptions. He did not know where to place his loyalty.” The Chief Executive had placed in offices of great trust two depraved, petty politicians. Harry Daugherty, his attorney general, presided over an ill-assorted coterie of plunderers who operated from his apartment in the Wardman Park Hotel which he shared with his housekeeper and confidant, Jesse Smith. In turn, Smith presided over the headquarters of the Ohio gang in a little green house on K Street, which was part brothel, part speakeasy. Here a bonanza business went on in selling immunities from government prosecution of various kinds, handing out government appointments, pardons and paroles for criminals, with Smith acting as liaison to Daugherty’s Justice Department.

Of Albert B. Fall, Secretary of the Interior, White commented that he looked like a patent medicine vendor—“a cheap, obvious faker.” Fall, however, did not operate on a

beggarly scale. In 1921, he induced the Secretary of the Navy to transfer the invaluable naval oil reserves at Teapot Dome, Wyoming, and Elk Hills, California, to the Interior Department, and persuaded Harding to sign the secret order for the transfer. Then he proceeded to lease the reserves to oil promoters after receiving bribes amounting to \$125,000.

Scandal and Corruption

By the spring of 1923, some details of the tricky transaction had leaked out and ugly rumors of corruption and worse had begun to spread around Washington. Charles R. Forbes, head of the Veterans Bureau, suddenly resigned his post. It was later revealed that he had embezzled some \$250 million from the government in connection with sites and buildings for veterans' hospitals. Then in May Jesse Smith was found dead of a gunshot wound in the apartment he shared with Daugherty, and the verdict was suicide.

The abyss had begun to open for Harding. When he left that summer for a trip to Alaska he remarked to an intimate, "This White House is a prison. I can't get away from the men who dog my footsteps." Throughout the journey the President was restless, compulsively playing bridge from breakfast to midnight. Shortly after leaving Alaska he received a long message from Washington. After that he kept asking Herbert Hoover, whom he had invited along as a bridge companion, what a President should do if he discovered scandals in his administration.

When the party reached the Pacific Northwest, Harding looked worn and exhausted. He became ill while on board ship, from bad crabmeat it was said, though no fish was found on the menu, and within two days he was dead. Later, when the scandals were exposed, it was rumored that he had committed suicide, a not unnatural surmise about a weak, kindly man in a vital position who was the center of a nest of pirates disguised as friends.

The full disclosures of the sordid and shameful web of corruption, with which the phrase, "the Ohio gang," was an ignominious simile, became public property after Harding's death. By the end of the decade the toll of the leading figures in the administration

was two suicides (Charles Kramer, Forbes' legal adviser also took his own life), the conviction and sentencing of Charles Forbes, Thomas W. Miller, the Alien Property Custodian, and Albert Fall, the only cabinet member in history to be sent to jail. Harry Daugherty, the king maker, was forced by Coolidge to resign.

Perhaps even more odious than the corruption was the apathy of the public or its perverted attitude towards the scandals. Senator Walsh who led the investigation of the infamous oil deals and Senator Wheeler who investigated the Department of Justice were attacked by leading newspapers as "scandal mongers," "mud gunners," "assassins of character." The next administration, with the aid of the press, so adroitly belittled the venalities that the harshest condemnation was not for the men who had dragged the nation down into the nadir of perfidy, but for those who had exposed them.

For its depressing record of graft and corruption, for the low tone of public morals, the Harding administration even surpassed that of Grant. The two Presidents were also alike in being unwitting tools in the hands of unscrupulous friends. Harding had estimated himself correctly when he told Nicholas Murray Butler, "I am not fit for this office and should never have been here." Before the election a contemporary publication wrote that

The first impression gained is that Senator Harding, whatever may be his defects as a world statesman, is an exceedingly courteous gentleman. If he is elected, good nature, both to political friends and to political enemies, will once more become the prevailing note in the White House.

"Good nature" and good cheer and conviviality, too, did indeed prevail. Alice Roosevelt Longworth, wife of the Speaker of the House, describes a typical scene in the study of the White House—the President surrounded by cronies, cards and poker chips on the table, whiskey and tall glasses on the trays, the air thick with cigar smoke. While Harding gambled and drank and played the stock market (he died owing a brokerage house \$180,000), the affairs of the nation were in the hands of other men. His abdication of leadership was almost complete. The

(Continued on page 219)

Calvin Coolidge's emphasis on good fellowship and his lack of initiative were motivated, according to this specialist, by "...his general aversion to change ...and his great reluctance to make any decisions at all unless absolutely forced to do so." He gave the presidency a weak interpretation, limiting "...the proper range of his legislative and administrative activity. ...[and thus] removing him[self] from the center of conflict."

Coolidge: Representative of the People

By RICHARD F. FENNO, JR.

Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester

THE PRESIDENT of the United States is both a representative symbol of our national unity and an active participant in the making of national policy. In the first role, he speaks *for* the country, reflecting its prevailing sentiments and interpreting its mood or purpose. He becomes the visible embodiment of the American people, living on a plane above the nation's internal controversies.

In playing the second role, the President speaks *to* the country, altering public opinion, rallying the support of his party or urging the legislature—all in the direction of programs to which he is committed. In this role he is a partisan contender for particular policies, an active leader necessarily immersed in political conflict. Calvin Coolidge was eminently successful in fulfilling his function as a representative symbol and notoriously impotent as a policy maker for the na-

tion. And, since the label of greatness has been given only to those Presidents who have blended the two aspects of the job, Coolidge has been ranked among the less distinguished occupants of his office.

Calvin Coolidge was successful as a national symbol because his personality and his program were in substantial harmony with the national mood of the mid 1920's. In the aftermath of World War I, there was a widespread desire for tranquility and stability; in the wake of the Teapot Dome scandals, there was a desire for probity, temperance and faithfulness to duty; in the presence of unprecedented prosperity, there was a call for the continued application of fundamental business virtues—of frugality, hard work and common sense. These were Coolidge's virtues, all of them, and he became, for the majority of Americans in the 1920's "the essence of the nation's personality." The personal qualities which Coolidge lacked were precisely the ones for which there was scant demand at the time—vision, imaginativeness, creativity or devotion to social causes. The period between Wilsonian progressivism and the New Deal has been called by some historians a time of "tired radicalism." With the exception of farmers and a few urban progressives, no substantial group could be found to follow a magnetic personality crusading for a new morality or for social change.

The fact that his personality suited the times does not, by itself, explain the success-

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., teaches courses in American national government. He is the author of *The President's Cabinet* (1959) and editor of *The Yalta Conference* (1956). At present, he is writing a book on executive-legislative relations in the appropriations process, under a grant from the Committee on Political Behavior of the Social Science Research Council.

ful popularization of Coolidge as a symbol. By merely being President, of course, a man becomes the focal point of national attention. But some Presidents have a greater talent for capitalizing on this condition than others. Coolidge was one of these.

Though we may tend to forget it, Coolidge was one of the most successful politicians ever to occupy the White House. His election as President in his own right in 1924 was the orderly outcome of a political career in which he had been chosen successively as city councilman, state representative, mayor, state senator, president of the state senate, lieutenant governor, governor and vice-president. In each case his electioneering technique had been to avoid controversial issues, to speak in generalities about the things most people agreed upon, and thus to identify himself as a spokesman for the broadest public interest. He had long been known as a public figure without enemies.

In addition, Coolidge ranked second to none among modern Presidents in his appreciation of the advantages of good public relations.¹ He made skillful use of the communications media of radio, the press conference and general newspaper coverage—in transforming his private virtues into a well-known public image. He was especially quick to sense the value of radio as a political weapon and to see that it might be turned to advantage by a public figure deficient in crowd-pleasing attributes. Despite his proverbial taciturnity, he made frequent speeches and issued from his office a flood of press releases (more than either Teddy Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson)—all designed to focus attention on himself and enhance his effectiveness as a symbol of national unity. Without in the least being spectacular, he nonetheless made the name Coolidge and the nickname “Silent Cal” household commodities.

The most conclusive demonstration of Coolidge's symbolic ascendancy was his overwhelming election triumph of 1924. He won with a total of 382 electoral votes to 136 for John Davis, the Democratic candidate, with 13 going to Robert LaFollette, the candidate of the Progressive party. Coolidge's plurality of 7.3 million votes over the Democratic candidate was greater than even Harding's had been four years before. Because of the de-

fection of many Republicans, particularly those in the rural mid-west, to LaFollette, Coolidge's percentage of the total popular vote dropped six percentage points from that of Harding—from 60.2 per cent to 54.2 per cent. Still, this count left the Republicans far ahead of the Democrats who, at 28.8 per cent of the popular presidential vote, had slumped to an all-time low.

Characteristically, Coolidge's campaign tactics were designed to make a general interest, lowest-common-denominator-type of appeal, and to avoid any increase in social tension. In order to underscore the presidential responsibilities of his incumbency, he stayed on the job in Washington during the entire campaign. He made no partisan campaign speeches, and delivered only one nation-wide radio address, an address which barely qualified as a defense of his administration. His public appearances during the fall of 1924 were shrewdly confined to those where he could don his ceremonial mantle as the nation's chief representative, and could speak vaguely about commonly shared values.

He opened the Red Cross drive, for example, with a speech on world peace; at the world series, he lauded the moral value of athletics; kicking off the Community Chest Fund campaign, he stressed the need for economy; to a group of newly naturalized citizens, he discoursed on the significance of American citizenship; he picked the unveiling of a statue of a religious figure as the occasion to talk about the importance of religion to American life; on election eve, he issued a get out the vote appeal.

Vice-Presidential nominee Charles Dawes and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes traveled widely to defend the administration against Democratic and Progressive attack; but Coolidge himself maintained what his frustrated opponent Davis referred to as “a vast, pervading and mysterious silence.” In other words, he did nothing to stir controversy or excite divisive opinions, but contented himself with voicing aspects of the national consensus. By so doing, he hoped to pose a favorable contrast to the Democrats, who were deeply divided after their bitterly contested nominating convention,

¹ See Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., “Coolidge and Presidential Leadership,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 21, pp. 265-278.

and to the Progressives, who were making a frankly divisive appeal against monopoly. Coolidge campaigned to the end that he would appear as the only trustworthy protector of national solidarity and spokesman for the American way of life.

Strategy of this sort does not make for a colorful, spectacular campaign. Contemporary observers noted the "general apathy and detachment on the part of a large percentage of the citizens"; and one of Coolidge's biographers has labelled it "an unimportant, uninteresting and unexciting campaign."² This was, of course, Coolidge's own blueprint. By virtue of his aloofness from the potentially divisive issues of public policy—of farm income, of labor reform, of business regulation, and of foreign affairs—he succeeded in making himself, his personality, his virtues the major issue of the campaign. On this battleground, Coolidge was invincible. He was admirably cut to the specifications of the large majority of voters, the more so for his remarkable achievement in self-advertisement. He was clearly identified with the widespread sense of well being. Prosperity became naturally and imperceptibly the "Coolidge prosperity."

When the Democrats attempted to make major campaign hay out of the Harding scandals and to indict the entire Republican party for malfeasance, the charge was smothered, and even turned against them, by the personal honesty and integrity of candidate Coolidge. In this respect and in others, the Democrats made little headway with their warning that "A Vote for Coolidge is a Vote for: Chaos." Coolidge supporters, stressing his devotion to the status quo and highlighting the innovating tendencies of his two opponents, sloganized the alternatives as "Coolidge or Chaos." A vast majority of voters apparently read it this way. They voted to "Keep Cool and Keep Coolidge." His victory was a highly personal one—an impressive instance in the exercise of the representational aspects of presidential leadership.

Coolidge's success in establishing himself as a representative symbol of national agreement ought not to obscure the obvious fact that, like all Presidents, he represented some groups in the population more satisfactorily than others. Most significantly, he reflected the attitudes of the business community in

the United States. It helps us to understand both Coolidge's success as a representative symbol and his inaction as a policy leader if we note the close identity of viewpoint between the President and the business group.

It was the articulated interest of this group that set the dominant tone of national life in the mid-1920's, and Coolidge, by speaking in harmony with them, could, indeed, appear to be speaking for the broadest possible set of national interests. The interests of some other groups, organized labor for instance, were temporarily muted as they shared in the benefits of an expanding economy. When Coolidge said that "the business of America is business," he was stating his belief that by protecting and promoting American business, the national government could best serve the interests of all groups in the nation. In responding to public opinion, he equated business opinion with that of the public as a whole. "I have been greatly pleased to observe," he said on one occasion, "that the attitude of the Chamber of Commerce (the leading businessman's group) very accurately reflects that of public opinion generally."

Coolidge's behavior as a policy leader was the product of his own temperamental and ideological makeup; but it was the kind of behavior which dovetailed with the expectations of the dominant business group. Under the circumstances, they desired (with the exception of a protective tariff) a minimum of governmental activity, a minimum of decision making by public officials, and in general as little change as possible. The only policy leadership they expected of the President was of a kind that constantly sought to pare down the activity of government—cutting spending, reducing taxes, and practicing strict economy.

Coolidge was in agreement with all of these points. "I dream of balance sheets and sinking funds and tax rates and all the rest," he confessed; and he deferred to one of the nation's most successful businessmen, Andrew Mellon, in all financial matters. With Secretary of the Treasury Mellon in control of the Administration's domestic policies, businessmen shared the view of Henry Ford that, "The country is perfectly safe with Coolidge. Why change?" They agreed, too, with

² See Hugh Keenleyside, "The American Political Revolution of 1924," *Current History*, Vol. XXI; and Claude M. Fuess, *Calvin Coolidge—The Man from Vermont*, Boston, 1940.

Chauncey DePew, that "We've got a leader for a President." Their conception of leadership, however, stressed its representational rather than its policy making aspect.

Calvin Coolidge's conception of policy leadership as a presidential function was fixed and limited by his general aversion to change, his particular dislike for legislation, which so often produced change, and his great reluctance to make any decisions at all unless absolutely forced to do so. In his inaugural address he said, "Our most important problem is not to secure new advantages but to maintain those which we already have." And, at another point he warned, "Don't be in a hurry to legislate. Give administration a chance to catch up with legislation."

Because of his minimal conception of policy leadership, Coolidge presented few policy programs to Congress and excited, on his own initiative, few policy conflicts in the legislature or elsewhere. His only passion was for the steady retrenchment of governmental (and therefore his own) activity. "I am for economy. After that, I am for more economy. At this time, and under the present circumstances, that is my conception of serving the people." "If we continue the campaign for economy we will pave the way for the further reduction of taxes." Near the close of his term, after he had chosen not to run for re-election, he reflected with detachment on his own single-mindedness, "I know how to save money. All my training has been in that direction. The country is in a sound financial position. Perhaps the time has come when we ought to spend money. I do not feel that I am qualified to do that."

His attitudes, of course, involved him in conflicts with legislators, administrators and some non-business groups. But the struggle normally took the form of someone else seizing the policy initiative and Coolidge taking negative action to hold the line. Thus he vetoed the veterans' bonus, vetoed the postal salary increase, opposed the congressional salary increase, rejected demands for increased funds by his Cabinet members, and vetoed (twice) the McNary Haugen Bill. The only noteworthy exceptions to this pattern were his advocacy of tax reduction and adherence to the World Court.

Consistent with his view of policy leader-

ship, Coolidge twice vetoed the McNary-Haugen Bill, designed to raise farm prices, without making a single positive suggestion for dealing with this most troublesome domestic problem of his administration. His veto response was more closely in accord with the wishes of the Chamber of Commerce than with the major organized farm groups, as his cool relations with the American Farm Bureau Federation will attest. When he addressed that group's convention in 1925, the historian of the Farm Bureau records that "his words fell on the audience like a wet blanket. . . ."³ With regard to the farm question, Coolidge was doubtless following his own prescription and "keeping dead still."

Coolidge's interpretation of proper presidential-congressional relations were of a piece with his reluctance to assume policy initiative. He took an orthodox, constitutional view designed to minimize executive-legislative conflict by minimizing presidential leadership.

As an experienced politician, he knew the value of cordial personal relations; and he pursued them through informal White House breakfasts with legislators. But it was typical that these were not devoted to the discussion of public policy. "Good fellowship" on a purely personal basis is rarely a guarantee of legislative success, yet it was as far as Coolidge would extend himself. He declined to assume an aggressive role as chief legislator. Even on occasions when his party leaders needed and requested his assistance, as in the Senate fight over adherence to the World Court, he declined to act—and was in this case defeated.

Due in part to his extremely deferential attitude and in part to the strength of the rebellious progressive Republicans in Congress, Coolidge met with conspicuously meager legislative success. Congress passed the bonus over his veto, and the congressional salary increase in spite of his objections; it added a Japanese exclusion provision to the immigration bill over his protest; it mutilated his first tax bill and added an unwanted publicity provision; it precipitated the resignation of two Cabinet members (Denby and Daugherty) and refused (twice) to confirm

³ Orville M. Kile, *The Farm Bureau Through Three Decades* (Baltimore, 1948), p. 134.

another (Warren); it refused to agree to his proposal for joining the World Court; it passed a Railway Labor Act in which Coolidge showed pointed disinterest. It did uphold his postal salary veto—by one vote—and it passed his second tax reduction bill. He asked the legislature for little; and they, in turn granted him considerably less. Coolidge viewed this outcome as the result of the proper exercise of legislative authority, and not as a condition to be altered by any increase in presidential leadership.

A President who chooses to make the most of his policy-making role will ordinarily seek to preserve and even to enlarge the area within which he can exercise his discretion. The very essence of the presidential responsibility is the making of choices. Policy leadership consists not only in waiting to make those choices which are unavoidably thrust upon a man, but consists also in taking initiative in such a way as to help shape the alternatives. By moving forward to tackle problems on his own, a President frees himself from total dependence on the perceptions of others, even though he pays a high price by increasing tension in his environment. Coolidge refused to take this kind of positive action or to pay the inevitable price. Every interpretation which Coolidge made of the proper range of his legislative and administrative activity had the effect of reducing his freedom of maneuver and removing him from the center of conflict.

Coolidge's behavior as administrative head of the executive branch was formalistic, legalistic and restrictive. It involved extensive reliance on his Cabinet; yet he declared it to be his "duty" to retain the Harding Cabinet, thereby demonstrating no desire to use his department heads as instruments of a distinctive policy leadership. His attitude toward the possibility of encouraging the discussion of policy alternatives within the Cabinet was that "there never ought to be and never were differences of opinion in my Cabinet."

Coolidge expressed his guiding principle of administrative decision-making when he explained that, "If you see ten troubles coming down the road, you can be sure that nine will run into the ditch before they reach you and you have to battle with only one." He

followed this prescription in the firing of Attorney General Daugherty and in waiting out a settlement of the coal strike of 1925–1926. His key administrative technique was the delegation of authority, which was so lavish that it effectively removed the President from a central role in the making of American foreign policy.

So great was Coolidge's devotion to procedural regularity and the strictly constitutional way of doing things that he sometimes seemed eager to pump from the policy making side of the presidency all of its personal ingredient. "I regard myself," he once said,

as the representative of the government and not as an individual. When technical matters come up, I feel called upon to refer them to the proper department of the government which has some information about them and then, unless there is some good reason, I use this information as a basis of whatever I have to say; but this does not prevent me from thinking whatever I please as an individual.

In his *Autobiography*, written in retirement, Coolidge wrote that "It is because in their hours of timidity the Congress becomes subservient to the importunities of organized minorities that the President comes more and more to stand as the champion of the rights of the whole country." Judging by his behavior as President, Coolidge saw this as a preeminently representational function. National unity required that the President "stand as" the representative of the American people, that he speak in terms of the national consensus, and that he hold himself aloof from domestic conflict. He succeeded, and under Coolidge, the symbolic dominance of the presidency remained impressive.

Men with a more expansive interpretation of the presidential role, however, have felt that in order to be a "champion of the rights of the whole country" the President must take positive steps to insure the success of specific policies. They have felt that he must use his political skills not just to gain and hold office but to play a leading role in the formulation and execution of public policy. The Chief Executive, it is said, must reign, but he must also rule. Calvin Coolidge could and did perform the first function; he could not or would not perform the second.

Herbert Hoover was "politically . . . a nineteenth century Whig in a twentieth century economy." He "was the last of the old type chief executive, and the first of the new." Here is an impartial analysis of a controversial figure.

Hoover: The Presidency in Transition

By VICTOR L. ALBJERG

Professor of History, Purdue University

THE ELECTION of 1928 was one of the most colorful and tumultuous campaigns since the contest 100 years earlier between Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams. The excitement in the combat between Herbert Hoover and Alfred Smith did not spring from contrasting party principles, for both platforms avoided definite commitments. They were primarily a compound of "bunk and bluster." Each one in vacuous phraseology promised appealing impossibilities on the subjects of tariff, farm relief, prohibition, foreign policy and efficient administration.

While party principles differed little, personalities contrasted sharply. Hoover began life in rural Iowa, the son of a Quaker blacksmith. Smith was born in East Side New York, the son of an Irish Catholic drayman. Hoover graduated from Stanford University; Smith was an alumnus of the Fulton Street fish market. Hoover was shy, sensitive, reserved and dignified. Gutson Borglum maintained that Hoover looked as though "a rose would wilt in his hand." Smith was gregarious, convivial, ebullient, and sparkling. Hoover was lonely in a crowd; Smith, at home. Both were able, serious and conscientious. Hoover, as a mining engineer and promoter, had accumulated

a fortune estimated at \$4 million by the time he was 40. Smith had become governor of the state of New York. At Kansas City, Hoover was nominated on the first ballot. At Houston, two weeks later, Smith was similarly chosen.

During the presidential campaign the Republicans took their cue from Senator James Eli Watson: "Why, the Democrats can't govern. It's all we can do." And with pride the GOP campaigners propagandized their achievements which astonished the world and aroused its envy. They had stimulated industry, reduced the national debt and lowered taxes. They had elevated the standard of living, and Hoover promised to tilt the cornucopia at a still more lavish angle to assure a chicken in every pot and a car in every garage. Few presidential candidates had been held in higher esteem, and one clergyman urged his congregation to vote for him "not in the interest of Mr. Hoover, but in the interest of the Kingdom of God."

In a euphoria so well publicized all that the Democrats could do was to assure the voters that they would continue abundance. In addition, Smith promised a virtual end to prohibition.

In spite of the Democratic candidate's many political assets, he traveled an uphill road during the campaign, for he was a "Democrat in a Republican year, a wet in a dry country," a Catholic in a Protestant commonwealth, and a herald of urban immigrants in a regime dominated by rural Nordics. Smith, therefore, found himself the target of bigotry, hypocrisy and snobbery. "A whispering campaign with the audibility

Victor L. Albjerg is the author of *Foundations of American Neutrality* (in cooperation with C. R. Fish); *Europe since 1870*; *Europe from 1914 to the Present* (with M. H. Albjerg); *Richard Owen, A Biography*; and *Europe since 1939*.

of a bull-frog chorus" insinuated that religious intolerance, orgies of drunkenness, and crude upstarts would prevail if Smith should occupy the White House.

In the election the public confirmed its confidence in the Republican party and its candidate by a vote of 21,410,992 to 15,027,892, and by an electoral count of 444 to 87. The Republicans broke the Solid South where they carried Virginia, North Carolina, Florida and Texas. The election also assured the Republicans supremacy in both houses of Congress with 269 Republicans in the House of Representatives to 165 Democrats; 55 Republicans to 39 Democrats in the Senate. The Farmer-Labor party returned one of its members to each of the two houses. Hoover started his term under felicitous circumstances.

As Elizabeth I of England was crowned, she whispered audibly, "This is the Lord's work and it is good." At his own inauguration, President Hoover experienced Elizabeth's confidence and rejoicing. By the time he arrived at the White House he was suffused with the dedication of men who had entered Jerusalem and Rome. To the new President, the United States was not merely a country: it was the Beulah Land of the Western Hemisphere. Upon his acceptance of the nomination to the presidency he intoned: "Given a chance to go forward with the policies of the last eight years we shall soon, with the help of God, be in sight of the days when poverty will be banished from this nation." The stock market corroborated his heart-warming optimism, for its quotations spurted upwards in an exuberant frenzy.

Politically Hoover was a nineteenth century Whig in a twentieth century economy. He agreed with Senator Jim Reed that "There will never be any improvement on the philosophy of John Stuart Mill." Almost like Thomas Jefferson he believed that government which governs least governs best. As a successful businessman he was hostile to government intervention and control. He believed that the proper function of the government was to serve as an umpire. While he had been Secretary of Commerce he had slapped the wrists of corporations gently when they took liberties with the Sherman Anti-Trust Law.

His political philosophy, therefore, inhibited executive initiative, and he was suspicious of any President who championed the cause of the masses for, in his opinion, such a man was a threat to liberty. The legislative branch, he believed, was the shield of liberty and should remain inviolate from executive aggressiveness. The President should give Congress scant direction.

Tariff Reform

Within a month after his inauguration, he demonstrated his reluctance to initiate and prosecute effective leadership. In gratitude to Senator William E. Borah for his support during the presidential campaign, President Hoover promised to call a special session of Congress to consider a revision of the tariff, especially as it applied to agriculture. President Hoover had no enthusiasm for tariff reform, and wished to limit its scope as far as possible. The special session called to revise the tariff assembled April 15, 1929, before the President could make a thorough study of the problem or formulate a comprehensive bill had he been so disposed.

In introducing the bill for tariff revision Senator Borah accompanied it with a resolution requesting that tariff revision be confined to agriculture. This resolution lacked one vote of passage, and therefore Borah's original bill was opened to a comprehensive inclusion of tariffs on almost any item. Before its passage 1,253 amendments had been tagged onto the bill. Senator James E. Watson, majority floor leader, in his *As I Knew Them*, maintains that President Hoover took no steps to secure the additional one vote which would have prevented a general overhauling of the tariff problem. During the long debate on this subject the President did not try to influence the trend of the discussion. In a press interview he confessed that he had declined to interfere, or to express an opinion on the details of the tariff bill owing to the thousands of items in it with which he would have to familiarize himself in order to offer intelligent suggestions. This admission constituted an abdication of leadership in one of the most important pieces of legislation enacted during his administration.

Since the measure passed in the Senate by the narrow margin of 49 to 47, the President's influence again might well have

swung a few votes against it, but he refused to exert this pressure. The President was aware of the opposition to the bill. Many members of Congress denounced it, and 1,038 members of the American Economics Association signed a resolution which analyzed its defects. Most of the foreign countries which traded with the United States registered their objection to the measure and threatened retaliation, but with President Hoover these carried no weight. He signed it even though he characterized it as "vicious, extortionate and obnoxious."

His estimate of the bill was not far wrong for it raised the tariff on dutiable goods on an average of from 39 to 59 per cent; this increase augmented the difficulty of debtor countries to sell in the American market which was imperative for them if they were to meet their obligations to the United States. By imposing quota regulations on their imports, European countries reduced their purchases from the United States and thereby intensified the virulence of the depression.

The Farmers' Plight

No segment of the American economy was more fortunately favored by nature than the agricultural, and yet few classes experienced greater distress. While the farmers were in part responsible for their own plight through having invested too heavily in land in the hope of a continued rising market, they were also the victims of every one with whom they had any dealings. Total outstanding farm mortgages increased from \$4 billion in 1917 to \$9 billion in 1928. Each year foreclosures drove an increasing number of farmers from the countryside. Even before the depression of 1929 farmers were losing their American identity and were approaching the status of European peasantry.

While President Hoover sympathized with the farmers, he again felt that the proper agency to relieve them was Congress. But in rendering aid, Hoover insisted that Congress should function within the scope of a laissez-faire philosophy. It should provide "no equalization fee, price fixing, or any such nonsense." In response to this directive, Congress, on June 15, 1929, passed the Agricultural Marketing Act. It established a Federal Farm Board of nine members, eight

of whom were to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate with the Secretary of Agriculture an *ex officio* member. To this body was assigned a revolving fund of \$500 million with which the Farm Board was, in periods of glut, to enter the market and buy surpluses and thus restore the prices of agricultural commodities to "normal" levels.

Year by year the Farm Board through an intermediary agency, for the President would not sanction direct action by the government, purchased increasing surpluses without making any headway in solving the farmers' difficulties. Government warehouses became choked with surplus commodities in which the revolving fund was buried. After a two-year effort the Farm Board abandoned its plan and strove to dispose of its holdings. President Hoover frowned upon the price-fixing efforts of the Board, but his scowls did not prevent prices from falling to a lower level than they had been for 250 years.

Even before the Farm Board began its operations and only six months after President Hoover had been inaugurated, the Wall Street Stock Market collapsed. To most people the crash came as a surprise, but by no means to all. Even in 1928, while Secretary of Commerce, Hoover indirectly had warned the Federal Reserve Board of an impending crash unless it restricted its lending policy. But after entering the White House President Hoover, according to Walter Lippmann, took no measure to forestall the unfolding economic catastrophe. Stock quotations declined noticeably in September, 1929, and by October they tobogganed. By July, 1932, the listed value of stocks had declined from \$89 billion to \$15 billion. The gamblers' jubilee had swung into an investors' nightmare.

President Hoover's immediate reaction to the debacle was to characterize it as the result of unrestrained speculation, maintaining that after a short deflationary period all would be well again. He thought that the economy of the country was essentially sound. He contended that it had passed through 15 major depressions which had corrected themselves through their own efforts. This one would do the same. To him the business cycle was a normal characteristic of American individualism as it applied to economics.

GENERAL EXPENDITURES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND OUTLAYS FOR PUBLIC WORKS

(From the Last Year of the Coolidge Administration until 1932¹)

Fiscal Year	Total General Expendi- tures	Public Works	General Expendi- tures Less Public Works	Public Works as Per- centage of Total Ex- penditures
(in millions of dollars)				
1928	1,947	267	1,679	13.8
1929	2,106	307	1,799	14.6
1930	2,178	339	1,839	15.6
1931	2,407	490	1,917	20.4
1932	2,596	556	2,040	21.4

¹ Arthur D. Gayer, *Public Works in Prosperity and Depression*, p. 79. Permission granted by the Bureau of Economic Research, New York.

No President in the past had ever invoked the power of the federal government to check or to control its ravages, and President Hoover pledged loyalty to that American folklore. He aimed to perpetuate this mystique. In past adversities local government and private charity had succored the distressed. When the stock market collapsed President Hoover prescribed the identical formula. He firmly opposed federal assistance for relief purposes.

The President, however, took some measures to mitigate the evils of the panic. He called the leaders of business, banking, and transport to the White House and urged them not to reduce wages or shorten hours of employment. He also requested them to continue their programs of capital investment and plant expansion in order to provide employment. These leaders approved the proposals in principle, but as their volume of business declined they yielded to necessity and cut both wages and hours.

To facilitate industry's compliance with his request President Hoover asked the Federal Reserve Board to lower the discount rate and otherwise to relax the extension of credit. He also called labor leaders to the White House and asked them to avoid irresponsible demands upon management. Further to absorb the shock of the depression President Hoover urged state and local governments to expand their local public works programs.

He, in turn, promised to enlarge the federal program during his administration, and national expenditures in the field of public works increased, although not so much as might have been expected considering the comprehensiveness and violence of the depression.

By the end of 1930 state and local relief funds already approached exhaustion. In Chicago charity allowances had been reduced to \$1.50 per week per child, and in Pennsylvania relief in many cases varied from \$8 to \$12 a month per family. In New York there were instances of death through starvation. In many cities on municipal dumps the destitute built shacks of whatever material was available and fought with one another for scraps of garbage. Throughout the country these "suburbs" became known as "Hoovervilles." One of its forlorn residents expressed the despair of all when he soliloquized: "Nobody knows what I seen, nobody but Jesus." Yet the President still "cited statistics to prove that there was no widespread under-nourishment," and that local agencies were handling the problem adequately.

Opposition to Federal Aid

Democratic Senators without constitutional scruples about enlistment of federal assistance urged the President to authorize the Farm Board to distribute its surplus wheat

to the unemployed, but President Hoover remained firm in his determination not to use federal resources for this purpose. Opposition leaders ridiculed him for having employed federal funds in the summer of 1930 to save cattle in the drought-stricken Southwest, but refusing to do as much for starving people. He was reminded of his aid to the European masses, and then reproached for turning his back upon his own citizens. Despite all of this derision, President Hoover remained faithful, for a while longer, to his states rights principles. When someone suggested old age and unemployment insurance the President endorsed such proposals, provided that they should be financed primarily by private sources. He maintained that "the moment the government enters into the field (of social security) it invariably degenerates into the dole."

President Hoover opposed federal relief because he feared that it would become a precedent for a widening of federal authority into other fields, especially into power production. He also believed that it would increase the cost of government to the point that it would unbalance the budget. As a successful businessman he abhorred a national deficit, and until 1930 he was able to prevent it. In that year federal revenue was \$1 billion less than expenditures, the largest peace-time deficit in our history until then. During the rest of his administration his budgets remained in the red, and he was compelled to pursue deficit finance. He set an example of personal frugality by declining his official salary, dismantling the Mayflower, abandoning the White House stables, and, on occasion, serving ice water as refreshment at the White House press conferences.

His fervor for a balanced budget was equalled by his zeal for the gold standard. Abandonment of gold, he believed, approached the ultimate in financial calamity. In January, 1932, some 40 nations had gone off the gold standard, leaving the United States and France the only large nations adhering to the yellow metal, yet he clung to his monetary faith. Before he retired from the presidency, he called his successor to the White House and tried unsuccessfully to pledge him to retention of gold.

President Hoover, in an effort to instill optimism, once had called the depression a

"superficial phenomenon." Its virulence and tenacity, however, resisted gold-standard and balanced-budget nostrums. As it progressed it became increasingly worse and by the end of 1932 some 13 million were forced into idleness. Bankruptcies increased and bank closures multiplied. Checks were no longer returned with the notation, "No Funds," but with "No Banks." The following jingle enjoyed widespread currency when the depression was at its nadir:

Mellon pulled the whistle,
Hoover rang the bell
Wall Street gave the signal
And the country went to Hell.

As hard times persisted newsmen became increasingly critical of the President. They disapproved of the involved protocol, the declining number of press conferences, eventually reduced to one a month, and finally the substitution of mimeographed sheets for the appearance of the President himself. In their despatches newsmen could not conceal their irritation toward the President, and the public lost confidence in him. In the midterm election of 1930, Democrats won control of both houses of Congress. Hoover had expected Democrats to torment him, but hoped for cooperation from members of his own party. However, a section of liberal Republicans joined the Democrats in scourging him. When Senator George Moses of New Hampshire called these insurgents "Sons of Wild Jack Asses," the President "did not dispute their genealogical background." The President's acquiescence may have propitiated his spleen, but it did not marshal congressional majorities in his behalf.

As the depression wore on President Hoover assumed a more positive leadership. During his initial year in the White House he sent few messages to Congress, but as the economic situation became increasingly critical he despatched a growing number of directives. By the end of his term he had sent 63. He also increased the use of the veto. As a matter of comparison President Coolidge invoked the veto 50 times, and President Franklin Roosevelt during his twelve years, 631. President Hoover rarely addressed the nation over the radio, partly because of the paucity of that instrument, and also owing to his unanimated delivery.

True to his engineering training he sought

facts as the basis upon which to formulate his decisions. To fortify himself with adequate information he appointed fact-finding bodies which collected pertinent information for his consideration. Although he did not always follow their recommendations few Presidents have been as well informed on current problems as was Hoover; fewer still have worked as conscientiously as he did. What increased his efficiency was his unique capacity to organize. In this he was without a peer among all who have occupied the White House.

Federal Aid

Toward the close of his term President Hoover relaxed somewhat his constitutional rigidities against the distressed. When nearly 2,300 banks had closed their doors, in December, 1931, and with industries and railroads experiencing similar agonies, he abandoned some of his fixations against federal aid to gasping firms. Upon his recommendation, Congress, on January 22, 1932, established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. It was capitalized at \$500 million, and in addition it was authorized to borrow thrice that sum if the situation should warrant it. It was to extend loans on appropriate securities to banks, insurance companies, trust companies, agricultural cooperatives, railroads and industry.

By March 31, 1933, the R.F.C. had granted 7,411 institutions loans totalling \$1.78 billion of which banks and trust companies borrowed \$1.055 billion and railroads \$331 million. An Emergency Relief and Construction Act, passed in July, 1932, authorized loans to states for relief purposes to the amount of \$300 million. This constituted a half-hearted admission that federal aid might be extended to the unemployed.

The President endorsed the principle of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the belief that funds poured into the top of an organization would seep to the bottom by providing credit for raw materials, employment, transportation and sales, and thereby re-ignite the creative process of industry. This "seepage" failed to trickle to the lower layers in any significant volume. It therefore arrested but little the downward trend of the national economy, although it may have cushioned the shock.

Prohibition

Next to the dire economic situation, no problem during the Hoover administration was so vexing as prohibition. One clamorous section of the population demanded alcoholic aridity while another enjoined spirituous indulgence. While President, Hoover dutifully observed the Volstead Act, although Washington parties were "wringing wet." Some time after retiring from the presidency Hoover began enjoying two martinis before dinner. His efforts to enforce prohibition were neither energetic nor inspired for public opinion at the time would support neither enforcement nor repeal of the prohibition amendment.

The President caught in this emotional tornado appointed the Wickersham Commission to investigate and recommend. It reported what everybody knew: that prohibition did not prohibit, that it engendered disrespect for law, and generated crime, that as long as the country was intolerantly divided, any solution suggested by one side would be regarded as an absurdity by the other. With President Hoover's endorsement, therefore, the Republican party in its platform of 1932 proposed to turn the problem back to the states. This was a straddle for which, under the circumstances, there was considerable justification. But Hoover could not leave the White House with the consolation that he had solved the prohibition problem.

In foreign affairs President Hoover's underlying principle was that the United States "should be in the world but not of it." Although he had traveled widely, (or because of it), he was an isolationist. He maintained that the United States should keep out of other peoples' wars and stick to "absolute independence of political action and adequate preparedness." He demanded that the United States should preserve its national dignity and its independence of action, and yet cooperate with other nations in the peaceable solution of world problems.

In 1931, when Japan occupied Manchuria, he suggested what became known as the Stimson Non-Recognition Policy. It was really the Hoover Non-Recognition Policy. In harmony with prevailing public opinion in the United States in 1931 and in line with his Quaker antipathy toward war, he refused

to employ American forces against Japanese aggrandizement in China.

Toward communism in any guise or disguise, he was hostile. While he was relief administrator after World War I, he diverted part of his relief funds to help overthrow Bela Kun's Communist regime in Hungary. During the Civil War in Russia between the Red and White forces, from 1918 to 1920, he again diverted relief funds to help finance the "White" cause. When he became President he refused recognition of the Soviet Union, and when his successor, in 1933, extended recognition to Moscow, Hoover still thought it was a calamitous mistake.

Good Neighbor Policy

He reversed the "Dollar Diplomacy" of Harding and Coolidge toward Latin America by inaugurating the Good Neighbor Policy. Following the election of 1928, and before his assumption of presidential duties, he took a six weeks tour of Latin America where he soothed past injuries and pledged a more sympathetic attitude. He lived up to his promises, for he withdrew American marines from Nicaragua, liquidated American claims against Haiti, and maintained strict neutrality during a revolution in Panama. He did not exploit the Monroe Doctrine for intervention purposes, but used it for mutual understanding and cooperation.

In 1931, President Hoover inaugurated "summitry." In that year Ramsay Mac-

Donald, Prime Minister of Great Britain, arrived in Washington to resolve misunderstandings between the two countries. The President took him to Rapidan Creek Lodge and there the two re-established agreeable relations. MacDonald was the first British Prime Minister to visit the United States (excluding Lloyd George who came after retirement). Subsequently the stream of world dignitaries converging upon Washington has grown to a flood.

A Dividing Point

Hoover's presidency placed him at the dividing point in American history. He was the last of the old-type chief executive, and the first of the new. Emotionally he could not abandon the past nor yet embrace or ignore the future. His adherence to that which was, and his reluctant acceptance of the imminent prevented him from performing well in either capacity.

Upon his defeat for re-election he felt disowned and forsaken, somewhat as Churchill did after his party's defeat in July, 1945. Churchill's gloom was dense. His wife tried to console him: "Well, after all, perhaps your defeat was a blessing in disguise." To which he replied: "At the moment the blessing seems very heavily disguised." After President Hoover's electoral defeat in 1932 he was no less inconsolable than Churchill; the thwarted ex-President remarked: "Democracy is not a polite employer."

(Continued from page 207)

President neither led with respect to his party, nor with Congress, nor with the public; in foreign affairs it was Hughes who spoke for the United States.

Harding lacked not only the training for the high office, but even an adequate comprehension of its constitutional and philosophical implications. It may be suggested that there is an atmosphere and a quality about the president that imbues even a mediocre occupant with at least a tolerable capacity for leadership. No such transformation took place with Harding.

The life of Warren G. Harding in the White House is more than the story of a per-

sonal tragedy. It is an indictment of a people whose complacency and self-interest, after 20 years of an awakened national conscience, made their expectation of the presidency pitifully inadequate and distorted. In a sense, the Harding administration can be viewed as part of an interregnum period in presidential leadership, a hiatus between eras of vigorous articulation of national goals and purposes. Yet it is a measure of the power and dignity and uniqueness of the presidency in our constitutional system that despite the low condition to which it had sunk, later chief executives would be able to restore it to its former greatness and add new dimensions to presidential power.

During his unprecedented terms of office, Franklin D. Roosevelt greatly increased the power of the American presidency, which under his administrations "reached new heights of power and influence." On both the domestic and international front, "he was very much the commander-in-chief, master of detail, strategist and spokesman."

The Roosevelt Administrations

By ROBERT E. BURKE

Associate Professor of History, University of Washington

FRANKLIN D. Roosevelt was the only person ever elected to the presidency more than twice. His four victories constitute a record which will last, unless the Twenty-Second Amendment is repealed. The effect of this amendment, many of whose supporters were apparently motivated by a desire that there should never be another President like F. D. R., has thus been to insure that his distinctive career will remain unique, at least in tenure. It seems likely that Roosevelt's work in the re-shaping of the office of President will seem in the long run to be far more significant than his mere longevity in office. Indeed, it is possible that his development of the office itself, essentially a by-product of the wars against the Great Depression and the Axis powers, will in time be seen as his major contribution to later generations.

Following his triumphant reelection to the governorship of New York in 1930, Franklin Roosevelt automatically became a leading

contender for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1932. Born to a rather aristocratic, well-to-do family in Dutchess County, he had been educated at Groton, Harvard and Columbia Law School, and had embarked upon a political career in 1910. Twice elected to the State Senate from a Republican district, the young F. D. R. soon won fame as an enemy of Tammany Hall in the legislature. He served in the important post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Josephus Daniels in the Wilson administration, building up a reputation as a great friend of the Navy and an able administrator.

Going down to defeat as the Democratic candidate for vice-president in 1920, and suffering an attack of paralytic polio in 1921 which left him permanently crippled, Roosevelt continued to maintain an active interest in Democratic politics. He twice placed the name of Governor Alfred E. Smith in nomination for President at national conventions, while managing to maintain a certain aloofness from Smith. In 1928, he consented to run for New York's governor, at the insistence of Smith, whose advisers felt that Roosevelt's name would give strength to the ticket. The ironic outcome was a narrow victory for F. D. R., while Smith lost to Herbert Hoover, even in New York.

The Campaigns

Roosevelt had a more difficult task in getting his party's nomination in 1932 than in winning the subsequent election over Hoover. The Great Crash and continuing depression had made life difficult for Republican politicians generally. Hoover's rather

Robert E. Burke taught at the University of Hawaii, 1956-1957, and spent the summer of 1960 as visiting professor of history at Columbia University. From 1950 to 1956 he was on the staff of the Bancroft Library, Berkeley, California, where he served as head of the manuscripts division. The author of *Olson's New Deal for California*, Mr. Burke is acting managing editor of the *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*.

rigid economic philosophy was tempered by his humanitarianism, but he had great difficulty in communicating with the people at large. Thus Democratic hopefuls, scenting victory after three defeats, began to enter the race. Had it not been for the two-thirds rule, Roosevelt's nomination would have been assured, due to the vigorous early work done in his behalf. As it turned out, the Roosevelt forces had to make a deal with those of Speaker of the House John Nance Garner, by which the latter was named for vice president, in order to get the necessary vote.

Roosevelt, perhaps feeling compelled to show his physical stamina, conducted a mighty speaking campaign against Hoover. He combined attacks on the administration—for its failure to find a way out of the depression, for its extravagance and unbalanced budget, and for its refusal to provide adequate relief—with promises of a "New Deal" for the American people. It is possible to detect, with hindsight, the outlines of the later policies of the Roosevelt administration, contradictory as they were to be. But it is perhaps less important to do this than it is to see the positive image of himself that F. D. R. projected in 1932—a buoyant, cheerful, do-something leader, the very opposite of the dour, inarticulate Hoover.

Roosevelt won by a landslide, securing 22.8 million popular votes (57.4 per cent) to Hoover's 15.76 million (39.7 per cent).¹ The President-elect also had large majorities in both houses, plus the good will of a sizeable number of progressive Republicans in the Congress.

The renomination of Roosevelt and Garner in 1936 was never in doubt. While a few prominent elder statesmen of the Democratic party were seriously disaffected and associated themselves with the bitterly anti-New Deal American Liberty League, the convention at Philadelphia was dull and tedious due to the unanimity of support for the incumbents. The Republican party turned in 1936 to Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas, one of their few remaining major office holders. Himself a moderate progressive, Landon attracted the support of most party conservatives in the pre-convention weeks and won on the first ballot.

Landon proved to be a thoroughly ineffec-

tive campaigner, seeming to move gradually to the right and ending in a position not far from that of the Liberty League itself. Roosevelt's campaign was masterful, his speaking tours a series of triumphs. He pointed with pride to his administration's program of relief, recovery and reform, creating the illusion that there was more system to the New Deal than there really was. He reminded his hearers early and often of the shortcomings of his predecessor's regime. Occasionally he spoke of the completion of his program, while side-stepping the problems presented by Supreme Court decisions adverse to his policies. Roosevelt in 1936 managed to retain the support of most conservative Democrats in the Congress, as well as most of his non-Democratic backers of 1932.

The result was Roosevelt's greatest victory. He lost only two states, giving gleeful Democrats a new slogan, "As Maine Goes, So Goes Vermont." F. D. R. won 27.75 million popular votes (60.2 per cent) to Landon's 16.7 million (36.5 per cent). As they had in 1934, the Democrats increased their margins in both houses of Congress. Republicans were down to 16 seats in the Senate and 88 in the House.

The 1940 Democratic convention assembled in a time of Nazi victories in Western Europe, victories which had finally aroused many Americans to a sense of their own danger. The renomination of Roosevelt was assured, once he had consented to run, both because he was still the master of his party in spite of the defection of its conservative wing on domestic issues and because of the recognition that his experienced leadership was the party's chief electoral asset. The convention replaced Garner, who had long since broken with his chief, with F. D. R.'s own choice, Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace. At their convention, Republicans were at first unable to choose their nominee from among recognized party leaders, leaving an opening for enthusiastic amateurs to put over Wendell Willkie, lawyer and utility magnate. The Willkie crusade, which was based upon an acceptance of most New Deal reforms but which insisted that

¹ Edgar Eugene Robinson, *They Voted for Roosevelt* (Stanford University Press, 1947) is the most convenient source for election data. It has been used here.

the administration was both too grasping and too tired, was the most serious challenge yet to F. D. R.

The campaign itself found both Willkie and Roosevelt agreed upon the necessity of aid to Britain, while each tried to outdo the other in pledging to try to keep the United States out of the war. Willkie's Crusade was counteracted by the Democrats with the now-familiar recital of New Deal accomplishments and Republican failures of the past, and with particular emphasis upon F. D. R.'s experiences in the conduct of defense and foreign policy.

The result was a Roosevelt victory, but by a sharply reduced margin. F. D. R. secured 27.9 million popular votes (53.9 per cent) to 22.3 million (44.7 per cent) for Willkie. It is notable that the Republicans substantially retained their 1938 gains in the states and in Congress. Willkie carried 10 states, with 82 electoral votes: Maine, Vermont, Michigan, Indiana, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas and Colorado. This is the first time Roosevelt had lost *any* states of the Farm Belt. Clearly the New Deal coalition was shrinking.

The low point in the fortunes of the New Deal came in the 1942 elections, when the Republicans made very substantial gains, coming very close to a majority in the House. By the time their convention met in 1944, Willkie had withdrawn from the race, a casualty of the Wisconsin primary. The G.O.P. bestowed its nomination upon the more traditional figure of young Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York. The nomination of F. D. R. for a fourth term, this time as the great wartime leader, was inevitable, once he had agreed. But this time he was forced to accept a running mate more acceptable to conservative Democrats, Senator Harry Truman of Missouri.

The 1944 campaign found Governor Dewey echoing many of Willkie's charges of the previous election, but in a more polished manner. Roosevelt campaigned only briefly, at the end, emphasizing again the domestic attainments of the past, and pointing up his wartime leadership.

The result was another Roosevelt victory, but by the closest margin of all the contests: 24.8 million popular votes (51.7 per cent) to Dewey's 22 million (45.9 per cent). Dewey

carried 12 states with 99 electoral votes: Maine, Vermont, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado and Wyoming. The Democrats made moderate gains in state and congressional elections, but the Republican party came out of the last Roosevelt campaign powerful in most of the North and West. The once-mighty New Deal coalition was but a shadow of its former self.

Roosevelt in Office

Franklin Roosevelt was a buoyant, cheerful campaigner in 1932, and it is clear that he sold himself to the American people as a man who would try to infuse new spirit into the country. His actual program, vague in many particulars and contradictory in others, was less important than his attitude, so different from that of the dour Hoover.

Many commentators were skeptical about him, partly because of the kind of pre-convention campaign made in his behalf (which seemed to promise all things to all men), partly because of the very gingerly way he treated the problem of New York City corruption, and partly because of the contradictory pledges he advanced in the general election campaign. It was his good fortune to take office "grossly underrated,"² an immense psychological advantage after March 4, 1933.

Roosevelt's own concept of the presidency was that it was "pre-eminently a place of moral leadership." He saw himself as in the Theodore Roosevelt-Woodrow Wilson tradition of strong Presidents, vigorous leaders of public opinion and Congress, propounders of ideas. He saw himself as a frank experimenter with means to his ends, having given classic expression to this in his speech at Oglethorpe University in May, 1932. If he had self-doubts, he hid them from his close associates, as well as from the public.

In his inaugural address, his call for a special session of Congress, and his first "fireside chat" to the American people, Roosevelt showed at the very outset of his administration that he would move swiftly in the battle against the depression. He made it clear that he would not hesitate to seek and to use emergency powers akin to those necessary in

² Walter Johnson, *1600 Pennsylvania Avenue* (Little, Brown and Co., 1960), p. 49.

wartime. He presented himself as the national leader, genuinely concerned about the crisis and anxious to improve the lot of the people. He was enthusiastic about his new role. Above all, through his mastery of the arts of communication, he projected his program to the people and involved them deeply in what was going on during the Hundred Days.

F. D. R. revived the near-dormant press conference, transforming it into a vehicle for getting his case before the public. Hoover had held only 66 press conferences in his whole presidency; Roosevelt held 337 during his first term. Hoover seemed not to enjoy his meetings with the press, and got a minimum of value for his cause out of them. Roosevelt obviously loved the give-and-take with reporters, and maintained excellent relations with the working press. Here his mastery of the machinery of government and his incredible, detailed knowledge of the problems he faced were essential.

Another basic tool for leading public opinion was the "fireside chat," a fresh device for the presidency but one F. D. R. had developed as governor. He was a superb radio orator, either when addressing a multitude or when he was virtually alone in front of a microphone in his study. He reworked drafts which had been developed by his writers, with an uncanny touch for the telling, intimate, human phrase and anecdote. The public response to his chats, which he took care not to over-employ, was enormous, especially in his first term. His speeches provoked letters to members of Congress, and proved highly valuable to him in his relations with the legislative branch. In his chats he was often the moralist he felt the President should be.

Roosevelt took pains to keep track of public opinion. Letters and telegrams to the White House were read and tabulated, editorial opinion throughout the country was extracted and circulated among officials, and careful study was made of the new opinion polls. No President had ever gone so far in trying to gauge public response to his policies, and no President before him ever tried harder to find out what the people wanted from their government.

Roosevelt had never served in Congress, and seemed often to feel that it was too un-

wieldy for the role of true leadership in the federal government. He believed, with Woodrow Wilson, that the President should direct Congress in every phase of important legislation. Frequent brief messages, often accompanied by bills drafted by the executive branch, sped up the legislative process. Job-hunting members of Congress were sometimes put off until crucial acts were passed, the power of patronage being especially strong with the party change-over coinciding with widespread unemployment. The Democratic leaders of Congress, chiefly old-line Southern conservatives, were briefed by F. D. R. and his aides, and generally treated with great deference.

Yet it would be a mistake to describe the Congress, even during the Hundred Days, as a "rubber-stamp" for the President. Indeed, the temper of Congress in the first term was often more radical than that of the administration. Thus, it took Republican support to put over the Economy Act; isolationists from the West managed to influence the monetary policies; and the initiative for pro-labor legislation generally came from the Congress.

In the second term, Roosevelt ran into serious difficulties with his legislation, even though he had enormous nominal Democratic majorities in both houses. For a time in 1937-1938 he seemed to have lost his touch. His court and reorganization plans were rejected by Congress, amid bitter scenes. His abortive "purge" in the 1938 primaries brought him charges of executive interference in the legislative branch. After 1938, Congress enacted no more major pieces of domestic reform legislation, and scuttled some minor parts of the New Deal already established.

Yet, as he became almost totally concerned with the world crisis, F. D. R. managed to work out new arrangements with the legislative branch. Even though the Republican-Southern Democrat majorities blocked further reforms, he was able to secure the necessary legislative implementation of his defense and foreign policies.

It should be noticed, too, that Roosevelt wooed non-Democrats, and won many to his cause. Although a thorough partisan, he was careful to keep himself and his administration slightly apart from the party. He

could thus use it when he needed it without being its captive.

Roosevelt opened a new era in public administration when he sought and won from Congress delegations of authority never before held by the President. Executive orders came forth in profusion in the first term, and it was some time before they became systematized in an orderly fashion. The code-making authority provided by the National Industrial Recovery Act added to the confusion, until it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1935. Executive orders in the areas of defense and war in the latter part of F. D. R.'s presidency were somewhat more orderly, but sometimes they were lacking in clarity.

But there is more to administration than lovely flow-charts, and history may give F. D. R. better marks than his own generation did in this field. It must be remembered that Roosevelt was always in the midst of crisis, facing unprecedented problems. As Clinton Rossiter has put it, "Governments bent on social reform are bound to be wasteful of time and money; Presidents who lead such governments have bigger things to think about than petty details of administration."³

Roosevelt generally picked strong and able administrators and encouraged them to move ahead, retaining for himself only the final power of decision on basic policy. The results included some memorable feuding, bickering and squabbling over jurisdiction, much of which F. D. R. seemed positively to relish. Whatever else may be said about the Roosevelt administration, it was colorful: "a darkling plain of administrative confusion, where bureaucrats clashed by night."⁴ Professor Schlesinger has advanced the apt term, "competitive theory of administration,"⁵ to describe Roosevelt's approach.

In an institutional sense Roosevelt also reshaped the presidency. In 1939, carrying out authority granted by the revised Reorganization Act, he set up the Executive Office of the President.⁶ By this means he secured assistance which kept him informed, helped him in planning, protected his time, and aided him in seeing that policy was actually carried out. No single act of the

Roosevelt era contributed more to the modern presidency.

Conclusion

Roosevelt's wartime role was not essentially different from his conduct of his office in the 1930's, in spite of the necessary shift in his major objectives. He was very much the commander-in-chief, master of detail, strategist and spokesman. He was far less accessible to those not directly involved in the war effort, and gradually he lost much of his gusto for domestic politics. He was less than ever concerned with mere partisanship in his policy-making appointments, and was very careful to avoid Wilson's mistake of making plans for the postwar world seem personal and partisan. Toward the end of his relish for the office itself had dimmed. When he died, he was himself as much a war casualty as any who had fallen in Normandy.

Under Roosevelt the American presidency reached new heights of power and influence. And until almost the end, it was permeated with his unique personality. His own qualities, among which must be listed flexibility, a flair for the dramatic, personal conservatism, warmth, good humor, sympathy, idealism, receptivity, skill at maneuver, curiosity, optimism and a sense of history, were basic elements of the office itself from 1933 almost to the end. Clinton Rossiter has listed five extra-constitutional functions of the modern presidency: chief of party, voice of the people, protector of the peace, manager of prosperity, and leader of a coalition of free nations.⁷ F. D. R. can be said to have originated the fourth of these and to have added new dimensions to each of the others.

Roosevelt was, of course, a unique individual. He added much to the lustre of the presidency, establishing precedents and structural reforms which will continue to influence his successors. When his generation had its rendezvous with destiny, Franklin D. Roosevelt was there to preside.

³ Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency* (Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 112.

⁴ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Coming of the New Deal* (Houghton Mifflin, 1958), p. 536.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 528.

⁶ Executive Order No. 8248, *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (Macmillan, 1941), 1939 Volume, pp. 490-506.

⁷ Rossiter, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-28.

In this excellent analysis, Louis W. Koenig gives a new dimension to the administrations of Harry S. Truman: "Truman was the first President to give the presidency an enduring 'peace time' global orientation. Because communism fought everywhere with many means, the presidency too had to cast its nets wide." It is this author's opinion that "...Truman regularized the global dimensions of the presidency."

Truman's Global Leadership

By LOUIS W. KOENIG

Professor of Government, New York University

HARRY S. Truman's victory in the 1948 presidential election is both a monumental provider of hope for all underdogs and a clue to the essence of his administration. Truman won in 1948 against odds seldom known in politics. Two years before, in the congressional elections of 1946, his party had, for the first time in 16 years, lost control of Congress. There was the cheerless statistic that of seven vice-presidents who had succeeded to the presidency, only two had later been elected to the office, Theodore Roosevelt and Calvin Coolidge. Truman's grim pre-convention situation approached a debacle when Henry Wallace broke off from the Democratic party and announced his own candidacy, and a Southern revolt loomed.

Worst of all, a full-scale revolt against Truman was attempted in Philadelphia just before the national convention opened. Jacob M. Arvey, Chicago Democratic leader, James Roosevelt, state chairman of California, Mayor Hubert Humphrey of Minne-

apolis, Chester Bowles, Mayor O'Dwyer, the Americans for Democratic Action and various Southern Democrats, ranging from New Dealer Senator Lester Hill, to Dixiecrat, J. Strom Thurmond, joined in common cause to stop Truman. The movement failed only because no suitable substitute candidate could be found. Dwight D. Eisenhower and William O. Douglas were earnestly considered, but to no avail. Truman was eventually nominated, but not unanimously as befits a President seeking re-election.

Truman entered the 1948 campaign as a nominee his party had openly demonstrated it did not want, a nominee that it thought would surely be beaten, running on a record which, by inference, a large and influential part of the Democratic organization thought should be repudiated.

Truman's victory against overwhelming odds was accomplished by a plan and technique of campaigning which deserve the status of classics and will surely be consulted by presidential candidates in the future. Truman's campaign opened when he appeared before the Philadelphia convention in a bright white flannel suit and delivered a fiery acceptance speech attacking the Republican Eightieth Congress. In the ensuing summer and fall, he applied himself unstintingly, making six separate campaign trips for a total of 25,000 miles and 250 speeches. (His opponent, Thomas E. Dewey, made three trips totaling 16,000 miles and 175 speeches.)

As a campaigner, Truman's forte was to extemporize before small crowds. Given his style of delivery, he was least effective read-

Louis W. Koenig is the author of *The Invisible Presidency* published earlier this year, editor of *The Truman Administration*, and co-author, with Edward S. Corwin of *The Presidency Today*. He served in the State Department during the Truman administration and was a member of the foreign affairs task force of the first Hoover Commission. He has also been employed by the Bureau of the Budget.

ing his major speeches. In 1948, he was known to make as many as 14 extempore speeches in one day, from dawn until midnight. His whistle stop talks followed a set pattern, commencing with pleasantries about local scenery, industry and farming, on which his knowledge was encyclopedic. Then came a harangue on the menace of the Republican party, followed by a preview of the Truman utopia.

How did Truman win in 1948? It is a mystery which still evokes speculation. Various explanations can be offered. He succeeded in identifying the Republican presidential party with the Republican congressional party, no mean accomplishment, for the two entities were quite different things. He succeeded, in a word, in pinning upon Dewey the barren domestic achievements, the obdurate conservatism of the Republican Eightieth Congress. Truman's campaigning evoked a popular image of a blunt and folksy candidate in vivid contrast to Dewey who stolidly maintained a fence-sitting posture and exhibited a rather distant arid personality who specialized in platitudes about national unity.

Various surveys have highlighted the importance of the "pocketbook" vote, of farmers, urban workers and housewives who credited the Democrats with prosperity and high wage rates and blamed the Republicans for ending price controls and failing to bring prices down. Racial and religious groups were rallied by Truman's promises in their behalf. Other analyses have stressed Dewey's failure to get out the Republican vote, especially the vote which is irregular in participation, but which when asserted tends to be Republican. The Dewey popular vote was the smallest received by Republican candidates since Landon in 1932.

The Truman presidency, operative in a period of basic historic change, can be viewed from many vantage points. Truman is the only President in American history who successfully progressed through a tri-part cycle as a war and reconstruction President, and again as a war President. As successor to Roosevelt, he completed the fighting of World War II, managed the country through a period of economic reconversion and reconstruction, and then was caught up in sev-

eral wars with the new Communist enemy, the worst of which was the Korean "police action." In comparison with such transitional Presidents as Andrew Johnson, and Warren G. Harding, Truman emerges most favorably. Harding was lost in ineptitude and the corruption of those around him, Johnson in raging warfare with Congress which almost resulted in his expulsion from office. Like both Johnson and Harding, Truman took on his difficult assignment with a minimum of preparation and under circumstances almost barren of advantage. He came into office without being briefed on the processes or current problems of government, without having in the Cabinet a single member who was devoted to him personally, and without knowing who the people were to whom he could best turn for counsel.

Truman as vice-president apparently obtained a minimum of tutelage from President Roosevelt. Roosevelt was not in Washington a month altogether during the 82 days that Truman was vice-president. The Roosevelt papers disclose that the two met by appointment only twice. Truman himself estimates that he saw Roosevelt only eight times during the year before his death, and these meetings contributed little to Truman's preparation for the presidency.

Like other Presidents before him, Truman found his main opportunities for achievement in the field of foreign affairs. Certainly, Winston Churchill's characterization of Truman as one who "has taken great and valiant decisions" receives its chief justification from the President's record in foreign affairs. Truman was in office when the hopes and expectations built up during World War II of a successful working rapport with the Russians evaporated in disillusionment. As long as he knew them, the Russians pursued a course of secretiveness, duplicity, suspiciousness and violent hostility.

The Kremlin bedeviled Truman with war in Korea and the overthrow of the Nationalist government on the Chinese mainland. The Kremlin put American forces under siege in Berlin, subdued Eastern Europe and posed a formidable threat of the same fate for the western portion of the continent. In 1948, matters reached a point where Truman expected a general war.

Truman's response to the Soviet challenge was imaginative, daring and successful. The creative and enormously successful European Recovery Program speeded the repair of the damage of the war, brought the economy of Western Europe to a state of productivity which exceeded its pre-war capacity, and rescued France and Italy from incipient Communist domination. The ingenious Point Four program offered hope and assistance to the peoples of "underdeveloped" areas in their ages-long drive to master the essentials of a satisfactory human existence. Without Point Four, many of these areas would have been easy prey to communism.

Against the Soviet threat the policy of containment was developed, a pliant adjustable holding operation along the whole periphery of Soviet dominion. Containment was launched in 1947 with the promulgation of the "Truman doctrine" and the founding of the program of aid to Greece and Turkey. After the Truman doctrine was declared, no government, not directly under Russian military pressure, succumbed to the Communists. In the three most contested instances of containment in action—Greece, the Berlin airlift, and Korea—the first two ended in United States victories and the last in at least a stalemate. Containment met the Communist challenges in widely separated theaters, yet it did not shut the door to negotiations with the Russians, nor did it bring about what Truman wanted above all else to avoid, a third World War.

Domestic Policy

On the domestic scene, Truman was the oracle and advocate of the "Fair Deal," a cluster of reforms he repeatedly proposed throughout his administration. The Fair Deal was a modernization of Roosevelt's New Deal, or as Truman himself once put it, the Fair Deal was the embodiment of "the progressive and humane principles of the New Deal" with "changes (as) may be required here and there to meet changing conditions." Both the New and Fair Deals operated over a broad range, including housing, social security, education, natural resources and the like. In the Fair Deal, however, Truman moved more swiftly and more deeply on two subjects which held a more removed place in the Roosevelt program:

the civil rights and national health insurance issues.

The Fair Deal resulted in little enacted legislation. Truman's usual course was to propose a program of many parts and then meet with almost complete rebuff from Congress. His most successful area was civil rights on which he achieved no legislation at all. Nevertheless, by constantly championing the subject, Truman prepared a receptive climate of public opinion concerning civil rights and established a necessary basis of acquiescence for the subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court on segregation.

With Congress consistently opposed to its chief features, the Fair Deal rarely emerged from the blueprint stage. Its principal significance, consequently, was that it kept the flame of reform alive in an era that was unfavorable for reform. The Fair Deal's political approach was as promise rather than reality and as such Truman profitably exploited it. He never particularly organized his administration in the expectation that the Fair Deal would be put to the test of implementation. Thus while Roosevelt sent drafts of legislation to Congress incorporating the New Deal, Truman rarely did this for the Fair Deal. Nor did Truman surround himself with a corps of "Fair Dealers" who could be so readily identified as Roosevelt's New Dealers. Actually, very few men of liberal views occupied responsible posts in the Truman administration.

His inner circle of advisers were men of conservative stripe: John Snyder, a banker, Fred M. Vinson, a conservative Southerner, his military idol, General George C. Marshall, and "Wall Streeter" Robert M. Lovett. The solitary exceptions were Leon Keyserling of the Council of Economic Advisers and Oscar Ewing of the Federal Security Administration, and neither could be said to have been at the center of power.

With a substantial degree of success, Truman defended the presidency against a number of serious attacks upon the integrity of its powers by the legislative and judicial branches. In the Truman years, Congress was particularly disposed to challenge and infringe upon the President's powers and office. At one extreme was Senator McCarthy and his lawless sorties, harassing the

civil service with smears and falsifications. In foreign affairs, the Bricker amendment was launched to limit the President's power to make executive agreements and treaties. There was new insistence in Congress to know the inner secrets of executive action.

General Omar Bradley, as Chief of Staff, was requested by a congressional committee to divulge the content of his conversations with President Truman on the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur. In 1950, Senator Taft challenged the President's right to send additional troops to Europe and to determine their number without advance congressional approval.

But the worst challenge to presidential authority which Truman faced was the hostile steel seizure decision (*Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer*) by the Supreme Court. Truman is one of the few Presidents who have called down upon themselves an adverse judicial interpretation of their powers. Although the full impact of the *Youngstown* case is not yet altogether clear, it is, on its face, one of the broadest limitations of the President's constitutional power so far delineated by the Supreme Court.

Truman added new dimensions to the presidency and demonstrated that the office can be successfully operated without reliance upon certain dimensions hitherto regarded as essential. Truman was the first President to give the presidency an enduring "peacetime" global orientation. Because communism fought everywhere with many means, the presidency too had to cast its nets wide. "I have been trying," Truman once declared at an informal luncheon address in Kansas City in 1950,

to mobilize the moral forces of the world—Catholics, Protestants, Jews, the eastern church, the Grand Lama of Tibet, the Indian Sanskrit moral code—I have been trying to mobilize all these people to the understanding that their welfare and the existence of decency and honor in the world depend on our working together, and not trying to cut each other's throat.

Truman also provided leadership to a half dozen alliances around the globe. His situation was more complicated than Roosevelt's, who guided a single coalition united by stress of war. The administration of the various alliances directly and personally involved

President Truman. He determined the amounts of military and economic aid to be given to the member countries, and he too determined the size of their contribution as a condition of our aid. The President had an influence on, say, the French budget beyond that of leading French politicians.

In other ways, Truman regularized the global dimensions of the presidency. He became an important force in the United Nations, appearing before the General Assembly and proposing concrete programs for its sessions. He became a principal performer on the Voice of America which beamed his messages to many lands. He provided succor to the aspirations for independence of Israel, Indonesia, Burma and other countries.

Under Truman, significant changes of emphasis occurred in several major areas of presidential power and activity. One of these is the President's role as commander-in-chief. The atomic bomb was first used, at Truman's order, against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the hydrogen bomb was constructed at his initiative. In the Truman administration, the presidential guardianship of these awesome weapons was exercised in almost absolute privacy. The President could request and receive huge appropriations from Congress and disclose very little of his purpose and activity under the necessity for secrecy.

Another area of activity very much emphasized in the Truman administration was the President's involvement as an emergency participant in labor-management disputes. Although Presidents before Truman were enmeshed in this area, what distinguished his administration was the paramouncy he gave to his attentions to labor-management difficulties. Truman's involvement was not simply a matter of personal decision but was fostered by the contemporary economic environment. The general unionization of many basic industries, the rise of industry-wide bargaining, the intention of labor to hold its wartime gains and of management to exact maximum profits from reconversion together produced an historic high wave of strikes in 1946. It was not exceptional to have simultaneously a coal strike and a nationwide railroad strike.

In his own intensive application to the labor-management problem, Truman composed numerous messages to Congress pro-

posing remedial legislation; he sponsored labor-management conferences, appointed emergency fact-finding boards, and personally presided over eleventh-hour negotiations in the White House between the disputants. He sought injunctions from the courts, fines for John L. Lewis, and seized plants and whole industries threatened or paralyzed by work stoppages.

Truman sponsored many changes in the administrative organization of the presidency. In lieu of what Rexford G. Tugwell has called "the glorious informality" of Franklin D. Roosevelt's administrative methods, Truman sought to impose more order and system upon the conduct of presidential administration through the creation of new staff institutions and services and the realignment of old ones.

The National Security Council, patterned after the long-standing British Council of Imperial Defense, was established in 1947 and provided major assistance in preparing the President for the many politico-military crises which kept cropping up in succeeding years. The National Security Resources Board was set up to provide mobilization plans for various degrees of war emergency. The Council of Economic Advisers was an innovation of 1946 to assist the President in the preparation of economic reports, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, created almost casually during World War II, was given a statutory basis and its duties extended. Truman himself was a major factor in the success of the first Hoover Commission which in 1949 proposed numerous improvements in the organization of the Executive branch.

President Truman went to great lengths to establish and maintain his personal mastery of the Executive branch. This entailed the assertion of his own authority against internal challenge and the building up of a subordinate officialdom loyal to himself and his policies. He dared to remove the popular, but insubordinate, General Douglas MacArthur, from his Korean command. He skillfully accomplished the delicate feat of substituting a Truman cabinet for the inherited Franklin D. Roosevelt cabinet. Truman dismissed Henry Wallace, Louis Johnson and J. Howard McGrath from their cabinet posts and the evidence suggests that he elbowed out Henry Morgenthau. One of

Franklin D. Roosevelt's favorite liberals, Harold Ickes, was impelled to resign in extreme dudgeon, and another, Marriner Eccles, was demoted from the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve Board. Truman also broke with the man he first turned to upon becoming President, James F. Byrnes, and with his chief mobilizer in the Korean conflict, Charles Wilson of General Electric.

Truman contrived to run the presidency effectively in difficult times with only limited support from Congress. In domestic legislation, his proposed Fair Deal program was almost wholly ignored by Congress. The term "Do-Nothing" which Truman applied to the Republican Eightieth Congress could have been applied with equal merit to the Democratic Eighty-first Congress produced by the election of 1948 in which Truman achieved his sensational victory. Except for housing, the domestic program of the Fair Deal was hardly more successful in the Eighty-first Congress than in the Eighty-second. In foreign affairs, Truman could achieve his necessary legislative support only through a bipartisan coalition. The leader of this coalition was Senator Arthur Vandenberg who had a strong sense of mission.

In return for the Senator's support, Truman had to yield some of the initiative in foreign affairs which he believed rightfully his. In a very real sense, Truman was the captive of Vandenberg. Otherwise, in dealing with such urgencies as the Korean conflict, the steel strike of 1952 and the Berlin blockade, Truman relied heavily on his presidential prerogatives as commander-in-chief and chief executive. In such major domestic fields as civil rights and public health, he utilized his speeches and messages to Congress and the public to arouse general concern over these problems and to draw attention to his proposed solutions.

Above all, Harry Truman stands out as a man who responded courageously to the challenges of his office. The quality of courage surely dominates his most revealing decisions and commitments—in his confrontation of Stalin at Potsdam, in his unhesitating answer to the challenge in Korea, in his acceptance of the awful responsibility for the use of the atomic bomb, in the faith and fortitude that carried him through the 1948 campaign.

Discussing the conflict between Eisenhower's popular appeal and his record of personal or party achievement, this student of American foreign policy points out that "with Dulles' death in 1959 American policy became equated with the personality of the President." Indeed, Norman Graebner continues, "Eisenhower's leadership has given rise to a curious standard of appraisal. For almost eight years his adherents have measured his success by popularity, not achievement."

Eisenhower's Popular Leadership

By NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

Professor of History, University of Illinois

AFTER ALMOST eight years in the White House, Dwight D. Eisenhower remains the most enigmatic phenomenon in the history of the American presidency. Never has a popular leader who dominated so completely the national political scene affected so negligibly the essential historic processes of his time. Never has a President so renowned for his humanitarian instincts avoided so assiduously all the direct challenges to the status of individual civil rights. Promoted in 1952 as the man best qualified to deal with the Russians, he has resolved or mitigated none of the cold war conflicts which existed when he assumed office. Elected with an unshakable reputation in military affairs, he has met expanding criticism from military experts for his primary decisions on national defense. Heralded as a man of peace, he has entered his last months in office with the United States subjected to humiliating and unprecedented abuse in many areas of the free world.

This evident dichotomy between the popu-

lar image of the President and the net gains of his leadership is a simple and disturbing expression of that traditional American philosophy which denies politics a distinct and honorable place in national affairs. American society has long admired personality more than political wisdom, technique more than substance, honesty more than judgment. In a nation where private virtues have become the measure for public as well as private action, the President's transparent goodness and integrity alone have permitted him to escape direct responsibility for the nation's performance at home and abroad.

But Eisenhower as a political phenomenon has also been the product of his times, for he has fit the 1950's like a glove. Prosperity, by 1953, had eliminated most of the direct economic and social challenges of the past and with them the hard contest of power which characterizes politics in periods of stress. This absence of pervading strife has contributed to the nation's complacency and sustained the illusion that good will is sufficient for successful leadership. When the President has failed to achieve what was expected of him, the country has excused the failure as either inconsequential or the product of perversity in others.

For Republican leaders, therefore, the task of maintaining Eisenhower's popularity has consisted largely in keeping the American people mindful of his personal attributes. Republican editors, whether motivated by the President's obvious good intentions or by the knowledge that for a minority party he has been the greatest asset in over a generation, have given him the most adulatory press

Norman A. Graebner is a frequent contributor to *Current History*, and a contributing editor. Early in 1958, Mr. Graebner delivered the Commonwealth Fund Lectures in London on the subject, "The Revolution in American Politics, 1837-1877." He is the author of *Empire on the Pacific* and *The New Isolationism*, and is also a contributor to many scholarly journals.

coverage in American history. The principle that right intent is of the essence has permitted White House officials to isolate Eisenhower from his policies. Indeed, even those Democratic leaders in Congress who have lampooned most things that the administration has done have been careful not to blame the President directly.

That Eisenhower's personality would become the dominant fact of American politics in the 1950's was apparent even before his nomination. As a purely military figure he was clearly one of the most "available" candidates in the nation's experience. His widely publicized and genuine personal charm, added to an illustrious military reputation at a time when such a reputation had some relevance to the requirements for successful leadership, made his selection by the Republican convention synonymous with his election to the White House.

Beyond Eisenhower's personal popularity nothing in the 1952 election was clear. The Republican candidate was not offered to the nation as the exponent of any specific economic faith. His personal "creed" had been published in the New York *Herald Tribune* prior to his nomination; it avowed a fundamental economic conservatism in which he warned that too much federal intervention would turn "the American dream into an American nightmare." But such views were not publicized, and Republican campaigning avoided any open clash with established Democratic economic dogma.

Eisenhower's Appeal in 1952

In electing Eisenhower, the nation demanded nothing more than a kind of independent leadership from a great personality who could rise above the strife of party. It was this quality in him that brought millions of stay-at-homes to the polls to produce a landslide victory. Eisenhower had not shattered the Democratic party. Adlai Stevenson, his Democratic opponent, received 3,000,000 more votes than did Harry Truman in 1948.

Dominating the new administration in January, 1953, were representatives of the managerial class—the highly-paid men hired to manage the great industrial and commercial enterprises of the country. This new class had thrown its corporate power behind Eisenhower in 1952; now it provided two-

thirds of his original appointments to cabinet and key administrative posts. This group interpreted the election as a clarion call to effect a conservative revolution.

Whatever the composition and intent of the new leadership, it could not ignore the twin legacies of the past—the New Deal and the cold war. Republican leaders might speak the rhetoric of free enterprise, but in the essential areas of national action they deviated scarcely from the Truman tradition. Secretary Humphrey could neither dismantle the budget nor halt the continuing inflation. Nor could Secretary Benson return the American farmer to free enterprise. Eventually he would hand out more in agricultural subsidies than any of his Democratic predecessors.

The "New Look" in military policy spelled out the administration's effort to fulfill its promise of tax reduction without endangering the nation. The President made it clear that he was tailoring military power to budgetary considerations. In May, 1953, he suggested a budget cut of \$8 billion to achieve "maximum military strength within economic capacities." A healthy and functioning economy, he said, was inseparable from true defense.

Eventually the New Look resulted in the burgeoning emphasis on nuclear weapons, for with such weapons the nation could achieve maximum destructiveness at minimum cost. Military experts warned that the concentration on such weapons limited the nation's strategic flexibility and, in the event of aggression, narrowed the American response to inaction or the mushroom cloud. The President held his own simply by throwing his personal prestige behind the administration's basic military decisions.

Necessity had taken its toll of Republican ambitions. Occasional legislation like *Tidelands Oil* or the *Dixon-Yates contract* caught the old spirit, but most bills resembled the remnants of the New Deal. Never had a national leadership been forced to operate so completely outside its established philosophy. This, in essence, spelled out the Republican dilemma. With its deep allegiance to American business, the administration refused to modify or restate its neo-Hooverian beliefs. It talked the language of Main Street, but Main Street does not control elections.

What remained in the Republican arsenal were the alleged failures in Truman foreign policy that had been exploited effectively in the 1952 campaign. For the Taftites in Congress, foreign policy had become the pawn in the conservative revolution with American failures in the Far East attributed to Democratic subversion and even New Dealism itself. Through congressional investigation the Republican leadership in Congress proceeded to delve into everything from past treason and corruption to the decisions of the Korean War.

Eisenhower did nothing to prevent this continuing Republican assault on the Democratic past although Democratic support was essential for the success of his program in Congress. His administration quickly came to terms with Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin as the price of party unity. In exchange for administration silence the Wisconsin Senator agreed to attack nothing that occurred after January 20, 1953. Eventually the administration itself became implicated in offering the diet of "warmed-over spy" when Herbert Brownell, the Attorney General, resurrected the Harry Dexter White case in 1953. As the administration, under Executive Order 10450, relieved hundreds from the federal payroll, it never made clear the nature of the charges.

Democratic leaders never forced the President to pay the political price for silencing his own right wing for their support in Congress. The foreign aid bill of 1953, for example, passed an almost equally divided House with 160 Democratic and 119 Republican votes. On critical matters of foreign affairs it was the Democratic party that carried the administration's program. These Democratic votes, for which nothing was required, permitted Eisenhower to escape the internal warfare of his party.

The New Republicanism

Sharp Republican reverses in November, 1953, demonstrated that the party leadership had not found a satisfactory formula. Republican chairman Leonard W. Hall admitted, "There is no question about it—as of today we are in trouble politically." To liberal Republicans there was an answer. The party required essentially a restatement of its philosophy that would form a better compro-

mise between the past and present. Jacob K. Javits of New York suggested that liberal Republicanism contained the balance that would meet the challenge of American politics. "Republican progressives," he wrote in *The New York Times Magazine Section* of November 15, 1953,

subscribe whole-heartedly to the principle of individual freedom and to the idea of an economic system of competitive, private enterprise functioning with government help and cooperation rather than under government domination. But they also hold that belief in free enterprise does not eliminate a wide area of activities in which government can and should provide the individual's welfare by providing him with greater opportunities for social improvement than he could otherwise obtain.

Eisenhower grasped at the new formula. The government, he explained, believed in a program that was liberal with respect to public needs but conservative in matters of finance. In his message of January, 1954, he promised the business community that it would be expected to meet the basic need of an expanding economy. But the government, he added, would face the issues of welfare, social security, health, education and housing. "Banishing of destitution and cushioning the shock of personal disaster on the individual," he said, "are proper concerns of all levels of government, including the federal government."

Republican writers such as Arthur Larson, author of *A Republican Looks at his Party*, accepted the challenge of giving the new consensus the stature of a philosophy which was neither old Republicanism or New Dealism. They insisted that Eisenhower had become the architect and embodiment of a coherent political movement which had an entity of its own and which would continue after him. In a sense the new Republicanism reflected the President's amorphous vision of the general good which could best be achieved with moderation in everything. To describe his program, the President applied the terms "moderate progressivism" and "progressive moderation."

Essentially the new middle represented Republican conservatism which had made its bargain with the New Deal. As such it was an apt expression of the times, not a new philosophy of government. It simply re-

flected the conviction that policies of moderation are most suitable for times of prosperity. Efficiency and decentralization are natural goals in any post-crisis period.

Eventually the new Republicanism was reduced to an effort to explain the nation's high prosperity in terms of expanded economic freedom under the new Republican hegemony. At times it even identified prosperity with American virtues—a strong devotion to the family, the urge to work and save, the ambition to excel. Nowhere did Republican faith harbor the slightest doubt that the new balance had cured the business cycle. Assuming the persistence of prosperity, it contained no body of thought to guide the nation when things went wrong. It was not concerned with innovation or foreign affairs.

Actually the nation had long been moving toward what has been called the Eisenhower equilibrium. But the movement was prompted more by the mood of complacency and the conviction that enough had been done than by the attraction of any new economic doctrine. At the heart of the new center stood the conservative Democrats who after 1954 managed the affairs of Congress. With them were the Eisenhower Republicans of 1952 strengthened by the increasing conversion of Old Guard Republicans through political, economic and diplomatic necessity. Both groups agreed that the economy was basically sound and that the United States could not escape its challenges abroad. In the new consensus was an almost unprecedented feeling of interparty comradeship which blurred party distinctions. It left little room for the extremes in national political affairs. But the new center would last only as long as the nation's prosperity. Any serious cracking of the economy would again send politicians and the public scurrying to the edges of the political spectrum in search of answers and action.

The Eisenhower Leadership

Eisenhower's concept of his office was humble, even deferential, when compared to that of successful Presidents of the past. He had little taste for politics—the struggle for power among rival interests. Claiming no constitutional prerogatives for the executive branch, he pledged himself to restore confidence between the President and Con-

gress so that both branches might work “with patience and good will to insure that the government is not divided against itself.”

Eisenhower viewed his role as that of a presiding officer who exhorted and proposed, but who refused to enforce party discipline. Congressman, he has said repeatedly, have a right to vote their own consciences.

Eisenhower was by training and habit a man of action, not of ideas. Abstractions never meant so much to him as things. For that reason the White House organization was designed to keep intellectual conflict within the administration to a minimum. Sherman Adams, White House Chief of Staff, controlled the information coming into the White House. James C. Hagerty, White House Press Secretary, controlled the information that came out. Together they managed to keep the President almost completely isolated. The President had never acquired the habit of reading the newspapers when he was in the Army; nor did he develop the habit after he entered the White House. He secured his news largely through the Army system of being “briefed” by spokesmen of Central Intelligence, the Pentagon, the State Department, or the White House staff.

Nor had the President any greater interest in other outside sources of information. Washington officials complained that they could not reach the President. Occasionally he conferred with Republican leaders in formal meetings, with White House aides sitting in.

Eisenhower once explained why he refused to become involved in details. “I do not believe,” he informed a press conference, “that any individual . . . can do the best job just sitting at a desk and putting his face in a bunch of papers.” It was his purpose, he added, “to keep his mind free of inconsequential details” so that he could make “clearer and better judgments.” The President constructed his White House staff to eliminate the burden of detail.

Some writers have become ecstatic over Eisenhower's concept and use of his cabinet. They have prophesied that this organization, with its regularly scheduled meetings and carefully prepared agenda, will remain an integral part of the American governmental system. Perhaps the uniqueness of the system, relying on papers prepared by the execu-

tive departments, rests in the fact that it is admirably designed to achieve a broad consensus on administrative decisions. Eisenhower has viewed his administrative machine as partially a military staff, partially a board of directors.

The cohesion and loyalty of the White House team was a controlling factor in the President's willingness to run for a second term. "It's taken four years to get this outfit into top working shape," he told a friend. "It would be a shame to wash it out just as they are reaching their peak efficiency." If the staff system has secured the President's objectives of consensus and efficiency, it has also led to a diffusion of responsibility, illustrated most clearly in the U-2 incident of May, 1960.

Eisenhower has refused to permit his official duties to interfere with hunting, golfing and bridge. He has sought relaxation at every opportunity away from Washington, usually at his Gettysburg farm or at the Augusta National Golf Club. Occasionally he has taken a vacation in the West or New England. He once explained to a Washington press conference that recreation was essential to maintain the fitness necessary to meet the demands of the presidency. Hagerty has made it clear that when the President is absent from Washington a courier plane brings official papers every other day. In addition, the President often confers with officials in Washington by telephone, although more than once he has revealed extreme impatience at being disturbed by official calls from the capital.

Most Presidents have sought relief from the burdens of office. It was to the President's critics simply a matter of balance, and many believed that too often golf took precedence over matters of state. Edward P. Morgan of A.B.C. quipped characteristically in April, 1960: "President Eisenhower had hoped to helicopter to Gettysburg to cast his ballot today but found his schedule too tight. At the last minute, however, he did manage to squeeze in a round of golf."

Undoubtedly Eisenhower's concern for things material has had its effect on the intellectual climate of Washington. Many of the experts who drifted into Washington as economic and foreign policy advisers soon left. In every area of public policy the most im-

pressive writers and thinkers are not only outside the government service but also almost totally ignored by those who make policy. Noting the absence of intellect in the nation's capital, James Reston of *The New York Times* Washington staff, complained in December, 1957:

We are in a race with the pace of history. We are in a time when brain power is more important than fire power, but in the last five years, the President has gradually drifted apart from the intellectual opinion of the country, filled up his social hours with bantering locker-room cronies, and denied himself the mental stimulus that is always available to any President.

The President's New Look

Whatever the nature of Eisenhower's leadership, his personality remained the unquestioned phenomenon in presidential politics. His image was that of a well-meaning man standing at the center of American life. Never was its impact clearer than at the San Francisco convention of 1956. Eisenhower was the convention; he was the party. He was beyond challenge. Much of the President's power, ironically, resulted from his party's decline during his first term.

This commanding position was also the product of the President's new look. Under Hagerty's coaching Eisenhower had learned to dominate the Washington press conference—an exceedingly important method of shaping the public impression of the President. By 1954, he was competely at ease, often bantering with reporters. He was increasingly better informed. He had learned to dodge questions for which he had no ready answer, avoiding the "bloopers" of his early months. Republican professionals now called him the greatest instinctive politician since F.D.R.

Eisenhower's television style, assiduously cultivated by professionals, had become technically perfect. Television, in fact, provided party managers with the perfect medium for maintaining the Eisenhower image, for what mattered was not the intellectual content of his speeches, but the sincerity and warmth which he communicated to the public.

The Eisenhower personality overshadowed the presidency itself. The traditional duties and obligations of office appeared inconsequential when contrasted with the warm and easy smile, the beaming face, the informal,

simple and unpretentious manner that captured the imagination of people everywhere. Even the most popular Presidents of the past had begun to lose much of their lustre long before they left the White House. But Eisenhower's stature continued to grow.

With the new look the President revealed more determination in office, more familiarity with issues. He spoke less of cooperation with Congress and more about defending the prerogatives of the executive. But energy and action are not the sole criteria for effective leadership. With his increased interest in the exercise of his powers the President demonstrated no new awareness of the great political forces in the world, no new evidence that he had any greater interest in ideas. Often he seemed to be placing his new leadership in the service of drift, providing, in the words of Richard H. Rovere, "the spectacle, novel in the history of the Presidency, of a man strenuously in motion yet doing essentially nothing—traveling all the time yet going nowhere."

The difficulty was not the President's firmness; it was the nature of his policies. It was less the decisiveness than the decisions themselves. Despite the energy behind them, Eisenhower's actions still suggested that there were no problems that good intentions would not cure.

Sustaining the Eisenhower image did little for the Republican organization. Party managers sought to exploit the President's personality. They succeeded merely in assuring the American people that whatever happened, the President, not the party, would assume the burdens of leadership. This accounts for the strang dichotomy between the President's growing popularity and the persistent decline in Republican strength. Republican Governor Theodore R. McKeldin of Maryland reminded a Republican audience in February, 1957, that the party "hasn't a thing that the country wants" except Eisenhower. Nowhere had the Republican party succeeded in turning the President's image into any genuine political gains.

What has characterized the Eisenhower foreign policies has been the substitution of principle and personality for the traditional ingredients of diplomacy. In large measure this approach was dictated by the successful Republican campaigning of 1952. For when

the Republican leadership, with its rhetoric of liberation, promised no less than the dismantling of both the Iron and Bamboo curtains, it denied itself the freedom to create future policy compatible with limited American power. Only when that leadership had disposed of its political symbols of Democratic iniquity and admitted publicly that it could not achieve what its key spokesmen, including the President, continued to promise during the months of party consolidation, could it formulate policy goals that had some relationship to the means at its disposal.

So completely had party objectives abroad over-reached American interest that the President's noteworthy achievements lay in *not* doing what members of his party demanded. His stature in the area of foreign affairs rested in his *refusal* to engage in war against mainland China, to become involved in the Indochinese civil war, to employ massive retaliation against Chinese cities.

It was the contribution of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to translate American demands on Moscow and Peking, anchored to domestic political requirements, to the high realm of principle. If politics and principle converged, it was because both sought the retreat of the Soviet bloc. To that extent Dulles' principles appeared to square with American security interests, and the fact that through six years they exceeded what this nation's power could achieve and prevented the settlement of every outstanding issue in the cold war seemed to make no difference. If United States leadership could not secure what it wanted of others, it could at least take comfort in its ideals.

Unfortunately this reduced Mr. Dulles' diplomacy to rhetoric, for nothing else remained. As Hans J. Morgenthau wrote in December, 1956:

When we heard spokesmen for the government propound the legal and moral platitudes which had passed for foreign policy in the interwar period, we thought that this was the way in which the government—as all governments must—tried to make the stark facts of foreign policy palatable to the people. . . . We were mistaken. Those platitudes *are* the foreign policy of the United States. . . .

If Dulles settled nothing, he also gave nothing away. The result of his tenure as Secretary of State was stalemate—a stalemate in

which the cold war shifted to intense military and economic competition. Here Dulles' leadership could not prevent sharp reverses in Western power and prestige.

With Dulles' death in 1959 American policy became equated with the personality of the President. The rhetoric of liberation, now anchored to such homilies as "peace under freedom" or "peace with justice," continued, but even more important in the new diplomacy was the very person of the President. State visits abroad would give him the opportunity to demonstrate his good will before the world. Thereafter his success was measured not by diplomatic settlement but by the size and enthusiasm of the crowds that lined the thoroughfares of the cities of Europe, Asia and Latin America when he visited. These pressing throngs gave the impression that this nation was at last winning the cold war.

Unfortunately there was always the marked dichotomy between the cheers of the crowds and the lack of diplomatic progress in the chancelleries. Eisenhower's world travels were continuing expressions of American good intent, but they encompassed no action, commitments, or positive ideas to give permanent meaning to the tours. What remained after the experience was the evidence of personality and the absence of concrete achievement.

It was ironic that the President's good will tour of the Orient should be marred by Tokyo mobs, for the new diplomacy had been directed toward mobs. The President had been warned by writers, editors and even members of Congress, after the collapse of the Paris summit conference of May, 1960, not to run the risk of a trip around the fringes of the Communist world in the Far East. But to men who equated large crowds with diplomatic success here was the easiest method available to prove that the United States had lost nothing at Paris. What the cheers at Taipei and Tokyo might achieve was not clear. Had the President managed his trip to Japan he would have measured the triumph by the shouts of the people, for there was little to be gained in the quiet of the Japanese Foreign Office.

In a sense, Eisenhower's world tours comprised a final effort to create the illusion of

peace when all genuine diplomacy had ceased to exist. What seemed to matter was the President's ability to draw larger and more enthusiastic crowds than Premier Khrushchev. But the visit of a president or premier to another land has no function other than to expose the visiting dignitary to the people that jam the thoroughfares. It is a mutual demonstration of good will, but nothing more. For if actual diplomacy were the objective, that could be pursued more cheaply and effectively via normal diplomatic channels. Nothing better illustrates the ephemeral nature of state visits than Khrushchev's conviction that he had won over the support of the American public during his remarkable visit of September, 1959. In retrospect, the visit had no effect on Russian-American relations at all.

Eisenhower responded to his failures in Paris and Tokyo with an air of injured innocence. His own dignity amid the collapse of the summit created the impression that whatever went wrong he was not at fault. He continued to detach himself from personal responsibility or the opinion of the free world. For the loss of American prestige in the Far East he blamed the Communists, not the deep and reasonable doubts created by missiles and Soviet threats. He continued to identify world peace with his personal diplomacy, repeating this conviction after his return from the Orient in July, 1960:

No consideration of personal fatigue or inconvenience, no threat or argument would deter me from once again setting out on a course that has meant much for our country, for her friends, and for the cause of freedom—and peace with justice in the world.

Always the sacrifice was to the person, not to the nation in the form of added strength or reduced ambitions. In equating the cause of peace with the enthusiasm he received abroad, the President forgot that it is this nation's relations with the governments at Moscow and Peking, not with the crowds of New Delhi, Paris, or Taipei, that matter. In denying any error in judgment or policy, the President permitted no official review of his record. This solved no problems, but merely swept them under the rug.

Eisenhower's leadership has given rise to a curious standard of appraisal. For almost

(Continued on page 244)

Current Documents

CIVIL RIGHTS PLANKS IN THE PARTY PLATFORMS, 1960

The civil rights planks of the Democratic and Republican party platforms adopted at their national conventions provide a basis for comparison of the two parties on this vital issue. The text of the Democratic plank is taken from the "basic platform," which was submitted to the Democratic national convention, meeting in Los Angeles on July 12. On July 26, the Republican national convention also approved a civil rights plank. The texts of the planks follow:

The Democratic Platform on Civil Rights*

As we proceed with the urgent task of restoring America's productivity, confidence, and power, we will never forget that our national interest is more than the sum total of all the group interests in America.

When group interests conflict with the national interest, it will be the national interest which we serve.

On its values and goals the quality of American life depends. Here above all our national interest and our devotion to the rights of man coincide.

Democratic Administrations under Wilson, Roosevelt, and Truman led the way in pressing for economic justice for all Americans.

But man does not live by bread alone. A new Democratic Administration, like its predecessors, will once again look beyond material goals to the spiritual meaning of American society.

We have drifted into a national mood that accepts payola and quiz scandals, tax evasion and false expense accounts, soaring crime rates, influence-peddling in high government circles, and exploitation of sadistic violence as popular entertainment.

For eight long critical years our present national leadership has made no effective effort to reverse this mood.

The new Democratic administration will

The Republican Platform on Civil Rights

This nation was created to give expression, validity and purpose to our spiritual heritage—the supreme worth of the individual. In such a nation—a nation dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal—racial discrimination has no place. It can hardly be reconciled with a Constitution that guarantees equal protection under law to all persons. In a deeper sense, too, it is immoral and unjust. As to those matters within reach of political action and leadership, we pledge ourselves unreservedly to its eradication.

Equality under law promises more than equal right to vote and transcends mere relief from discrimination by government. It becomes a reality only when all persons have equal opportunity, without distinction of race, religion, color or national origin, to acquire the essentials of life—housing, education and employment. The Republican party—the party of Abraham Lincoln—from its very beginning has striven to make this promise a reality. It is today, as it was then, unequivocally dedicated to making the greatest amount of progress toward that objective.

We recognize that discrimination is not a problem localized in one area of the country, but rather a problem that must be faced by North and South alike. Nor is discrimination confined to the discrimination against Negroes. Discrimination in many, if not all, areas of the country on the basis of creed or national origin is equally insidious. Further

* Ed. note: topic headings inserted by editor.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

help create a sense of national purpose and higher standards of public behavior.

We shall also seek to create an affirmative new atmosphere in which to deal with racial divisions and inequalities which threaten both the integrity of our democratic faith and the proposition on which our nation was founded—that all men are created equal.

It is our faith in human dignity that distinguishes our open free society from the closed totalitarian society of the Communists.

The Constitution of the United States rejects the notion that the rights of man means the rights of some men only. We reject it too.

The right to vote is the first principle of self-government. The Constitution also guarantees to all Americans the equal protection of the laws.

It is the duty of the Congress to enact the laws necessary and proper to protect and promote these constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has the power to interpret these rights and the laws thus enacted.

It is the duty of the President to see that these rights are respected and the Constitution and laws as interpreted by the Supreme Court are faithfully executed.

What is now required is effective moral and political leadership by the whole Executive Branch of our government to make equal opportunity a living reality for all Americans.

As the party of Jefferson, we shall provide that leadership.

In every city and state in greater or lesser degree there is discrimination based on color, race, religion, or national origin.

If discrimination in voting, education, the administration of justice or segregated lunch-counters are the issues in one area, discrimination in housing and employment may be pressing questions elsewhere.

The peaceful demonstrations for first-class citizenship which have recently taken place in many parts of this country are a signal to all of us to make good at long last the guarantees of our Constitution.

The time has come to assure equal access for all Americans to all areas of community life, including voting booths, schoolrooms, jobs, housing and public facilities.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

we recognize that in many communities in which a century of custom and tradition must be overcome heartening and commendable progress has been made.

The Republican party is proud of the civil rights record of the Eisenhower administration. More progress has been made during the past eight years than in the preceding eighty years. We acted promptly to end discrimination in our nation's capital. Vigorous executive action was taken to complete swiftly the desegregation of the armed forces, veterans' hospitals, Navy yards, and other federal establishments.

We supported the position of the Negro school children before the Supreme Court. We believe the Supreme Court school decision was right and carried out in accordance with the mandate of the court.

Although the Democratic-controlled Congress watered them down, the administration's recommendations resulted in significant and effective civil rights legislation in both 1957 and 1960—the first civil rights statutes to be passed in more than eighty years.

Hundreds of Negroes have already been registered to vote as a result of Department of Justice action, some in counties where Negroes did not vote before. The new law will soon make it possible for thousands and thousands of Negroes previously disenfranchised to vote.

By executive order, a Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination in Government Employment has been re-established with broadened authority. Today, nearly one-fourth of all federal employees are Negro.

The President's Committee on Government Contracts, under the chairmanship of Vice-President Nixon, has become an impressive force for the elimination of discriminatory employment practices of private companies that do business with the government.

Other important achievements include initial steps toward the elimination of segregation in federally aided housing; the establishment of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, which enforces federal civil rights laws; and the appointment of the bipartisan Civil Rights Commission,

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM**[1. Voting]**

The Democratic administration which takes office next January will therefore use the full powers provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and 1960 to secure for all Americans the right to vote.

If these powers, vigorously invoked by a new Attorney General and backed by a strong and imaginative Democratic President, prove inadequate, further powers will be sought.

We will support whatever action is necessary to eliminate literacy tests and the payment of poll taxes as requirements for voting.

[2. Public Schools]

A new Democratic administration will also use its full powers—legal and moral—to insure the beginning of good faith compliance with the constitutional requirement that racial discrimination be ended in public education.

We believe that every school district affected by the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision should submit a plan providing for at least first-step compliance by 1963, the one hundredth anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation.

To facilitate compliance, technical and financial assistance should be given to school districts facing special problems of transition.

For this and for the protection of all other constitutional rights of Americans, the Attorney General should be empowered and directed to file civil injunction suits in federal courts to prevent the denial of any civil rights on grounds of race, creed, or color.

[3. Employment]

The new Democratic administration will support federal legislation establishing a fair employment practices commission effectively to secure for everyone the right to equal opportunity for employment.

In 1949 the President's Committee on Civil Rights recommended a permanent commission on civil rights. A new Democratic administration will broaden the scope and strengthen the powers of the present commission and make it permanent.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

which has prepared a significant report that lays the groundwork for further legislative action and progress.

The Republican record is a record of progress—not merely of promises. Nevertheless, we recognize that much remains to be done.

Each of the following pledges is practical and within realistic reach of accomplishment. They are serious—not cynical—pledges made to result in maximum progress.

1. Voting

We pledge:

Continued vigorous enforcement of the civil rights laws to guarantee the right to vote to all citizens in all areas of the country; and

Legislation to provide that the completion of six primary grades in a state accredited school is conclusive evidence of literacy for voting purposes.

2. Public Schools

We pledge:

The Department of Justice will continue its vigorous support of court orders for school desegregation. Desegregation suits now pending involve at least 39 school districts. Those suits and others already concluded will affect most major cities in which school desegregation is being practiced.

We will propose legislation to authorize the Attorney General to bring actions for school desegregation in the name of the United States in appropriate cases, as when economic coercion or threat of physical harm is used to deter persons from going to court to establish their rights.

It will use the new authority provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1960 to prevent obstruction of court orders.

Our continuing support of the President's proposal to extend federal aid and technical assistance to schools which in good faith attempt to desegregate.

We oppose the pretense of fixing a target date three years from now for the mere submission of plans for school desegregation. School districts could construe it as a three-year moratorium during which progress would cease, postponing until 1963 the legal

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

Its functions will be to provide assistance to communities, industries, or individuals in the implementation of constitutional rights in education, housing, employment, transportation, and the administration of justice.

In addition, the Democratic administration will use its full executive powers to assure equal employment opportunities and to terminate racial segregation throughout federal services and institutions, and on all government contracts. The successful desegregation of the armed services took place through such decisive executive action under President Truman.

[4. Housing]

Similarly the new Democratic administration will take action to end discrimination in federal housing programs, including federally assisted housing.

To accomplish these goals will require Executive Orders, legal actions brought by the Attorney General, legislation and improved congressional procedures to safeguard majority rule.

Above all, it will require the strong, active, persuasive and inventive leadership of the President of the United States.

The Democratic President who takes office next January will face unprecedented challenges. His administration will present a new face to the world. It will be a bold, confident, affirmative face. It will draw new strength from the universal truths which the founder of our party asserted in the Declaration of Independence to be "self-evident."

Emerson once spoke of an unending contest in human affairs, a contest between the party of hope and the party of memory.

For eight years America, governed by the party of memory, has taken a holiday from history.

As the party of hope it is our responsibility and opportunity to call forth the greatness of the American people.

In this spirit, we hereby rededicate ourselves to the continuing service of the rights of man—everywhere in America and everywhere else on God's earth.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

process to enforce compliance. We believe that each of the pending court actions should proceed as the Supreme Court has directed and that in no district should there be any such delay.

3. Employment

We pledge:

Continued support for legislation to establish a commission on equal job opportunity to make permanent and to expand with legislative backing the excellent work being performed by the President's Committee on Government Contracts.

Use of the full-scale review of existing state laws and of prior proposals for federal legislation to eliminate discrimination in employment now being conducted by the Civil Rights Commission for guidance in our objective of developing a federal-state program in the employment area; and

Special consideration of training programs aimed at developing the skills of those now working in marginal agricultural employment so that they can obtain employment in industry, notably in the new industries moving into the South.

4. Housing

We pledge:

Action to prohibit discrimination in housing constructed with the aid of federal subsidies.

5. Public Facilities and Services

We pledge:

Removal of any vestige of discrimination in the operation of federal facilities or procedures which may at any time be found;

Opposition to the use of federal funds for the construction of segregated community facilities;

Action to ensure that public transportation and other Government authorized services shall be free from segregation.

6. Legislative Procedure

We pledge:

Our best efforts to change present Rule 22 of the Senate and other appropriate congressional

(Continued on page 244)

Received At Our Desk

Studies in American Politics

By EDWARD G. JANOSIK

Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

ORDEAL OF THE PRESIDENCY. By DAVID CUSHMAN COYLE. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. 400 pages and index, \$6.00.)

While the American voter has ever relied on the ballot, his consistent acceptance of the verdict at the polls seems to have whetted his acerbity toward whomever of his countrymen happens to be president. Beginning with Washington and John Adams, all presidents have been the target of considerable abuse, some of it justified but most of it needlessly vicious. Thomas Jefferson and all presidents since have come into office with a knowledge of the indignities hurled upon their predecessors. In facing this, Jefferson commented on the scarcity of men capable of filling high office and declared that if qualified men allowed themselves to be driven out by liars, their enemies would be all the more prone to use so cheap a weapon. Ridiculed as an intellectual, as indecisive and without devotion to an orthodox religion, Jefferson was so devoted to the concept of freedom for the press that without bitterness he continued to do his public duty and await calmly the honorable place he was certain history would accord him.

Many presidents, apart from their policies and the pressures under which they functioned, were by nature or appearance or circumstance peculiarly susceptible to lampooning and vilification. This lively study has selected ten of our most pilloried Executives and, using the language of the critics wherever possible, has given us an inkling of the day to day abuse heaped upon the presidents by the people they served. The connecting narrative skillfully weaves the exercises in invective into

an exciting and unified account. Reproductions of cartoons, handbills, and other types of political propaganda appear in generous measure to illustrate the frightfulness of the presidential ordeal.

FRONT RUNNER: DARK HORSE. A POLITICAL STUDY OF KENNEDY AND SYMINGTON. By RALPH MARTIN AND ED TLAUT. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960. 473 pages, \$4.95.)

The front runner scrutinized here has won all but the ultimate prize, while the dark horse has virtually faded away. With the uncertainties of the 1960 Democratic Convention dispelled, the study of Symington is interesting chiefly as a contrast to the more successful Kennedy. Much of the detail on the Kennedy clan, their compulsion to win, their acknowledged fealty to a very formidable parent is not new. Neither is the view expressed not once but several times that without the impetus of money and family this front runner might well have proved an also ran.

It is a testimony to the astuteness of John F. Kennedy that one can find in his voting record little of the "mechanical" consistency of Stuart Symington. Kennedy voted against parity but for an amendment giving 90 per cent parity to small farmers and a sliding scale for big farmers. He introduced a bill providing for admission of immigrants previously separated from American relatives but retaining the national origins quota for other immigrants. He voted against the right to work bill.

The pages on Symington are now in the nature of anticlimax, but the information has at least the charm of greater novelty.

In the matter of integration, Air Force Secretary Symington gave more than token recognition. There is no question of his opposition to McCarthy tactics, but the element of timing is still inherent. As long as McCarthy involved only individual rights, Symington, like his colleagues, was silent. Only when the integrity of the Army was assailed did Symington unequivocally oppose McCarthy.

In this objective treatment unmistakable differences between the two men appear, although the technique of direct comparison is not employed. Kennedy is described as more personality than politician, a celebrity whose public image has been cast in an almost flawless mold, whose single minded devotion to the goal has already paid off and who, for all the record reveals, may well be the best or the worst of Presidents. To date, the harsh glare of publicity has revealed only a clever and polished man. It remains for time and events to show us whether the profile is illuminated by courage or marred by the shadow of political expediency.

THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET. By RICHARD F. FENNO, JR. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. 271 pages, notes and index, \$5.50.)

Richard Fenno's political study of one of the oldest institutions of American government is a valuable contribution to the literature of domestic politics. With shrewd insight the author analyzes the personal and political factors involved in the recruitment of Cabinets and the relationships which develop between the chief executive and his aides. Such variables as the personality of the President, his conception of the office he fills, the political and public status of the Cabinet members, and the interaction among them during their periods of service within the Cabinet are considered.

The documentation in this volume is impressive, although in a few instances the notes are not informative regarding the individuals to which reference is made. In view of the complexity and the fortuitous nature of the factors with which he dealt, Fenno wisely refrains from positing

rigid generalizations, confining himself to broad conclusions amply justified by the thoroughness of the study.

POLITICS U.S.A. EDITED BY JAMES M. CANNON. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960. 347 pages, \$4.95.)

Here is a collection of twenty-three essays on political topics, presented to the public as a practical guide to the winning of public office. While most of the essays are well done only those on "The Political Life" have any general application to the pursuit of American politics. To be sure, if one has in mind running for the office of President or a congressional seat, this volume might be of some assistance. Since most of the people looking for a prescription for political success have in mind more modest goals, it is unlikely that the portions of the book dealing with public opinion polls, public relations, television and other of the more lofty activities of large scale campaigns would be more than mildly informative. This limitation should not deter those persons interested in the operations of the experts in various fields of politics and the relative usefulness of their skills and advice.

THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE. By W. BURLIE BROWN. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960. 145 pages, index and bibliography, \$4.00.)

While the actual influence of the stereotyped campaign biography is open to question, its currency is undeniable. If we must investigate the folkways behind these books which bloom brightly on booksellers' shelves during presidential years, it is more bearable to adopt the irreverence found in this brief treatment. More often than not the campaign biographer must press his candidate into the outline calculated to win admirers and influence voters. Without destroying the truth he must temper it, and some writers are far luckier than others in their subjects.

It is the premise here that the campaign biography is a composite of the American President as the people would like him to be. In the campaign biographies published between 1824 and 1960 there is a basic similarity in presentation.

Every campaign biographer sprinkles his hero's adventures with morals and homilies. Usually biographers set the man above the party, claiming for him a purity unparalleled in the dirty business of politics. Since a presidential candidate is himself a politician of sorts this amounts to a reversal of the guilt by association theory. What we must hope then is that the human being chosen by the voters this November will strive tirelessly to live up to the heroic image he has allowed his biographers to claim for him.

MR. CITIZEN. BY HARRY S. TRUMAN.
(New York: Bernard Gies Associates, 1960. 314 pages, \$5.00.)

This is Harry S. Truman's own account of his return to private life peppered with some observations, mostly critical, of our current foreign and domestic dilemma. The prose is as flat as the Missouri fields which produced the man, and the book could easily be digested by a bright fifth grader. Mr. Truman's adversaries, and there were many within his own party, are painted in a range of gray to black, but Harry himself emerges as a bright figure clothed in truth and radiating good will. To himself he generally attributes the highest motives. His interesting rationale for opposing Adlai Stevenson and supporting Harriman at the 1956 Democratic Convention is that this step freed Stevenson from defending the Truman administrations and induced the always reluctant candidate to assume a more decisive stance. Despite similar political philosophies, it is quite likely that the temperamental differences of the two men have obscured from each the very real virtue of the other.

Here is Harry Truman, the "indomitable man of the people", combative, intensely partisan, but earnest, devoted to country, family, the Baptist Church, and the Democratic party. Provincial in tastes, he is possessed, nevertheless, of a marvelous sense of historical fitness. His shock at the burning of Millard Fillmore's and Abraham Lincoln's papers by their over-sensitive sons is unfeigned. His attentions to the Truman Library at Inde-

pendence stem not from ego but from devotion to the continuing reputation of the Republic. What arrogance he displays does not extend to the office of the presidency. He remains conscious of the awesomeness of that great trust and the responsibility developing upon the men who aspire to it.

THE INVISIBLE PRESIDENCY. BY LOUIS W. KOENIG. (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1960. 410 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.95.)

The bulk of this volume is a series of separate monographs on seven Americans who operated in the shadows of six markedly dissimilar Presidents. Beginning with Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury, Koenig gives us a memorable account of the machinations of the first presidential favorite as policy maker, ghost writer, meddler, and sometime patriot. Noteworthy is the fact that of the seven favorites here delineated only one, Van Buren, ever ascended into the presidency. Yet even Van Buren paid a price for his invisibility, for we are told that his inauguration was a matter of great public detachment, the American people reserving their enthusiasm for the outgoing Jackson whom Van Buren had served for eight arduous years.

In describing William Loeb Jr., secretary and friend to Teddy Roosevelt, the well-remembered Colonel House, aggressive Thomas (the Cork) Corcoran, the perennially ailing Harry Hopkins, and controversial Sherman Adams, the author provides informative studies. Still more revealing, however, is the attention given by indirection to the chief executives, for the operations of the advisers emphasize the strengths and shortcomings, the eccentricities and stratagems of the occupants of the throne itself. In a sense every President is the object of such juggling for favor by subordinates that only by devious effort and considerable selfishness can he avoid being possessed by them.

This is a book based on solid research but also capable of considerable popular appeal. Color and readability can certainly be claimed. Some objection can be taken to the editing, for there is repetition

of favorite phrases and some redundancy. Oversimplification can be justified on the grounds that the expanse is a large one. The author employs a smooth style, seasoned with anecdotes and salubrious adjectives.

MEET CALVIN COOLIDGE: THE MAN BEHIND THE MYTH. EDITED BY EDWARD CONNERY LATHEM. (Brattleboro: The Stephen Greene Press, 1960. 223 pages, \$4.50.)

This collection of writings on Calvin Coolidge by some 35 contributors is edited by Edward Connery Lathem. It is an

unpretentious volume, easily read in a single sitting and remarkable chiefly for its uncritical view of the late President. Among the contributors of vignettes are old friends such as Frank W. Stearns of Boston, political partisans like Herbert Hoover and Clarence Day, and the universally admired Grace Coolidge.

Walter Lippmann is the contributor who comes closest to explaining the impact of this New Englander on the national scene. Briskly and whimsically Lippmann writes of what he calls the Coolidge genius for inactivity and tells why political inertia exactly suited the needs of the land.

(Continued from page 240)

sional procedures that often make unattainable proper legislative implementation of Constitutional guarantees.

We reaffirm the Constitutional right to peaceable assembly to protest discrimination in private business establishments. We applaud the action of the business men who have abandoned discriminatory practices in retail establishments, and we urge others to follow their example.

Finally we recognize that civil rights is a responsibility not only of states and localities; it is a national problem and a national responsibility. The federal government should

take the initiative in promoting inter-group conferences among those who, in their communities, are earnestly seeking solutions of the complex problems of desegregation—to the end that closed channels of communication may be opened, tensions eased, and a cooperative solution of local problems may be sought.

In summary, we pledge the full use of the power, resources and leadership of the federal government to eliminate discrimination based on race, color, religion or national origin and to encourage understanding and good will among all races and creeds.

(Continued from page 236)

eight years his adherents have measured his success by popularity, not achievement. As George E. Allen concluded in his *Saturday Evening Post* article on Eisenhower in April, 1960:

The man who took office mistrusting politics and politicians will leave office having proved himself one of the most successful politicians ever to occupy the Presidency. He will leave the White House more popular than when he moved in, and this will be an unprecedented feat—a political feat.

By such standards of personal popularity Harding and Coolidge would rank among the most successful of American presidents; Washington, John Adams, Polk, Lincoln, and Wilson among the failures.

What matters far more in presidential success are, first, the intellectual alertness neces-

sary to penetrate contemporary movements and, second, the political craftsmanship required to translate victory into political action which meets the challenge of the times. Measured by its adaptation of the Democratic past to the conditions of the 1950's, the Eisenhower leadership had been a success, indeed an historical necessity. But the permanent judgment of that leadership will hinge on the President's achievement in influencing, within the limits of his power, the fundamental trends of this age toward the protection of this nation's well-being.

The recent past is interlude. The dilemmas of the 1950's await their disposal in some future time. Only in that future will men be permitted to judge finally whether the present leadership has prepared the nation mentally and physically for the cataclysm that is sure to come.

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of August, 1960, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

African States (See *Congo Republic*.)

Arab League Conference

Aug. 28—Foreign ministers of the Arab League countries end a conference outside Beirut.

Berlin Crisis

Aug. 31—An East German order temporarily closing traffic routes between West Germany and West Berlin becomes effective at midnight; the prohibition will continue through September 3. The action was instigated to prevent West Germans from attending a meeting of refugees from East Germany to be held in West Berlin.

The Allied powers in West Berlin protest East Germany's 5-day shut-down of traffic lines between West Germany and West Berlin.

Congo Crisis (See *Congo Republic*.)

Disarmament

Aug. 5—At the 3-power Geneva conference on nuclear weapons and testing, the Soviet Union officially rejects a Western proposal for an East-West pool of nuclear devices in a research program to develop controls for underground explosions.

Aug. 16—The U.N. Disarmament Commission meets. The U.S. offers to close down gradually its production plants for uranium and plutonium if the Soviet Union does the same. It offers also to set aside 30,000 kilograms of fissionable materials for peaceful uses if Moscow matches the offer. Both proposals are rejected by the Soviet Union.

Aug. 17—The U.S. tells the Disarmament Commission that it would scrap "sizeable numbers" of its nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union accepted its proposals, since uranium offered for peaceful uses would have to come from the present weapons stockpile.

Aug. 18—Ending its 3-day session, the Disarmament Commission votes unanimously to have the General Assembly call for "the earliest possible continuation" of the 10-

power negotiations that collapsed in June. Aug. 22—The Geneva East-West talks on a nuclear testing ban adjourn for 5 weeks.

European Free Trade Association (See *British Commonwealth, Great Britain*.)

Organization of American States (See *Cuba and Dominican Republic*.)

United Nations (See also *Disarmament and Congo Republic*.)

Aug. 21—The Soviet Union asks U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to include on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly meeting full debate on the U-2 and RB-47 plane incidents.

The United States formally asks that the agenda of the General Assembly include discussion of Soviet actions in Hungary.

Aug. 23—The Security Council votes to recommend that the General Assembly admit 8 new states to U.N. membership. These states, former French African colonies, are: Dahomey, Chad, Niger, the Voltaic Republic, Ivory Coast, the Congo Republic, Gabon and the Central African Republic. The Council has already recommended admission of Cameroon, Togo, Mali, Malagasy, Somalia and the Republic of the Congo.

Aug. 24—The Security Council votes to recommend the admission of Cyprus to the U.N.

BELGIUM (See also *Congo Republic*.)

Aug. 18—The House of Representatives gives the government a vote of confidence (115-82) on its Congo policy.

BOLIVIA

Aug. 6—Victor Paz Estenssoro, leader of the National Revolutionary Movement, assumes the presidency for the second time. He succeeds President Hernan Siles Zuazo, to whom Paz turned over the presidency in 1956.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE

Ghana

Aug. 8—In Accra, President Kwame Nkrumah

mah and Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba agree to set up a joint high command of African states to oust the Belgians from the Congo if the U.N. forces do not.

Aug. 10—Parliament authorizes the government to "commit Ghanaian troops to offensive military action against Belgian troops now in the Congo" and to mobilize Ghana's forces if necessary.

Aug. 18—The U.S. conditionally offers to lend Ghana \$30 million to help finance a \$164 million power project on the Volta River.

Aug. 24—Leading members of the Opposition United party are arrested under the preventive detention law, under which a person can be detained up to 5 years without a trial.

Parliament passes a bill empowering the government to impose press censorship and to restrict the importation of publications "contrary to public interest."

Aug. 26—Parliament amends the Industrial Relations Act to require all workers to join unions; strikes are outlawed. A pay increase of 14 cents daily is ordered for workers earning less than \$19 a week.

Aug. 28—*Tass* reveals that Ghana and the U.S.S.R. have signed economic and technical cooperation agreements in Moscow.

Great Britain

(See also *Germany, Federal Republic of.*)

Aug. 12—Diplomatic representatives of the countries in the 7-member European Free Trade Association visit the British Foreign Office to discuss the 2-day meeting in Bonn between Prime Minister Macmillan and West German Chancellor Adenauer. Representatives are urged to suggest the best methods of working out an agreement with the European Common Market.

India

Aug. 1—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru tells Parliament that after a week of discussions it has been decided to create India's sixteenth state, Nagaland, from a tribal area near the northeastern frontier.

Aug. 8—It is announced that the government has banned strikes in such public services as railroads and the post and telegraph department.

Aug. 12—The government tells Parliament that India has strongly protested to Peking

against a June 3 incursion by a Chinese patrol into Indian territory near the Tibetan border. New Delhi considers the Peking reply to its protest unsatisfactory.

Aug. 21—The police arrest 127 Sikhs as they leave their temple to demonstrate before the prime minister's home for a separate Sikh state.

Aug. 26—Parliament approves the expenditure of 102 billion rupees (\$21 billion) for the third Five Year Plan, starting in April.

Aug. 29—Finance Minister Morarji R. Desai tells Parliament that India has accepted a 500 million ruble credit from the U.S.S.R. (\$125 million) for use in India's third Five Year Plan.

Pakistan

Aug. 2—President Mohammed Ayub Khan issues an order, effective yesterday, stripping Karachi of its status as the nation's capital. Rawalpindi, an industrial center and military station of 250,000 people in the Himalayan foothills, is declared to be Pakistan's only capital.

Union of South Africa

Aug. 29—The National party opens a congress to begin a drive to make South Africa a republic.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Aug. 4—The Legislative Council approves a law barring racial discrimination in Northern Rhodesia's tearooms, cafes, restaurants, hotel dining rooms and lounges, and movie theaters.

The Nyasaland constitutional conference ends in London with agreement on the course of the territory's advance toward self-government under an African majority. Under the agreement, 100,000 Africans will be able to vote and share a greater responsibility for the administration of the government. There is no time limit for the drafting of a new constitution and no date set for independence.

Aug. 24—The Southern Rhodesian Parliament adopts a constitutional amendment increasing membership of the House from 30 to 50, thus assuring that Africans will sit in Parliament for the first time.

Kenya

Aug. 26—Kenya's African leader Tom

Mboya arrives in Tanganyika to discuss plans for an East African Federation with Kenyan Julius K. Nyerere.

Nigeria

Aug. 30—The Colonial Office reveals that Sir James Robertson will be first Governor General and Commander in Chief of Nigeria when it becomes independent October 1. Now Governor General of Nigeria under Britain, Sir James plans to serve until November.

Tanganyika

Aug. 30—Voting begins for 13 seats in the Legislative Council. The Tanganyika African National Union won 58 seats on nomination day without competition.

Aug. 31—It is reported in Dar Es Salaam that the Tanganyika African National Union candidates have won all 13 seats in the Council, according to preliminary returns.

BURMA

Aug. 22—Burmese Premier U Nu tells parliament that his administration has reduced tensions.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Aug. 1—Premier Chou En-lai says his country would like to arrange a "peace pact" with the United States. Such a treaty would include the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Western Pacific area.

Aug. 13—The government denounces as a "frame-up" a charge that it says the U.S. has made in reply to proposals for a peace pact. Chinese reports say the U.S. accuses China of aggression in the Taiwan Strait and repression in Tibet. These charges are false, say editorials in Chinese papers, since Taiwan and Tibet are China's own territory.

Aug. 14—A Yugoslav newspaper reports that its observers in Peking have noted a mass exodus of Soviet technicians from China and feel that this is indicative of a wide breach between the two countries.

Aug. 25—The official newspaper of the Communist party reports that floods, drought and insects have affected more than 25,000 square miles. The Communists rank 1960 as the worst year for natural calamities since they came to power in 1949.

CONGO REPUBLIC

(See also *British Commonwealth, Ghana*.)

Aug. 2—U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjöld says that U.N. forces will start moving into Katanga Province on August 6 and that Belgian forces will then immediately withdraw from all points occupied by these forces.

Aug. 3—Premier Moïse Tshombe warns that he will "regard U.N. intervention as an act of aggression" against Katanga and will oppose it by force.

Aug. 5—A 21-man U.N. advance party is barred from leaving its plane in Elisabethville, the Katanga capital. The U.N. cancels its plans to send troops into Katanga. Premier Patrice Lumumba of the Congo telegraphs Hammarskjöld that if U.N. troops do not enter Katanga on schedule he will be forced to revise his position.

Calling the "behavior" of the U.N. force command "very alarming," the Soviet Union calls for removal of the U.N. force unless all Belgian troops immediately leave the Congo and Katanga Province.

Aug. 6—Dag Hammarskjöld suggests that the Security Council give the Katanga government assurances that if it admits U.N. troops its claim to home rule will not be prejudiced.

Aug. 7—A *Reuters* report from Leopoldville says the party of Joseph Kasavubu, Chief of State of the Congo, calls for a loose federal government instead of the present strong central regime. It also gives Premier Lumumba a vote of no confidence.

Pravda and *Izvestia* accuse Dag Hammarskjöld of perfidy and "capitulation before the colonizers" in postponing the entry of U.N. troops into Katanga.

Aug. 8—As the Security Council resumes debate on the Congo situation, Hammarskjöld warns that a world war might result if the problem of the Congo is not solved. He intervenes in the debate to oppose a Soviet demand that U.N. forces be ordered to fight their way into Katanga.

The government of Leopoldville Province appeals to the U.N. to establish a federation of the 6 provinces to replace the present strong central government.

Aug. 9—The Security Council adopts a resolution calling on Belgium to withdraw its troops “immediately” from Katanga and backing Hammarskjöld’s plan to send in U.N. forces.

Premier Tshombe lists 16 conditions for the unopposed entry of U.N. forces.

Albert Kalonji, leader of a rival wing of Lumumba’s Congolese National Movement and a tribal chief in Kasai Province, proclaims the independence of what he calls the Mining State.

Aug. 10—Declaring there can be “no question of condition or agreement,” Hammarskjöld notifies Premier Tshombe that he will personally command 2 companies of Swedish U.N. forces arriving in Katanga. Tshombe replies that the group will be received in an orderly manner.

Aug. 12—Dag Hammarskjöld and 7 planes carrying troops land in Katanga.

In a second report to the Security Council on the Congo crisis, the Secretary General pledges that the U.N. force there will maintain a completely neutral role in the republic’s internal quarrels. He announces a wide program for assistance to the government, going far beyond technical assistance offered thus far to underdeveloped nations.

Bunche gives Premier Lumumba a memorandum from Dag Hammarskjöld interpreting the August 9 Security Council resolution as forbidding the use of U.N. troops on behalf of the central government to subdue Katanga.

Aug. 13—U.N. forces begin taking over police duties from Belgian troops in Katanga. Premier Lumumba of the Congo criticizes the use of white troops for the initial move into Katanga and accuses Dag Hammarskjöld of “discourtesy” because the Secretary General failed to consult with him during a stop-over in Leopoldville.

Aug. 14—The Belgian Army formally turns over control of Elisabethville to Swedish troops of the U.N. However, Belgian officials maintain their troops will not now totally evacuate 3 Congo bases that Belgium holds under a still unratified treaty.

Aug. 15—Following a bitter exchange of letters between Premier Lumumba and Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary General flies from the Congo to New York,

and asks the Security Council to meet to discuss the matter.

Aug. 16—Premier Lumumba decrees martial law for 6 months. The army and police move against Belgians and what are termed “Belgian spies disguised as U.N. personnel” in a series of arrests. The Premier gives Belgium 15 days to “restore” the “gold of the Congo” to his government or see all Belgian assets in the country seized.

Aug. 17—The Soviet Union officially informs Dag Hammarskjöld that it disagrees with his ruling that the U.N. force in the Congo cannot be used to “subdue” Katanga Province.

Aug. 18—Congolese soldiers beat a Canadian captain and manhandle 7 other Canadians at the Leopoldville airport. The Canadians are rescued by Ghanaian U.N. troops.

Aug. 21—An emergency session of the Security Council is held to discuss the Congo crisis.

Aug. 22—The Security Council declines to interfere with the policies of Hammarskjöld or to give him new instructions. The Secretary General begins work on plans to set up an advisory committee.

Aug. 23—It is reported that heavy fighting has broken out in Albertville, Katanga, between U.N. Mali troops and Balubakat tribesmen opposed to President Tshombe.

Aug. 24—Premier Lumumba sends Congo Army units to Luluabourg, capital of Kasai Province, which has announced its secession from the central republic.

Aug. 25—Premier Lumumba addresses the opening session of a pan-African conference meeting in Leopoldville at his invitation. Police break up a demonstration organized by the Association of the Lower Congo, known as Abako, which favors a Congo confederation.

Aug. 26—The Belgian radio reports that President Albert Kalonji of Kasai and President Tshombe of Katanga yesterday signed an agreement to federate their states. Premier Lumumba announces that Congo troops have taken up positions in Kasai.

Aug. 27—Congolese soldiers attack and injure 8 American fliers who landed a U.S. plane in Stanleyville; aboard the plane were U.N. personnel. U.N. personnel in

Stanleyville center are also assaulted by Congolese soldiers.

Lumumba, arriving in Stanleyville, declares that U.N. forces will have to withdraw following the departure of Belgian troops. Ralph J. Bunche protests that the Stanleyville airport incident violates the U.N.-Congo agreement on the U.N. peace force.

Bakwanga, capital of the newly declared Mining State in Kasai Province, is reported to have fallen to Congolese soldiers, according to Kasai Province President Albert Kalonji.

Aug. 28—It is announced by an army spokesman that Congolese troops are 20 miles outside of the border of Katanga Province, the secessionist state headed by Premier Moise Tshombe.

It is announced that the U.N. has completed its troop build-up in Katanga Province, and that Belgian soldiers could be withdrawn by the promised August 29 deadline.

Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba tells 2,000 Congolese in Stanleyville that they must welcome white men who come to work with them.

Aug. 29—U.N. Under Secretary Bunche announces that all Belgian combat troops will be evacuated from the Congo by "dawn tomorrow."

Bunche ends his mission to the Congo; he will be succeeded by Rajeshwar Dayal of India.

Aug. 30—It is reported by a U.N. spokesman that the last remaining Belgian troops have departed from Katanga Province. Some Belgian administrative and technical personnel remain at the former Belgian base, Kamina, in Katanga Province.

The 13-nation Pan-African Conference, meeting in Leopoldville at Lumumba's behest, urges Lumumba's cooperation with the U.N.

Aug. 31—Hammaraskjold reports to the U.N. Security Council on the situation in the Congo. The report discloses Hammaraskjold's protest over Belgian failure to complete total troop withdrawal and his request that they do so at once. An immediate Belgian reply declares that the 337 soldiers remaining at Kamina base lack transportation.

U.N. soldiers are sent to reinforce Ka-

mina base, which Premier Tshombe of Katanga Province threatens to destroy unless the U.N. guarantees that it will not be used for landing Congolese troops.

The 13 African states meeting in Leopoldville issue a closing communique approving U.N. action in the Congo, declaring African aid to the Congo will be given in cooperation with the U.N., and urging an African summit conference.

CUBA

Aug. 5—In a move to collect an additional 100 million pesos, the government raises taxes on profits, personal income and sales.

Aug. 7—The Roman Catholic Church in a pastoral letter condemns communism and expresses its concern about the close relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

In a memorandum submitted to the Organization of American States, the U.S. charges that the Cuban government is "in open league with the Soviet Union and Communist China."

Premier Castro announces the nationalization and seizure of nearly \$1 billion worth of American-owned property.

Aug. 8—The O.A.S. by a 20 to 1 vote overrides Cuban objections on a revised agenda for the forthcoming foreign ministers meeting. The group will consider "defense of the democratic American institutions against the subversive activities of any organization, government or their agents."

Aug. 11—Premier Castro attacks the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church for its "systematic provocations" against his rule.

Aug. 22—The O.A.S. conference of foreign ministers begins consideration of the Cuban issue.

The Soviet Ambassador, Sergei M. Kudrayavtzev, arrives in Havana.

Aug. 24—Premier Castro charges that the O.A.S. is an instrument of U.S. "imperialism."

Aug. 25—Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa tells the O.A.S. that the most serious problem facing the American republics is the threat of U.S. aggression. He denies that Cuban acceptance of Soviet military protection involves Communist intervention in the Western Hemisphere.

Aug. 28—Cuba walks out of the Conference of American Foreign Ministers. Shortly afterwards, the Conference approves the Declaration of San José condemning acceptance of any intervention in Latin America by an "extra-Continental power," i.e., Cuban acceptance of Soviet military assistance. Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa declares that his country faces a U.S. military threat and will therefore accept any assistance for its survival. The declaration results from Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's willingness to accept military protection from the U.S.S.R.

Aug. 30—Premier Castro rejects the San José declaration adopted by the O.A.S. He reaffirms his willingness to accept Soviet rocket protection against the U.S.

A statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, in which he accuses the U.S. of interfering in Cuban affairs, is broadcast. Gromyko rejects U.S. charges of Soviet interference there.

CYPRUS

Aug. 1—The parties supporting Archbishop Makarios win yesterday's elections to the House of Representatives. Not one of the 15 independent opposition candidates wins. The composition of the first Parliament will be: Patriotic Front, 30 seats; AKEL (Communist-controlled), 5; Turkish Cypriote Nationalists (supporters of Vice-President Fazil Kutchuk), 15 seats.

Aug. 16—Cyprus becomes independent of Great Britain. Archbishop Makarios is sworn in as President and Kutchuk as Vice-President.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, THE

Aug. 2—President Hector Trujillo Molina, brother of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo Molina, submits his resignation to Congress.

Aug. 3—Vice-President Joaquin Balaguer is sworn in as President.

Aug. 4—Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo is appointed to head the country's delegation to the 1960 session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Aug. 9—President Balaguer announces that safe-conduct passes and passports will be furnished to political refugees wishing to leave the country.

Aug. 14—President Balaguer issues a proclamation calling for "progressive democ-

ratization." He asks for participation in the program by all political interests and repeats an invitation to opposition factions to take part in the elections scheduled for December 15.

Aug. 15—A 5-nation investigating committee reports to the O.A.S. that it has conclusive evidence that the attempted June 24 assassination of President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela was linked to high Dominican officials.

Aug. 17—The foreign ministers of the O.A.S. convene in Costa Rica to consider the Cuban situation and the Venezuelan charges against the Dominican Republic.

Aug. 20—Dominican delegates walk out of the conference of American foreign ministers as it prepares to vote sanctions against the Dominican Republic.

Aug. 21—The 20 ministers present at the O.A.S. conference sign a resolution condemning the Dominican Republic for aggressive acts against Venezuela and recommending a collective break in diplomatic relations and application of "partial" economic sanctions.

Aug. 23—In a special message to Congress, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower asks Congress to end the Dominican Republic's "windfall" sugar quota in the U.S. market.

Aug. 26—The U.S. breaks off diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic.

ECUADOR

Aug. 31—At midnight, President José Maria Velasco Ibarra's fourth presidential term begins.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

Aug. 22—The rebel provisional government in Tunis issues a communiqué ending any hope of an early resumption of direct negotiations with France. The rebels call for the internationalization of the Algerian issue through a U.N. referendum.

FRENCH COMMUNITY, THE

Chad

Aug. 11—Chad becomes independent.

Aug. 12—Premier Francois Tombalbaye becomes President by a unanimous vote of the Legislative Assembly.

Aug. 25—It is reported that Vice Premier

Gabriel Lisette has been removed from office while absent on a visit to Israel.

Congo, Republic of the

Aug. 15—President and Premier Fulbert Youlou proclaims the independence of the Congo Republic from France. (See also *Israel*, Aug. 28.)

Ivory Coast

Aug. 7—The Ivory Coast proclaims its independence from France.

Mali Federation, The

Aug. 19—The Premier of the Mali Federation, Modibo Keita, who is also Premier of Sudan, proclaims a state of emergency and cancels the defense and external security powers of Mamadou Dia, Premier of Senegal.

Aug. 20—The Senegalese government announces its withdrawal from the Mali Federation. Senegalese forces take control of Dakar.

Aug. 22—Premier Keita is expelled from the Republic of Senegal and returns to Bamako, capital of Sudan. In a radio speech he threatens to recognize the Algerian provisional government.

Aug. 23—Premier Dia arrives in Paris to confer with President de Gaulle. Premier Keita warns that French recognition of the secession of Senegal from the Mali Federation would have "extremely grave" international consequences.

Aug. 25—Premier Keita announces that he has asked U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjöld for a Security Council meeting on the break-up of the federation.

Voltaic Republic

Aug. 5—The Upper Volta proclaims its independence from France as the Voltaic Republic. It is a member of the Council of the Entente with Dahomey, the Niger Republic and the Ivory Coast. Earlier in the week the first 2 received their independence from France.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (WEST)

Aug. 2—A government spokesman, reporting on the weekend talks between Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French President Charles de Gaulle, says both men agree that a reform of Nato is needed.

Aug. 10—British Prime Minister Harold

Macmillan arrives in Bonn for 2 days of personal talks with Chancellor Adenauer.

Aug. 11—Britain and West Germany agree to seek a compromise formula to bridge the differences between the European Economic Community and the rival European Free Trade Association.

Aug. 12—In separate notes, Britain, France and the United States reject Soviet protest notes of June 30 claiming that members of the West German armed forces are being recruited in West Berlin.

Aug. 17—In the sharpest note ever dispatched to the Soviet government from Bonn, West Germany demands that the Soviet Union stop using "dangerous political methods" to arouse world unrest and tension. The note is in reply to a Soviet protest, on July 19, against German interest in acquiring the Polaris missile.

Aug. 24—The leadership of the Social Democratic party nominates Willy Brandt, mayor of West Berlin, to lead its election fight in September, 1961, against Chancellor Adenauer's Christian Democratic party.

HAITI

Aug. 16—The Senate votes to give President Francois Duvalier full economic powers to rule by fiat for the next 6 months.

Aug. 17—The Chamber of Deputies rejects a decree to give President Duvalier wide economic powers. After this surprise move, a special session of the National Assembly grants the President full economic powers, including the authority to rule by decree, establish taxes and award pensions, remunerations and subsidies.

INDONESIA

Aug. 13—The National Planning Council announces the general outlines of an 8-year development plan that will require more than \$1 billion in "economic co-operation" from abroad.

Aug. 15—President Sukarno appoints 61 men to serve on a governing council of the National Front, which he heads. The appointments include Communist, Nationalist and Muslim politicians, but no opposition leaders. The President also announces the appointment of a 609-member Provisional People's Congress, which he terms the nation's highest authority.

Aug. 17—The President announces that he has severed diplomatic relations with the Netherlands in retaliation against The Hague's refusal to yield Netherlands New Guinea, claimed by Indonesia.

The President orders the dissolution of two opposition anti-Communist parties. The parties are the Muslim Masjumi, which ran second in the 1955 parliamentary elections, and the Socialist party, which ran eighth.

Aug. 28—It is announced that a ban on Communist party activity in South Sumatra and Jambi provinces was proclaimed last night.

IRAN

Aug. 13—The National party, led by Premier Manouchehr Eghbal, appears to be winning a sizable parliamentary majority in the country's first 2-party elections. The People's party, led by Assadollah Alam, has been attacking the government largely on economic grounds. Voting will continue throughout the month in various provinces.

Aug. 27—Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi tells newsmen that he is not completely satisfied that current elections to the lower house of parliament (Majlis) have been "free and fair." The Shah places the blame on Iran's faulty and outdated electoral system.

Aug. 28—Premier Manouchehr Eghbal, whose National party is winning a strong majority of parliamentary seats, offers to resign.

Aug. 29—The Shah accepts Eghbal's resignation. He names Jaffar Sharif-Imani, Minister of Mines and Industries in Eghbal's Cabinet, to form a new government.

Aug. 31—The electoral council resigns. Vote counting, formerly halted elsewhere, stops in Teheran also.

ISRAEL

Aug. 3—Israel and Argentina announce that the "incident" concerning Adolf Eichmann has been settled.

Aug. 4—The World Bank agrees to lend Israel \$27.5 million for the construction of a new Mediterranean harbor at Ashdod.

Aug. 8—The Minister of Justice asks the Knesset to pass a measure to enable a

West German lawyer to defend Eichmann in an Israeli court.

Aug. 21—Premier B. P. Koirala of Nepal concludes a 9-day state visit to Israel. Israel agrees to send experts to Nepal to draw up plans of technical assistance and to organize joint economic enterprises.

Aug. 28—Talks between Israeli President Itzhak Ben-Zvi and Republic of the Congo Premier Fulbert Youlou end. A joint statement announces agreement on technical cooperation; Israel will train French Congolese leaders.

ITALY

Aug. 3—The Senate gives Premier Amintore Fanfani and his Christian Democratic government a vote of confidence.

Aug. 5—The Chamber of Deputies votes its confidence in the new cabinet by the largest majority obtained by any government since 1948.

JORDAN

Aug. 29—Premier Hazza Majali and 10 others are killed by 2 time bomb explosions in a government building. Chief of the Royal Cabinet Bahjat Talhuni is named the new premier by King Hussein.

Aug. 30—King Hussein accuses the U.A.R. in particular Syrian officials, of involvement in the assassination of Premier Majali.

Aug. 31—Premier Bahjat Talhuni, who succeeds Majali, holds his first official Cabinet meeting.

KOREA, SOUTH

Aug. 2—The government reports that demonstrations against the arrests of persons involved in the July 29 election disorders have subsided. It is disclosed that 609 persons were arrested in 19 localities for having interfered with ballot counting, and that new elections will be held in these areas on August 13.

Aug. 7—The split in the ranks of the successful Democratic party increases when the "old guard" of the party boycotts a party caucus to designate a president and a premier.

Aug. 8—The newly elected legislature convenes.

Aug. 12—A joint session of both houses of

the legislature elects Posun Yun, co-leader of the Democratic party, as President of South Korea.

Aug. 17—By a one vote margin, the National Assembly rejects Do Yun Kim as premier, the nominee of President Posun Yun.

Aug. 19—By a margin of 2 votes, John M. Chang, leader of the "new faction" of the Democratic party, is elected premier.

LAOS

Aug. 9—An army coup under the direction of Captain Kong Le, is successful in the capital city of Vientiane.

Aug. 11—Captain Kong Le calls on Premier Somsanith to resign and asks the former Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, "to lead our country on the path of neutrality."

Aug. 12—Pro-Communist rebels declare their "full support" for the Vientiane coup.

Aug. 13—The National Assembly votes no confidence in the government of Premier Somsanith. Four deputies leave for Luang Prabang to inform King Savang Vathana of the vote and to ask that the premier resign.

Aug. 15—King Savang Vathana accepts the resignation of the Cabinet and asks Prince Souvanna Phouma to form a new government.

Aug. 16—The new premier presents his cabinet to the National Assembly and declares his policy will be to end the internal discord and to pursue a neutral policy in foreign affairs.

Aug. 17—The National Assembly unanimously endorses the government of Souvanna Phouma.

Royal troops, led by Major General Phoumi Nosavan, are reported to be ready to open civil war against Captain Kong Le.

Aug. 18—Captain Kong Le turns over administrative authority to the new government.

Aug. 19—The military commander at Luang Prabang arrests an envoy from Vientiane sent to obtain the King's approval of the new government of Prince Souvanna Phouma; the Premier-designate must be approved and invested by the king.

Aug. 20—Five battalions of loyal Laotian troops move toward the rebel center of Vientiane.

Aug. 21—Tension eases as loyal troops halt their march on the rebel capital. Prince Souvanna Phouma announces that General Phoumi Nosavan, head of the loyal forces, has agreed to General Quane Rathikone's resumption of the post of commander of the armed forces. This would restore the high command that existed before the coup.

Aug. 29—Differences between political leaders in Laos, which became acute on August 9 when Captain Kong Le took control of Vientiane, are settled. King Savang Vathana asks Prince Souvanna Phouma to form a new government. The Prince declares that he will broaden the base of his government, while retaining the 6 ministers appointed at the time of Kong Le's Vientiane coup.

Aug. 30—Neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma announces his cabinet, which includes 5 pro-Western leaders. Captain Kong Le approves of the new cabinet.

Aug. 31—Prince Souvanna Phouma's coalition government is approved by the National Assembly. Phouma departs to meet with Captain Kong Le to "explain" his cabinet line-up.

LEBANON

Aug. 2—Premier Saeb Salaam announces the members of his 18-man cabinet, the largest in Lebanese history. It will replace the interim government of former Premier Ahmed Dauk. Salaam will be interior minister as well as premier.

PANAMA

Aug. 19—The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development grants a \$7.2 million loan to Panama to help finance new farm-to-market roads.

PERU

Aug. 19—Premier Pedro G. Beltran asks both houses of Congress for quick passage of enabling legislation for his economic development program. He announces a series of bills to be introduced to set conditions for the \$50 million U.S. development loan and to establish administrative bodies for the low-cost housing and land colonization programs.

TURKEY

Aug. 25—Ten members of Lieutenant General Cemal Gursel's non-party provisional cabinet are relieved of their duties by the National Union Committee.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS

Aug. 9—The government makes public the official indictment of Francis Gary Powers, pilot of the U-2 plane downed May 1 over Soviet territory, as a U.S. spy.

Aug. 10—The Soviet Union accuses the U.S. air attaché in Moscow of engaging in illicit intelligence activities and orders him to leave the country immediately.

Premier Nikita Khrushchev hints that he might head the Soviet delegation to a debate on disarmament in the U.N. General Assembly.

Aug. 11—The government accuses the U.S. of using tourists as espionage agents and announces it is expelling a tourist immediately on spy charges.

Aug. 12—The Moscow press reports that another U.S. student on tour in the U.S.S.R. has been accused of hostile and provocative activities and has been ordered to leave the country.

Aug. 16—The government grants permission to the family of Francis Powers and its advisers to attend his espionage trial.

Aug. 17—Francis Powers pleads guilty before a high military tribunal to charges of having flown an intelligence mission over the Soviet Union.

Aug. 18—Francis Powers blames "the people who sent me" for the major political consequences of his May 1 U-2 flight over the Soviet Union.

Aug. 19—Francis Powers is found guilty of espionage for the U.S. and sentenced to 10 years' loss of liberty.

The Soviet Union launches an earth satellite weighing more than 5 tons. On board are experimental animals, including 2 dogs.

Aug. 20—After 17 orbits and 437,500 miles in 24 hours, the Soviet satellite lands safely with its animal passengers in "satisfactory condition."

Aug. 23—Vyacheslav M. Molotov, ambassador to Outer Mongolia, is appointed to the post of representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Aug. 1—The U.S. agrees to supply the U.A.R. with an additional \$75.2 million worth of wheat and flour. This brings to more than \$330 million the total amount of U.S. loans and grants made to Egypt and Syria since 1952.

Aug. 7—A conference of Muslim leaders meeting in Cairo strongly criticizes the Shah of Iran for his *de facto* recognition of Israel. The conference accuses the Shah of violating the teachings of the Koran.

Aug. 27—The Soviet Union signs an agreement providing for a \$225 million loan to finance the second stage of the U.A.R.'s Aswan dam project.

UNITED STATES

The Economy

Aug. 11—The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System authorizes 4 of the 12 Federal Reserve banks to reduce their discount rates from 3.5 to 3 per cent.

Aug. 14—The government reports that personal income rose to record levels last year in all but 3 states. For the whole country, personal income totaled \$381 billion, up \$23 billion or 6 per cent from 1958.

Aug. 25—The July consumer price index reaches a new record of 126.6 per cent.

Foreign Policy

Aug. 9—The U.S. formally becomes a member of the International Development Association, an affiliate of the World Bank.

Aug. 10—The Senate by a vote of 66-21 ratifies the Antarctic Treaty.

Aug. 13—The U.S. orders the expulsion of the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy on the ground that he paid an American citizen to seek a government job.

Aug. 19—It is reported in Washington that the government has decided not to permit other countries to buy sugar from Cuba with funds loaned by the U.S.

Aug. 23—The President nominates James J. Wadsworth to be the U.S. delegate to the U.N., succeeding Henry Cabot Lodge, whose resignation becomes effective on September 3.

Aug. 27—It is revealed in Washington that the U.S. has protested the action of the "Israel Boycott Office" of the Kuwait Directorate of Customs in sending letters to

American business firms threatening to blacklist firms dealing with Israel.

Government

Aug. 8—The Senate reconvenes for its special summer session and receives a message from Eisenhower. The President demands that the resumed Congress remain in session as long as required to pass the 21 items of unfinished business set forth in his legislative agenda of last May.

Aug. 9—The Senate votes to table a civil rights measure introduced by Minority Leader Everett Dirksen.

Aug. 15—The scheduled opening session of the House is adjourned because of lack of a quorum.

Aug. 22—The Senate Judiciary Committee approves Harold Russell Tyler as assistant attorney general to head the civil rights division.

Aug. 23—By an almost exact party line vote, 67 to 28, the Senate defeats a Republican measure providing for a contributory insurance plan for medical care for the aged. The Senate then defeats, 51 to 44, the Kennedy-backed "Social Security approach." It passes, 89 to 2, a bill providing for federal participation in state relief medical payments to the needy aged.

Aug. 24—Eisenhower signs a bill to permit radio and television debates by the 2 major presidential candidates.

Aug. 25—Senate and House conferees agree on a medical care plan based on federal help to state relief programs.

Aug. 26—Ignoring an urgent plea from the President, both houses of Congress pass a foreign aid appropriation bill that is \$559 million under the original request.

Aug. 30—The White House receives a bill penalizing broadcasters whose radio and television shows deceive the public.

At a public hearing, Representative Oren Harris, chairman of the House Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight, charges that there is evidence of "irregularities and even possible corruption" in trucking regulations set by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Aug. 31—The White House receives 3 housing measures added as stop gap riders to a joint resolution to prevent current programs from running out of money.

Both houses authorize \$600 million in

Latin American aid and \$65 million in additional foreign aid funds.

Labor

Aug. 19—Eleven non-operating railroad unions, representing 500,000 off-train employees, settle their 15-month wage dispute with the nation's railroads. The agreement provides for a 2 per cent pay increase and a 2 per cent increase in fringe benefits.

Aug. 26—The National Labor Relations Board declares the Kohler Company guilty of prolonging a 6-year-old strike by unfair labor practices. The Wisconsin plumbing-fixture plant is ordered to rehire up to 1,700 strikers discharged in 1954.

Military Policy

Aug. 4—The X-15 rocket plane makes the fastest manned flight on record—2,150 miles per hour.

Aug. 8—The President announces he has ordered an increase in military strength "as a result of a continuous appraisal of changing Communist tactics and attitudes." He does not say whether he will seek more defense appropriations or whether he will spend all of the \$40 billion—\$600 million over the President's request—that Congress has appropriated for defense.

Aug. 11—The Air Force successfully recovers a 300-pound capsule ejected from a Discoverer satellite after the capsule falls into the water north of the Hawaiian Islands.

Aug. 12—A test pilot rides the X-15 rocket ship to a record height of nearly 25 miles.

The United States places in orbit a balloon satellite 100 feet in diameter weighing 136 pounds. Designed to further research in world communications, Echo I bounces a recorded message by President Eisenhower between stations in California and New Jersey.

Aug. 15—The President names Army Chief of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; he succeeds General Nathan Twining.

Aug. 17—Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates creates a central planning group to assign nuclear weapons to enemy targets in case of war. General Thomas Powers, chief of the Strategic Air Command, will direct the new interservice group, with a Navy officer as his deputy.

- Aug. 19—The Air Force recovers a capsule ejected at 10,000 feet.
- Aug. 30—A 98-foot Titan is fired successfully 5000 miles down the Atlantic firing range from Cape Canaveral.

Politics

- Aug. 1—Senator John F. Kennedy joins 9 Democratic party leaders from the Middle West in attacking the Vice-President's recently expressed views on farm policy. The Democratic presidential nominee accuses Nixon of a "betrayal of the Benson farm program which he helped to write."
- Aug. 2—Nixon opens his presidential campaign tour with "kick-off" festivities in his home town of Whittier, California. He says that a stronger America should be the theme for both parties.

Former President Harry Truman pledges his active support of Kennedy.

- Aug. 4—Senator Estes Kefauver, campaigning on the policies of the national Democratic party platform, wins the Tennessee senatorial primary race by a 2 to 1 margin over Judge Andrew Taylor, campaigning for conservative and segregationist policies.

Kennedy names Governor Herschel C. Loveless of Iowa as his principal farm policy adviser.

- Aug. 11—Representative Chester Bowles of Connecticut withdraws as a candidate for re-election to Congress to devote full time to the presidential campaign.

The Louisiana Democratic State Central Committee votes 51 to 49 to put on the ballot a slate of presidential electors pledged to Kennedy.

- Aug. 15—The South Carolina Democratic Convention endorses a slate of presidential electors pledged to Kennedy.

The Mississippi State Democratic Convention denounces the national party's platform and candidates and endorses a slate of independent presidential electors.

- Aug. 20—The Vice President releases a 30-page analysis of the meaning of communism.

- Aug. 21—Kennedy and his vice-presidential running mate, Senator Lyndon Johnson, attend a Des Moines rally of midwest farmers and key politicians. Kennedy tells the group that Nixon is a student and collaborator of Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson.

- Aug. 26—The executive council of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. endorses the Democratic presidential ticket.

- Aug. 29—Nixon enters the Walter Reed Army Medical Center for treatment of a staphylococcus infection of his knee.

- Aug. 31—Nixon and Kennedy agree to meet in 3 and possibly 4 television campaign appearances.

Segregation

- Aug. 4—A federal judge orders Houston, Texas, to integrate its schools a grade each year for 12 years, starting in the fall of 1960.

- Aug. 6—By a 4 to 1 margin, voters of Dallas, Texas, reject school integration. Regardless of the voting outcome, however, the federal district court has ordered school integration in September, 1961.

- Aug. 15—The Virginia Pupil Placement Board assigns Negro students to white schools in Richmond and Roanoke.

- Aug. 17—Governor Jimmie Davis of Louisiana assumes control of all New Orleans public schools to prevent integration scheduled for next month.

- Aug. 26—Louisiana's attorney general walks out of a federal court hearing on New Orleans' integration after his motion for a 5-day continuance is rejected.

- Aug. 27—Federal judges enjoin Louisiana officials from blocking plans for New Orleans public school integration; State Attorney General Jack P. F. Gremillion is cited for contempt.

Some 50 persons are injured in Jacksonville, Florida, in a racial clash.

- Aug. 30—A federal district judge grants a 10-week delay to the New Orleans School Board before the Board must comply with a federal court order to admit Negro students to all-white schools.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rules that the Dollarway, Arkansas, School District has used the Arkansas pupil assignment law illegally to maintain racial segregation.

- Aug. 31—In New York City, the Board of Education announces that altered zoning regulations will permit Negro and Puerto Rican children to enroll in integrated or predominantly white schools in various sections of the city.

These **CURRENT HISTORY** issues are available for quantity purchase.

Use this check list to order for your classes . . .

Problems in World Affairs

- Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (9/57)
- The World of Islam (6/57)
- France in Africa (2/58)
- West Europe Today and Tomorrow (11/56)
- France's Foreign Policy (5/55)
- Report on Germany (4/56)
- Canada (7/55)
- The Mediterranean World (8/55)
- Great Britain: Education at Mid-Century (9/58)
- The Far East in the Free World (7/56)
- Tensions in the British Community (6/58)
- The Soviet Union since Stalin (1/56)
- Problems of American Foreign Policy (3/56)
- India Between East and West (3/59)
- Tensions in East-Central Europe (4/59)
- France and the Fifth Republic (5/59)
- New States of Africa (7/59)
- Government and Labor Abroad (8/59)
- American Foreign Policy and the Communist World (10/59)
- Russian Foreign Policy and the Western World (11/59)
- Communist China as a World Power (12/59)
- West Germany as a World Power (1/60)
- U. S. Military Policy and World Security (4/60)

- Latin America in Revolution (3/60)
- Progress in the Middle East (5/60)
- The U. N. and Free World Security (6/60)
- World Federalism and Free World Security (8/60)
- Nato and Free World Security (9/60)
- Russia and Continuing Coexistence (coming 11/60)
- China and Continuing Coexistence (coming 12/60)
- West Europe and Continuing Coexistence (coming 1/61)

Problems of American Democracy

- United States Through Foreign Eyes (12/56)
- Dilemma of Empire (12/55)
- American Farm Leaders (6/55)
- Disarmament and Defense (10/57)
- Changing American Politics (8/56)
- Public Power in the U. S. (5/58)
- Integration: The South's Historic Problem (5/57)
- Education in Crisis (9/55)
- Security in a Free Society (10/55)
- Immigration and the American Ideal (11/55)
- Government and Labor in the U. S. (9/59)
- The American Economy (7/60)
- The American Presidency in the Last Half Century (10/60)

Our Special Group Rates . . .

Because these studies are so helpful, we are now offering them at special reduced rates for group use:

In orders of 5 or more copies of different issues, copies are available at 65¢ each; in orders of 5 or more copies of the same issue, at 50¢ each; 10 or more of the same issue, at 35 cents; 30 or more of the same issue, at 30¢ each; 100 or more of the same issue, at 25¢ a copy. Single copy price, 85¢. Special discounts on orders over 200.

We also offer reduced rates for student subscriptions: in orders of 10 subscriptions or more, your students may subscribe for 9 months at \$3.15; or for 12 months at \$4.20; in orders of 30 or more, our 9 month rate is \$2.70; 12 months, \$3.60; in orders of 100 or more, our 9 month rate is \$2.25 and our 12 month rate is \$3.00. The cost of a single subscription is \$5.25 for 9 months; \$7.00 a year. See our special introductory offer on reverse side.

CURRENT HISTORY

1822 Ludlow Street

Philadelphia 3, Penna.

CH 1060-3

I understand that I may order copies of these coordinated issues in quantity at special reduced rates. Please send me the issues I have indicated, in the quantities I have marked.

Name ☐ Check enclosed ☐ Bill me
Address ☐ 1 Year \$7 ☐ 2 Years \$13
City State plus 3 free issues plus 3 free issues

Keep Up To Date!

See what a **CURRENT HISTORY** subscription offers YOU!

****Month after month, our timely studies will keep you informed on vital topics.**

INTERESTING and KNOWLEDGEABLE REPORTS will round out your background information on such crucial matters as . . .

**FREE WORLD SECURITY
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN
POLICY**

**RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
THE COLD WAR*
THE UNITED NATIONS*
WEST GERMANY AS A WORLD
POWER**

Subscribe now to **CURRENT HISTORY**. **EXCLUSIVE AND ORIGINAL STUDIES** will provide you with invaluable, factual material that you can rely on for accuracy. Nowhere is such material duplicated. Nowhere are similar studies available at such low cost. **CURRENT HISTORY's** continuing reference volumes are *one-of-a-kind!*

COORDINATED ISSUES contain seven or eight articles each month devoted to a pertinent topic in world affairs. Each of our contributors is a specialist in his field, who brings you his first-hand knowledge, background, impressions. Each article in an issue focuses on a different aspect of the subject for complete coverage of the complex problems of today's world.

CHRONOLOGY — The Month in Review offers a day-by-day account of the important events in all the countries of the world, both large and small. This is the only monthly chronology of its kind being published in the United States.

DOCUMENTS — Our documents section reprints the texts of important treaties, laws, diplomatic notes, speeches, to provide original source material. See how this material increases your understanding of how history is made.

BOOK REVIEWS — Comments on current books of interest to our readers bring you concise notes evaluating the latest publications in the field of history and politics.

AS A SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY BONUS, we will give you 3 free issues. Today, as Americans travel throughout the world, their need for background information on the problems of our century has increased one-hundred-fold. Concerned citizens everywhere are awakening to the fact that they must be prepared to meet ever-growing demands upon their insight and understanding.

* Become acquainted with our continuing 3-issue series on **FREE WORLD SECURITY** (on the U.N., June; World Federalism, August; and Nato, September). Watch for our second series on **THE COLD WAR** — with 3 issues on Russia, China and West Europe — coming this fall.

3 FREE ISSUES

Your subscription to **CURRENT HISTORY** will include three coordinated studies **FREE**—Chosen from our List of Available Issues (see reverse side)—plus the next 12 issues for the usual yearly subscription price. Don't forget to select your 3 free gift copies from our list on the other side of this cover!

A GIFT FOR YOU WORTH \$2.55 *Sign up today!*

From **CURRENT HISTORY** • 1822 Ludlow Street • Phila. 3, Pa.

Name Address
City Zone State

Send me the following 3 gift copies:

☐ 12 months at \$7 plus 3 free issues ☐ 24 months at \$13 plus 3 free issues ☐ Bill me
☐ Check enclosed

Add 25¢ for Canada; 75¢ for foreign, including the Philippines.

CH 1060-4